

Doctoral Programme in Political, Societal and Regional Change
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**Sense and Sensibility – Emotions and Polarised
Politics of NATO in the post-Cold War Finnish Foreign
and Security Policy Debate**

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Paper to be presented at the
Conference of Emotions, Populism and Polarised Politics, Media and Culture
August 19–20 2019,
University of Helsinki

ABSTRACT

Finland's relationship and possible future NATO membership (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has been a persistent and evocative policy issue in the Finnish national security and defense policy debate during the post-Cold War period. Whilst the official government foreign and security policy line has outlined a deepening of relations with the alliance since Finland joined the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) (1994), not all stakeholders in the foreign policy debate have agreed on the government policy but voiced their differing views on the policy rhetoric. In fact, over the years the policy rhetoric over NATO has become more and more polarized.

In this paper, I study how the rhetoric of NATO has developed in Finland as an issue of polarized national politics. My empirical data consists of some 900 speeches (N=915) held by Finnish Members of Parliament addressing the NATO question as discussed in the corresponding parliamentary debates of the Government White Papers on foreign and security policy between 1995 and 2017. In particular, I will discuss and examine the role of emotions, and *pathos* related policy rhetoric in political speeches, by focusing on the polarized views of the policy issue debated. Furthermore, I analyse the changes in the relative distribution of standpoints within eight major political parties represented in the Finnish Parliament in relation to NATO.

My paper is an empirical study case study of political polarization of national policy debate, in which emotions have had a strong role to play. The study results are based on my PhD-thesis on "Rhetoric of NATO in the Finnish Security and Defence policy debate" (*Nato-retoriikka Suomen turvallisuuspoliittisessa keskustelussa*), which I will defend at the University of Helsinki August 23rd 2019.

1 INTRODUCTION

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) is a politically dubious topic in the Finland. For the Finns it has been difficult to openly talk about NATO, as it raises many fundamental questions about Finland's foreign and security policy objectives as well as identity. In the NATO debate, Finland as a nation state and Finns as a nationhood, are required to question who they are, where they are coming from and where they are going? The arguments for and against of joining the alliance have been at the heart of the Finnish NATO debate. For this reason, the Finnish foreign and security policy debate on NATO has often been considered as a polarized issue of policy debate, in which two opposing and ideologically distant camps are engaging in discursive battle, with the aim of convincing the audience of their views. Is it possible to engage in the NATO debate, without being framed as the most prominent advocate of joining the alliance, or its' most critical opponent? And does participation in the polarized policy debate of NATO necessarily translate into more polarized political stance and views?

The first objective of this paper is to study, the extent to which the NATO question constitutes a polarizing issue of national foreign and security policy debate? Secondly, this paper seeks to discover, whether polarization leads to a certain kind of policy rhetoric amongst the "ideological" NATO speaker types. Does polarized policy rhetoric, in which opposing ideological views are being expressed, also attract other than *logos*, such as *pathos*-related policy rhetoric, appealing to people's emotions? In this paper, my aim is to demonstrate, that polarization of policy views, indeed, correlates with emotional appeal in a political speech. Can we then say that politicians as rhetoricians are demonstrating a lack of sense in their political speeches or are they giving back to sensibility?

Thirdly, the aim of this paper is to examine, whether the polarizing division between NATO-related speaker types is reflected on the level of party polarization (Layman & Carsey & Horowitz, 2006)? Basing my analysis on some 900 speeches held by the Finnish Members of the Parliament between 1995 and 2017 (N=915), I will analyse four major ideological speaker types in relation to the polarized policy issue of NATO within eight major political parties present at the Finnish Parliament. Lastly in my concluding remarks, I will raise the question for a further research, whether we can argue, that polarization takes forms of populist policy rhetoric?

