


**#HEPP2**

**HELSINKI CONFERENCE ON EMOTIONS,  
POPULISM AND POLARISATION**



**ABSTRACT BOOK**



**#mainstreamingpopulism**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>KOEN ABTS, TILBURG UNIVERSITY (BELGIUM).....</u>	<u>1</u>
SOCIAL RESENTMENT AND CYNICAL-POPULIST ATTITUDES .....	1
<u>P MUHAMMED AFZAL, ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF CULTURAL STUDIES, DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, BIRLA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE, PILANI, RAJASTHAN, INDIAN (INDIA) .....</u>	<u>2</u>
MELODRAMA AND THE “PEOPLE’S HERO”: VISUAL IMAGERY AND POPULIST POLITICS IN KERALA, SOUTH INDIA .....	2
<u>ALEXANDER ALEKSEEV, INSTITUTE OF SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION ON SOCIAL SCIENCES OF THE RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH UNIVERSITY HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (RUSSIA) .....</u>	<u>4</u>
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF THE POPULIST RADICAL RIGHT: THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE AND THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLES.....	4
<u>SAMER ALNASIR, UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACIÓN A DISTANCIA, UNED (SPAIN) .....</u>	<u>5</u>
FORGING IDENTITY BY DEMONISING OTHERS: THE POPULIST EPISTEMES IN THE SPANISH IMAGINARY.....	5
<u>MAXIM ALYUKOV, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF TYUMEN (TYUMEN, RUSSIA); PUBLIC SOCIOLOGY LABORATORY, CENTRE FOR INDEPENDENT SOCIAL RESEARCH (ST. PETERSBURG, RUSSIA); FACULTY OF ARTS, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) (RUSSIA) .....</u>	<u>6</u>
NEWS, HEURISTICS, AND MEDIA CREDIBILITY UNDER A NONDEMOCRATIC REGIME.....	6
<u>TIMOTHY APPLETON, UNIVERSIDAD CAMILO JOSÉ CELA, MADRID (SPAIN) .....</u>	<u>7</u>
POPULISM VS. HEGEMONY: TOWARDS A POPULISM OF SINGULARITIES .....	7
<u>ABDELLATIF ATIF (FINLAND) .....</u>	<u>8</u>
THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION IN THE ELECTORAL LABOUR DISCOURSE ON EDUCATION .....	8
<u>MURAT AKTAS, MUS ALPARSLAN UNIVERSITY (TURKEY) .....</u>	<u>9</u>
FAR-RIGHT AND POPULIST COALITION IN AUSTRIA.....	9

<b><u>DR MARIA AVRAAMIDOU, UNIVERSITY OF CYPRUS &amp; EFTYCHIOS EFTYCHIOU (GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY) .....</u></b>	<b><u>10</u></b>
<b>MIGRANT RACIALISATION ON TWITTER DURING A BORDER AND A PANDEMIC CRISIS .....</b>	<b>10</b>
<b><u>EMÍLIA BARNA AND ÁGNES PATAKFALVI-CZIRJÁK, BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMICS (HUNGARY) .....</u></b>	<b><u>12</u></b>
<b>THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL COOPERATION HIT FACTORY: THE POPULIST AESTHETIC OF HUNGARIAN PROPAGANDA SONGS BETWEEN 2010-2020 .....</b>	<b>12</b>
<b><u>GWENAËLLE BAUVOIS, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>13</u></b>
<b>ARE THE YELLOW VESTS POPULISTS? A DEFINITIONAL EXPLORATION OF THE YELLOW VESTS MOVEMENT .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b><u>MÁRTON BENE, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (HUNGARY) .....</u></b>	<b><u>14</u></b>
<b>POPULISM IN CONTEXT: A CROSS-COUNTRY INVESTIGATION OF THE FACEBOOK USAGE OF POPULIST APPEALS DURING THE 2019 EP ELECTIONS .....</b>	<b>14</b>
<b><u>EMRE METIN BILGINER, CIES, ISTANBUL AYDIN UNIVERSITY (TURKEY).....</u></b>	<b><u>15</u></b>
<b>THE IMPACT OF THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONALISM ON THE RECENT RISE OF THE RADICAL RIGHT WITHIN THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF GOLDEN DAWN.....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b><u>THIBAUT BISCAHIE, YORK UNIVERSITY (CANADA).....</u></b>	<b><u>16</u></b>
<b>THE DEMOCRATIC LIMITS OF “ANTI-POPULISM”: PERSPECTIVES FROM FRANCE AND ITALY .....</b>	<b>16</b>
<b><u>COURTNEY BLACKINGTON, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL (USA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>17</u></b>
<b>IN DEFENCE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: WHO PROTESTS AGAINST POPULISTS AND WHY? .....</b>	<b>17</b>
<b><u>AHMAD BOSTANI, KHARAZMI UNIVERSITY, TEHRAN (IRAN) .....</u></b>	<b><u>18</u></b>
<b>A PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO POPULISM AND IMAGINATION .....</b>	<b>18</b>
<b><u>CYNTHIA BOYER, INSTITUT MAURICE HAURIOU, UNIVERSITÉ TOULOUSE II, (FRANCE).....</u></b>	<b><u>19</u></b>
<b>GOVERNMENT SPEECH, MISINFORMATION AND SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE TRUMP AGE.....</b>	<b>19</b>
<b><u>MELJANA BREGU, UNIVERSITY OF TIRANA (ALBANIA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>20</u></b>
<b>THE IMPACT OF COVID-19 AND POPULISM ON THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION .....</b>	<b>20</b>