2 FINLAND'S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO

During the Cold War Finland avoided establishing a relationship with NATO, fearful of the reactions it was likely to cause by its Eastern neighbor. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Finland finally saw its opportunity to establish political dialogue with the alliance. Other contributing factors to Finland's decision to join the PfP were Russia's willingness to develop co-operation with the alliance, NATO-EU relationship as well as the parallel enlargement processes between the two organizations (Ferreira-Pereira 2006, 108). In the post-Cold War period, as a result, Finland has demonstrated opposite foreign policy behavior and has aimed to deepen the institutional relationship with NATO (Forsberg 2002, 246; Blombergs 2016, 30). The first steps of establishing an institutional relationship between Finland and NATO were taken in 1991, as Finland joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). A few years later (1994) Finland also joined the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and started participating in NATO military structures, exercises and operations (Pyykönen 2016, 38–39). Creating an image of international peace contributor was important to Finland since the early years of PfP-co-operation, as Finland willingly contributed to the NATO-led crisis management operations (Browning 2008, 249–250).

Finland's willingness to enforce co-operation with NATO has deepened over the post-Cold War years. Whereas the first PARP goals clearly focused on enhancing interoperability in the crisis management operations, during the 2010s, Finland has chosen to maximize the co-operation with NATO by deepening many of the its partnership goals and moving even closer to the actual allied members (Cotter 2013, 447). A clear indication of more active involvement is Finland's engagement in the NATO Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (EOP) (Lohela 2016, 14; Kuusela 2016, 264). In the field of crisis management, further steps have been taken to increase Finland's involvement in the NATO Response Forces (NRF), and it has been estimated that Finland's involvement is likely to increase in the future (Ulkoasianministeriö 2016, 45).

A final, and maybe the most important question in defining Finland's involvement with NATO, however, relates to the question of potential NATO membership. During the post-Cold War period, Finland redefined its foreign and security policy discourse from a neutral, politically non-aligned nation (i.e. Agius 2011; Agius & Devine 2011; Browning 2002 & 2008) to a militarily non-aligned country that has actively maintained the option of joining the alliance (the so-called NATO-option) open. Rather than the other two militarily non-aligned nations Austria and Sweden (Ferreira-Pereira 2006, 113), Finland has emphasized the importance of the so-called NATO-option, entailing the idea that Finland could join the alliance whenever it deemed necessary.

In this paper I shall argue, that as “a hot potato” of the Finnish foreign and security policy debate, the question of NATO also polarizes the policy views of different ideological speaker types and the type of rhetoric they use. Through the analysis of

my empirical data, consisting of some 900 speeches (N=915) held by Finnish Members of Parliament addressing the questions of NATO 1995–2017, my aim is to show how “the NATO issue” has become and politically polarized topic in which senses and sensibility mix.

3 POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND NATO

Political polarization has been most studied in the US, and defined as the growing division between democratic and liberal ideologies (i.e. Hare & Poole 2014; Levendusky, 2009; Robison & Mullinix, 2015) and has been described as “the vast and growing gap between liberal and conservative, Republican and Democrats” (Pew Research Gate: Political Polarization, <https://www.pewresearch.org/topics/political-polarization/>, page accessed 30th of July 2019). In terms of Finnish politics, polarization has been a vastly understudied topic. In this paper, I define polarization broadly as a process of generating a divergence of political attitudes and ideological standpoints in relation to a given political issue, in this case the question of NATO in the context of the Finnish post-Cold War foreign and security policy debate.

The Finnish foreign and security policy debate around NATO is often portrayed as a rhetorical debate between pro- and anti-NATO-membership advocates (Forsberg 2002, Forsberg & Vaahtoranta 1999, etc.). Such claims, however, often lack an substantial empirical evidence. Earlier studies have addressed neither the content, the various different standpoints, nor the rhetorical style employed by the speakers. As a result, the NATO question has been most often understood as a question of potential membership, leaving other possible discursive and ideological contextualization undiscovered. However, a more recent study shows, that national interpretations of NATO’s role and significance have extended from local, European interpretation, on one hand, to a more global security actor on the other, whose active partner for instance Finland seeks to play (Särkkä 2019). As a result, the NATO question turns into a source of myriad different interpretations and a ground of discursive battle. In this rhetorical battle, where different discursive framings mix with a number of persuasive means, one may question is it, sense or sensibility that directs the Finnish foreign and security policy debate on NATO?

In this paper, I argue that what makes the question of NATO a polarized issue of the foreign and security policy debate indeed, is the fact that it raises various possible interpretations of its significance in the Finnish foreign and security policy. Secondly, in this process, a number of rhetorical stasis points are generated, laying grounds for the genesis of the so-called NATO-rhetorician types, types of political speakers that are polarized in their political ideologies and stance towards the NATO question. These rhetorician types are the so-called pro-NATO speakers, pragmatics, skeptics and the anti-NATO rhetoricians, that I shall discuss more in detail in section five. Secondly, I argue in this paper that these ideological speaker types polarize the policy rhetoric not only in terms of the substantive content and discursive frames, but by the rhetorical modes. I shall next describe the methods and data used.

4 RESEARCH DATA AND METHOD

Inductive, qualitative content analysis (QCA) was selected as a methodological approach in analysing policy discourse, rhetorical modes as well as identifying the NATO-related rhetorician types. However, also elements of quantitative research were incorporated in describing the changes in patterns of different NATO speaker types 1995–2017. The policy debates of Finnish foreign, security and defence policy reports (1995, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2012, 2016-17, the latter dealt as one policy debate) were chosen as the empirical research data due to their comprehensive coverage of all foreign and security policy issues, including the question of Finland's possible military alignment and its relationship with NATO. Secondly, analysing a continuous set of textual data made the study results more easily comparable in terms of policy issues and rhetoric.

A speech held by a member of the parliament (MP) was chosen as a coding unit. In my previous research, I have identified three types of policy discourses (Fischer 2003; Fischer & Gottweis 2012) of NATO that relate to the Finnish foreign and security policy content (describing NATO on its own and/or both framing Finland's relationship with the organization). In analysing the parliamentary rhetoric, I used these policy discourses as categorisations to depict the polarization of the policy issue (Särkkä 2019). In total over 900 speeches (N=915), were identified explicitly addressing NATO: speeches, that made an implicit reference to non-alignment or political and/or military alignment were not accounted for as they might also refer to non-alignment in another military alliance, not only that of NATO. As the speaker was likely to deal the NATO issue from a variety of different angles, more than one of the policy discourses may be addressed in a coding unit. Similarly, in relation to the different types of rhetorical means (Aristotle's *logos*, *ethos*, *pathos* related rhetoric), a MP is likely to employ a number of different rhetorical devices in building his or her arguments.

Secondly, I analyzed the temporal variation and emphasis in the use of three types of rhetorical modes of Aristotle's rhetoric, those of *logos*, *ethos* and, *pathos*, in relation to the four NATO speaker types. By *logos* it is referred to the logical arguments that create logical impression by the speaker (Aristoteles 2000; Cockcroft & Cockcroft 2005, 82–83, Torkki 2006, 161). *Ethos*-based rhetoric refers to the speaker's attitude, credibility, values and the image that the speaker seeks to promote of himself or herself (Cockcroft & Cockcroft 2005, 30; Torkki 2006, 160-161 & 284). In *pathos*-based policy rhetoric, the aim is to evoke different types of feelings amongst the listeners that can be divided between universal (emotions of humanity) and contingent (socially constructed) emotions (Cockcroft & Cockcroft 2005, 57). Whether the speaker succeeds in this task, is uncontrollable to the extent, that the he or she is unable to predict the possible reactions the rhetoric may evoke in the audience (Cockcroft & Cockcroft 2005, 63 & 111) or even readers (the researcher himself or herself). As the type of feeling the speech evokes in its listener is a

subjective one, a determining factor in identifying pathos-related speeches was the speaker's explicit use of a word (an adjective, noun etc.) that aims at arousing feelings.