<b><u>TUUKKA BRUNILA, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>21</u></b>
POPULISM AND THE LIMITS OF POLITICS .....	21
<b><u>EMANUELA BUSCEMI, UNIVERSITY OF MONTERREY (MEXICO) .....</u></b>	<b><u>22</u></b>
MEXICAN POPULISM AND THE FEMINIST SOCIAL MOVEMENT .....	22
<b><u>ROSEMARIE CALLEJA, MCAST INSTITUTE FOR THE CREATIVE ARTS (MALTA).....</u></b>	<b><u>23</u></b>
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND MEDIA IN TIMES OF CRISIS AND POLARISATION .....	23
<b><u>TEREZA CAPELOS, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM (UNITED KINGDOM).....</u></b>	<b><u>24</u></b>
HOT REACTION: RESENTMENT, VALUES, AND REACTIONARY ORIENTATIONS IN POPULIST TIMES .....	24
<b><u>JAMES CARR, MARTIN J. POWER AND EOIN DEVEREUX, UNIVERSITY OF LIMERICK (IRELAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>25</u></b>
LET’S GO FLY A KITE: PERFORMING POPULISM IN THE REUBLIC OF IRELAND .....	25
<b><u>REBECCA CARR, TRINITY COLLEGE DUBLIN (IRELAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>26</u></b>
POLARISING MYTHOLOGY IN THE FILMS OF CLINT EASTWOOD AND EMIR KUSTURICA .....	26
<b><u>FURKAN CAY, UNIVERSITY OF SZEGED, PHD CANDIDATE AND MURAT DEREGÖZÜ, CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST (HUNGARY) .....</u></b>	<b><u>27</u></b>
EARLY TURKISH POPULISM.....	27
<b><u>BRIAN CHARLES, NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE (SINGAPORE).....</u></b>	<b><u>28</u></b>
“THE SHAM(E) OF DEMOCRACY”: CONTEMPORARY POPULISM AND THE POLITICS OF SHAME .....	28
<b><u>IONUT CHIRUTA, UNIVERSITY OF TARTU (ESTONIA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>29</u></b>
COVID-19: PERFORMING CONTROL THROUGH SEDIMENTED DISCURSIVE NORMS ON MAINSTREAM MEDIA IN ROMANIA .....	29
<b><u>MICHAEL COLE, UNIVERSITY OF TARTU (ESTONIA), MARIANNA LYA ZUMMO UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI PALERMO (ITALY), SARA GARCIA, AND UNIVERSITAT JAUME I (SPAIN) .....</u></b>	<b><u>30</u></b>
CONSTRUCTING “AUTHENTIC” POPULISM ON SOCIAL MEDIA: VISUAL AND DISCURSIVE APPROACHES .....	30
<b><u>LUKE COLLISON, CRMEP, KINGSTON UNIVERSITY LONDON (GERMANY).....</u></b>	<b><u>31</u></b>