Thirdly, these rhetorical modes of persuasion were not considered as mutually exclusive but inclusive. The speeches in which the speakers carefully employ all three rhetorical means, can be considered as most persuasive (Cockcroft & Cockcroft 2005, 81; Pekonen 2011, 160). Therefore, the three policy discourses as well as rhetorical modes as coding categories, were not considered as mutually exclusive but inclusive when classifying the speeches. On the contrary, when identifying the correct rhetorical speaker type in relation to a speech held, the four NATO speaker types were considered as mutually exclusive in each of the coding units. Each speech was coded "blind-folded", in a sense that same speaker's earlier or later rhetorical speaker type was not considered as a pre-determining coding category. As a result, a number of different speaker types could be identified in relation to the same speaker, over the timeperiod studied.

5 DISCUSSION

Next, I shall turn into discussing NATO as a polarizing issue of Finnish foreign and security policy debate by first identifying and describing the four speaker types as constitutive of polarized policy rhetoric. Then I will turn into to the policy rhetoric employed by each type, especially pro- and anti-NATO -speaker speakers. Thirdly, I will extend my analysis on the party political axis and identify those parties whose views have been most polarized.

5.1 NATO SPEAKERS AND POLARIZATION

To begin with, I argue that the NATO question should be considered as polarized issue of the foreign and security policy debate, because it creates polarizing viewpoints of policy rhetoric and creates polarizing speaker types. These NATO-related speaker types are the pro-NATO, pragmatics, skeptics and anti-NATO speakers. Whereas the pro- and are strongly in favour and anti-NATO speakers against NATO's presence in Europe, its global role and as a military alliance as well as Finland's evolving relationship and potential membership within it, the pragmatics and skeptics take slightly more favourable and precautinate views respectively.


Hence, we may detect polarization in two ways: in relation to the substantive content of the political discourse as well as the tone each speaker takes in relation to the policy discourse. Although NATO as a defensive alliance and Finland's possible NATO membership is the most obvious rhetorical framing, polarization occurs also when the speaker is addressing NATO's roles as a local, European and global actor. Approximately 9% of the speeches studies were classified as pro-NATO (n=81/915), whereas the anti-NATO -speakers constituted approximately 14 % of the (n=129/915) between 1995–2017, the numbers of both pro- and anti-NATO –speakers have increased from the first, 1995 until 2017 defence policy debate substantially as the table 1 shows. Although this polarization was detectable during the whole study period 1995–2017, in the early 1990s, it has been more of a marginal phenomenon. The study results show, that polarization has increased in particular over the past ten years (see table 1).

Table 1 Number of speeches within each speaker type 1995–2017 (N=915)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Pro-NATO</i>	<i>Pragmatics</i>	<i>Skeptics</i>	<i>Anti-NATO</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>1995</i>	1	47	35	8	91
<i>1997</i>	5	75	47	17	144
<i>2001</i>	3	84	33	19	139
<i>2004</i>	12	79	21	20	132
<i>2009</i>	26	88	33	29	176
<i>2012</i>	23	62	13	20	118
<i>2016-17</i>	11	71	17	16	115
<i>Total</i>	81	506	199	129	915

Similarly, the percentage share of pro- and anti-NATO speakers has increased during from the mid-1990s until the early 2010s. In particular the anti-NATO speakers %- emphasis has increased steadily, whereas in the pro-NATO types we see a sharper increase between the 2001-2012 parliamentary debates. Concurrently, shares of pragmatics are in decline or show only a moderate increase, together with a sharper decline in the share of skeptics. This can be interpreted as an intensifying polarization in the foreign and security policy debate in relation to NATO.

What explains for this growing polarization? I argue that the increase in the relative shares (%) of the pro- and anti-NATO speakers is a reflection on one hand of reflection of break through of the NATO question in the Finnish foreign policy debate. This break-through has increase the the relative share of pragmatics within the NATO debate, but also hose of pro-NATO supporters that are ideologically most open to Finland's military alignment and co-operation with NATO. Concurrently, anti-NATO policy rhetoric has also also increased in the form ideologically polarizing counter rhetoric, which is reflected in the increase of number and % emphasis of anti-NATO speakers (see graph 1).



Graph 1 NATO -speaker types (%) in the parliamentary debates

5.2 RHETORICAL MODES OF PERSUASION AND POLARIZATION

All the four different speaker types have their own logic in arguing about NATO. In this paper, I will focus on analysing the policy rhetoric of the two polarized speaker types, those of pro- and anti-NATO –speakers; the former, strongly in favour of NATO, those strongly opposing. In my analysis I will highlight the difference in the emphasis and use of rhetorical modes between the pro-and anti-NATO-speakers and compare to the pragmatic and skeptical speakers’ views, as well as their political party affiliation.

According to the logic advocated by the pro-NATO -speakers, Finland should join the alliance, as NATO, is the only reliable and trustworthy military alliance that can provide security guarantees to its members. Secondly, in Finland’s position it would greatly illogical not to do so. Finland’s active participation in the partnership for Peace Programme (PfP) has paved a way for a more deepened membership, and without not joining, in which joining the alliance would be the next logical step. According to the pro-NATO speakers, Finland should join the alliance now and before it is not too late, as the situation in the approximate geographical region might take an unexpected turnstile. This is precisely the kind of situation that Finland should seek to avoid and file in the membership request form as soon possible.

For the anti-NATO -speakers, the logic of not deepening the NATO co-operation or not staying outside NATO is the opposite. Why Finland, as a peace-loving and historically neutral nation, should even consider joining a military alliance, a war machine which members actively engage in offensive type military operations? The anti-NATO speakers consider NATO as a wrong type of reference group that could eventually beg for a trouble. The anti-NATO speakers, however, are not emphasizing the possible consequences of Finland not joining the alliance, as this could put their

logic into question: if Finland stays outside of military alliances, then it should have a stronger national self-defence, which would require more pooling of resources to the defence budget. For the anti-NATO types, this is not a desirable outcome.

The major difference between anti- and pro-NATO –speakers and the pragmatic, as well as to a large extent, the skeptics, however, develops in relation to the pathos related rhetoric.¹ The pro-NATO speakers use pathos related rhetoric in average in 47% of the speeches, and the anti-NATO -speakers in 51% of the speeches, whereas the pragmatics only in average 12% of the speeches and the skeptics in average 38% of the speeches. This leads to conclude that more polarize and negative the speaker’s stance towards NATO is, the more pathos -related rhetoric he or she is likely to use (table 2).

Table 2 Emphasis (%) of rhetorical modes of persuasion 1995–2017

Year	Pro-NATO			Pragmatics			Skeptics			Anti-NATO		
	Logos	Pathos	Ethos	Logos	Pathos	Ethos	Logos	Pathos	Ethos	Logos	Pathos	Ethos
1995	0	100	0	100	10	32	100	43	46	100	13	63
1997	100	60	80	100	11	42	100	43	45	100	53	65
2001	100	33	67	100	11	42	97	28	50	95	68	63
2004	100	42	50	99	14	47	86	57	38	90	45	40
2009	92	50	62	97	11	45	91	36	30	86	41	55
2012	96	35	61	98	16	34	93	14	21	85	55	50
2016-17	91	64	55	99	8	25	88	29	65	88	69	44
Average	94	47	59	99	12	39	95	38	45	91	51	53

If the pro- and anti-NATO speakers use more pathos-related rhetoric, in which ways? This study has shown, that using pathos as a rhetorical device can take place in various different ways with the aim of evoking both positive and negative type of feelings. For instance, in relation to the positive feelings NATO-question has evoked, is that of love and passion. In particular in the 2004 governmental paper debate, the metaphorical love-relationship was given both positive and negative connotation Finland had established. The rhetoric may also raise negative feelings by aiming to frighten the listeners, for instance by outlining the possible outcomes of NATO membership, such as the possible foreign policy risks relating to it. Furthermore, the aim of the rhetoric may be also to evoke feelings by introducing expressions “such as I am very happy to hear”, aiming to set atone for the speaker’s argument.