THE POLITICAL “ENERGY” OF GEORGES SOREL .....	31
<b><u>EMMA CONNOLLY, OPEN UNIVERSITY (UNITED KINGDOM) .....</u></b>	<b>32</b>
#JeSuisCHARLIE AND #THEYAREUS: POPULIST POLITICS AS AFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE .....	32
<b><u>BEZEN COSKUN, TED UNIVERSITY (TURKEY) .....</u></b>	<b>33</b>
SYRIAN REFUGEES IN THE EYES OF THE SECOND GENERATION OF EXCHANGE (MUBADIL) FAMILIES IN IZMIR .....	33
<b><u>AYAN DAS, UNIVERSITY OF GOUR BANGA AND DEBAJIT GOSWAMI, NETAJI SUBHAS OPEN UNIVERSITY (INDIA) .....</u></b>	<b>34</b>
HOW TO IDENTIFY A POPULIST POLITICAL PARTY? UNDERSTANDING THE MODE OF GOVERNANCE OF POPULIST PARTIES: A STUDY OF LEFT FRONT & TRINAMOL CONGRESS REGIMES IN WEST BENGAL, INDIA .....	34
<b><u>EMILIANA DE BLASIO &amp; ISABELLA BORRELLI, LUISS UNIVERSITY (ITALY), DONATELLA SELVA, TUSCIA UNIVERSITY (ITALY) .....</u></b>	<b>35</b>
COUNTERING POPULISM WITH POSITIVE EMOTIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF QUEER MOVEMENTS’ COMMUNICATION IN ITALY .....	36
<b><u>GEORGIA DIMARI, CENTER FOR POLITICAL RESEARCH AND DOCUMENTATION (KEPET) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF CRETE (GREECE) .....</u></b>	<b>37</b>
THE DESECURITISATION OF MIGRATION IN GREECE: TOWARDS A “FLEXICURITIZATION” APPROACH .....	37
<b><u>VERONIKA DOSTÁLOVÁ, MASARYK UNIVERSITY (CZECH REPUBLIC) .....</u></b>	<b>38</b>
WIDESPREAD OR EXCLUSIVE TO PARTICULAR SUB-GROUPS WITHIN SOCIETY? MEASUREMENT EQUIVALENCE OF THE CSES POPULIST ATTITUDES SCALE AT THE WITHIN-COUNTRY LEVEL .....	38
<b><u>EMMY EKLUNDH, CARDIFF UNIVERSITY (UNITED KINGDOM) .....</u></b>	<b>39</b>
PERFORMING SOVEREIGNTY: POPULISM AS THE EUROPEAN CONDITION .....	39
<b><u>GERLY ELBRECHT, TALLINN UNIVERSITY (ESTONIA) .....</u></b>	<b>40</b>
THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY AS A TOOL FOR POPULIST VISIONARIES: POPULIST LEGITIMATION AS A TACTIC FOR STATE REFORM .....	40
<b><u>TUĞÇE ERÇETIN, ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY (TURKEY) .....</u></b>	<b>41</b>
REPRODUCTION OF FEAR IN POPULIST DISCOURSE: ANALYSIS OF ELECTORAL SPEECHES (2015-2018) BY THE AKP .	41