May one argue then, that the rhetoric relating to NATO, combines both sense and sensibility and how does it contribute to political polarization? The answer is yes.

¹ In relation to ethos -based rhetoric, the pro- and anti-NATO speakers also stress their own values and expertise more than pragmatics and skeptics: the pro-NATO -speakers in average 59%, pragmatics in average 39%, skeptics in average in 45% and anti-NATO in 53%. The difference to the other two speakers grows even larger, when compared to the use of pathos-related rhetoric.

When examining the temporal variation in the relative numbers of rhetorical means used by different NATO speaker types, logos is in fact mixed with pathos. Therefore, when considering the two most polarized NATO speaker types, pro- and anti-NATO speakers, the former use more pathos-related rhetoric. Whether the anti- and pro-NATO speeches succeed in creating a more convincing effect amongst the audience, is a separate research question that could be addressed more in further empirical research.

5.3 RHETORIC OF NATO AND PARTY POLARIZATION


Polarization in relation to the NATO question, however, occurs in relation to the political party affiliation. When examining the views presented by different political parties, a strong left-right party polarization is detected. In this study, eight major political parties present at the Finnish Parliament were analysed in relation to the changes in the rhetorical standpoints (the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Centre, the National Coalition Party, the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Finns Party, the Swedish People's Party and the Christian Democrats – the Liberal Finns had seats at the Parliament only in the 1995 and 1997 parliamentary debates). Table 3 indicates the variation in numbers and (%) emphasis between each speaker type and political parties.

Table 3 Emphasis (%) of speaker types within political parties 1995–2017


<i>Party</i>	<i>Pro-NATO (N)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Pragmatics (N)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Skeptics (N)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Anti-NATO (N)</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>Total (N)</i>	<i>Total (%)</i>
<i>Kok.</i>	68	28	166	68	9	4	0	0	243	27
<i>Kesk.</i>	1	1	136	68	58	29	4	2	199	22
<i>SDP</i>	1	1	103	59	68	39	4	2	176	19
<i>Vas.</i>	0	0	4	3	15	12	109	85	128	14
<i>RKP</i>	9	17	40	75	4	8	0	0	53	6
<i>PS</i>	0	0	20	50	12	30	8	20	40	4
<i>Vihr.</i>	0	0	15	41	18	49	4	11	37	4
<i>KD</i>	0	0	18	55	15	45	0	0	33	4
<i>NS</i>	2	33	4	67	0	0	0	0	6	1
	81	9	506	55	199	22	129	14	915	100

Abbreviations: Kok. = National Coalition Party; Kesk. = Centre Party; SDP= Social Democratic Party; Vas. = Left Alliance; RKP= Swedish People's Party; PS= Finns Party; Vihr. = Green League; KD= Christian Democrats; NS= Liberal Finns.

When examining the fluctuation in two polarized types, we may detect increase in numbers in relation to pro- and anti-NATO-types especially within left and right-wing parties (see graphs 2-5). On the right axis, in particular the National Coalition Party and the Swedish Peoples party have shifted strongly to be in favour of the Finland's affiliation with NATO (either partnership or membership) during the post-Cold War period as the following demonstrate.




Graph 2 NATO-speaker types (%) within National Coalition Party (Kok.)




Graph 3 NATO-speaker types (%) within Swedish People's Party (RKP)

A greatest variation between different speaker types, occurs among the Finns Party that have turned from anti-NATO to skeptic, and in the more recent years into more pragmatic speaker types.




Graph 4 NATO-speaker types (%) within Finns Party (PS)

The least polarizing view and most coherent rhetoric, however, is represented by the Christian Democrats. However, their views of NATO can not be considered to the same extent, as polarizing those of National Coalition Party's.




Graph 5 NATO -speaker types (%) within Christian Democrats (KD)

On the left axis, the Left Alliance has demonstrated clearest resistance to the NATO question whose members have most clearly resisted NATO (graph 6).



Graph 6 NATO -speaker types (%) within the Left Alliance (Vas.)

Similar anti-NATO is not discovered on the Social Democratic Party side, whose speakers have predominantly been characterized by more skeptic and pragmatic views (graph 7).



Graph 7 NATO -speaker types (%) within the Social Democratic Party (SDP)

This anti-polarization amongst the Social Democrats, however, can be explained by the government role and formal speaker positions, such as the ministerial positions that the Social Democrats have held in several governments between 1995 and 2017. Therefore, rather than clearly opposing the NATO, the Social Democrats adapt choose a middle way in the NATO question. Therefore, these study results show that the pro- and anti-NATO -speaker types are more likely to be MPs with no formal speaker affiliation, such as ministerial positions, party representatives presenting the party or the official inaugural speeches of the standing committees. For instance, in relation to the number of the ministerial speeches analysed within the data, only two were classified as pro-NATO (n=85/87). Therefore, political polarization in terms of the substantive content of the policy rhetoric is more likely to occur when the speaker is not holding a formal, political position.

But can we say that party polarization leads to elite polarization? Druckman et. al. have defined *elite polarization* as political phenomenon in which where there are “high levels of ideological distance between parties and high level of homogeneity within parties” (Druckman & Peterson & Slothuus, 2013, 57). Table 4 (Annex 1) shows, there is a high level of ideological distance between the parties, but also a relatively high level of homogeneity. However, in order to say that this there is elite polarization in detectable within this research data, a further analysis would need to be performed in order to further examine the levels of homogeneity possible using more sophisticated quantitative research techniques.

6 CONCLUSION – POPULIST RHETORIC AND POLARIZATION

In this paper, I have argued that polarization manifests itself in three major ways in relation to NATO when discussed in the threshold of the Finnish foreign and security policy. I have demonstrated that NATO question should be considered as a polarized policy question, because it polarizes political viewpoints. Secondly, this polarization leads to increase in emotion-based, pathos-related policy rhetoric. Thirdly, polarization is detectable in terms of political culture and in party politics and affiliation. However, the question that remains to be answered is the following: does polarization on the policy rhetoric level lead to populist rhetoric? Or does the use of populist policy rhetoric lead to polarization?

In order to consider these questions, we first need to define how we should understand and define populism and populist rhetoric. If populism is defined as a set of beliefs, where the people's wishes are taken into account (Heywood 2007, 81 cited in Wiberg 2011, 14) or as a political movement that seeks to attract popular support by the use of emotional language and unrealistic promises (Wiberg 2011, 15), then several political parties could be defined as populist. In order to assess and define the level of populism within political parties, one would also have to establish a more precise definition of populist per se, and the populist rhetoric as a concept.

For instance, populism has been divided into different types of populism (thin/thick) populism define populism differently, having different types of implications on the populist rhetoric. Populist policy rhetoric on the thinnest level simply means "a political communication style of political actors that refers to the people", without making any distinction between any particular groups of them – that is simply, talking about the people or in their name (Jagers & Walgrave 2005, 322). On the thickest level, on the other hand, there is a stronger adherence to the concepts of anti-establishment as well as homogeneity and exclusion. This could be implied for instance, as an establishment of anti-elitist attitudes and feelings such as against the political elites, media, intellectuals and the economic powers (Jagers & Walgrave 2005, 323-324). Therefore, when studying populist rhetoric, one can not also predominantly establish that the political parties studied, would be per se populist. My baseline argument for further research would be that one can see populist rhetoric tendencies across all speaker types and political parties. However, the extent to which the use of populist rhetoric differs between i.e. different NATO speaker types, is a research question that would need to be empirically studied.

In this paper I have demonstrated how NATO – related policy rhetoric creates political polarization in relation to policy discourse and rhetoric. A question for further research would be to discover, the extent to which polarization contributes to populist policy rhetoric and the types of implications it may have on people's perception of the policy issues.

ANNEX

Table 4 Changes (%) of speaker types within political parties 1995–2017

Year	Kansallinen Kokoomus (Kok.)								Total	Suomen Keskusta (Kesk.)								Total	Suomen Sosialidemokraattinen puolue (SDP)								Total
	1)	%	2)	%	3)	%	4)	%		1)	%	2)	%	3)	%	4)	%		1)	%	2)	%	3)	%	4)	%	
1995	1	7	11	73	3	20	0	0	15	0	7	35	13	65	0	20	0	20	69	9	31	0	29				
1997	3	10	23	77	4	13	0	0	30	0	12	40	15	50	3	10	30	0	26	68	12	32	0	38			
2001	3	10	24	83	2	7	0	0	29	0	20	69	8	28	1	3	29	0	15	54	11	39	2	5	28		
2004	11	31	25	69	0	0	0	0	36	0	32	82	7	18	0	39	1	5	14	64	6	27	1	3	22		
2009	26	46	31	54	0	0	0	0	57	0	38	86	6	14	0	44	0	8	25	24	75	0	32				
2012	17	38	28	62	0	0	0	0	45	1	7	9	60	5	33	0	15	0	9	82	2	18	0	11			
2016-17	7	23	24	77	0	0	0	0	31	0	18	82	4	18	0	22	0	11	69	4	25	1	3	16			
Total	68	166	9	0	0	0	0	0	243	1	136	58	4	0	199	1	103	68	4	0	0	0	0	176			
Year	Vasemmistoliitto (Vas.)								Total	Ruotsalainen kansanpuolue (RKP)								Total	Perussuomalaiset (PS)								Total
	1)	%	2)	%	3)	%	4)	%		1)	%	2)	%	3)	%	4)	%		1)	%	2)	%	3)	%	4)	%	
1995	0		2	15	4	31	7	54	13	0	5	100	0	0	0	5	0	0	1	100					1		
1997	0		2	11	5	28	11	61	18	0	3	75	1	25		4			0	2	67	1	33	3			
2001	0			0	5	28	14	72	19	0	16	100	0	0		16			0	0	0	2	100	2			
2004	0			0	1	6	16	94	17	0	3	50	3	50		6			0	0	0	3	100	3			
2009	0			0	0	0	29	100	29	0	4	100	0	0		4			2	67	1	33	0	3			
2012	0			0	0	0	18	100	18	5	42	7	58	0	0		12			6	43	6	43	2	14	14	
2016-17	0			0	0	0	14	100	14	4	67	2	33	0	0		6			12	86	2	14		14		
Total	0	4	15	109	128	9	40	4	53	20	12	8	40														
Year	Vihreä liitto (Vihr.)								Total	Kristillisdemokraatit (KD)								Total									
	1)	1. %	2)	2. %	3)	3. %	4)	4. %		1)	1. %	2)	2. %	3)	3. %	4)	4. %										
1995				1	50	1	50	2	5		1	20	4	80		5			1) Pro-NATO								
1997			1	11	6	67	2	22	9		4	67	2	33		6			2) Pragmatics								
2001			7	64	4	36		11	11		2	40	3	60		5			3) Skeptics								
2004			1	25	3	75		4	4		4	80	1	20		5			4) Anti-NATO								
2009			4	80	1	20		5	5		1	50	1	50		2											
2012			1	100	0	0		1	1		2	100	0	0		2											
2016-17			1	20	3	60	1	20	5		4	50	4	50		8											
Total			15	18	4	37		37	18		15		33														

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