<b><u>EMRE ERDOGAN &amp; PINAR UYAN SEMERCI, ISTANBUL BILGI UNIVERSITY (TURKEY)</u></b> .....	<b>42</b>
EMOTIONS: THE HIDDEN LINK BETWEEN POPULISM AND POLARISATION .....	42
<b><u>HANDE ESELEN-ZIYA, PROFESSOR (NORWAY)</u></b> .....	<b>44</b>
ESTABLISHING NETWORKED MISOGYNY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ONLINE ANTI-ISTANBUL CONVENTION PRESENCE .....	44
<b><u>ESZTER FARKAS, PHD CANDIDATE (HUNGARY)</u></b> .....	<b>45</b>
PARTISAN POLARISATION IN MEASUREMENT EVALUATION AND SCIENCE SCEPTICISM IN HUNGARY RELATED TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS .....	45
<b><u>XÉNIA FARKAS, CENTRE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCES, HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE; CORVINUS UNIVERSITY BUDAPEST (HUNGARY)</u></b> .....	<b>46</b>
VISUAL POPULISM IN THE 2019 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY CAMPAIGN ON PARTY FACEBOOK PAGES: A 28-COUNTRY COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS .....	46
<b><u>FILIPA FIGUEIRA, UCL (UK)</u></b> .....	<b>47</b>
THE TWO-SIDED EFFECT OF COVID-19 ON POPULISM: A BOUNDED RATIONALITY ANALYSIS .....	47
<b><u>SARA GARCÍA SANTAMARÍA, UNIVERSITAT JAUME I (SPAIN)</u></b> .....	<b>48</b>
POLITICIANS AT HOME: LEFT-WING POPULISM AND PERFORMANCES OF THE INTIMATE SELF DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC .....	48
<b><u>UGO GAUDINO, UNIVERSITY OF KENT (FRANCE)</u></b> .....	<b>49</b>
SECURITISATION OF ISLAM FROM THE RIGHT TO THE LEFT: IDEOLOGICAL TRANSLATIONS AND POPULISM IN ITALIAN POLITICS .....	49
<b><u>AMBAR KUMAR GHOSH, OBSERVER RESEARCH FOUNDATION, KOLKATA, INDIA (INDIA)</u></b> .....	<b>50</b>
LOCATING POPULISM THROUGH POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN INDIA DURING COVID-19: A CASE STUDY OF MODI'S POLITICAL MESSAGING IN RESPONSE TO THE PANDEMIC .....	50
<b><u>YBISKAY GONZALEZ, UNIVERSITY OF NEWCASTLE (AUSTRALIA)</u></b> .....	<b>51</b>
POLITICAL POLARISATION: A REVISITED CONCEPT .....	51
<b><u>SIMONA GUERRA, UNIVERSITY OF SURREY (UNITED KINGDOM)</u></b> .....	<b>52</b>
IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO: THE ANTI-POPULIST NARRATIVE THAT STRENGTHENS THE EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSE .....	52

<b><u>ANDREEA-ROXANA GUȘĂ, UNIVERISTY OF BUCHAREST (ROMANIA).....</u></b>	<b><u>53</u></b>
<b>CORRUPTION AS A RHETORICAL STRATEGY OF POPULIST PARTIES. CASE STUDY: THE 2020 ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE ROMANIAN PARLIAMENT OF THE ALLIANCE FOR THE UNITY OF ROMANIANS.....</b>	<b>53</b>
<b><u>OUTI HAKOLA, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (HELSINKI).....</u></b>	<b><u>54</u></b>
<b>TRUMPWAVE VIDEOS: POPULAR CULTURE, NOSTALGIA AND SOCIAL HIERARCHIES AS TOOLS FOR MOBILISATION OF TRUMP SUPPORTERS.....</b>	<b>54</b>
<b><u>JORGE HARDISSON MARTÍN, UNIVESIDAD DE SALAMANCA (SPAIN) .....</u></b>	<b><u>55</u></b>
<b>AFFECTION IN POSTMODERN IDENTITY.....</b>	<b>55</b>
<b><u>PAVOL HARDOS &amp; ZUZANA MAĎAROVÁ, FACULTY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SCIENCES, COMENIUS UNIVERSITY (SLOVAKIA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>56</u></b>
<b>THE CONSERVATIVE PEOPLE VS LIBERAL ELITES: HOW GENDER IDEOLOGY ACTORS PURSUED A NEW HEGEMONIC FRONTIER .....</b>	<b>56</b>
<b><u>ILANA HARTIKAINEN, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>57</u></b>
<b>THE VISIBLE VIRUS: ANDREJ BABIŠ’ RESPONSE TO COVID-19 REFLECTED IN PRAGUE.....</b>	<b>57</b>
<b><u>NIKO HATAKKA, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>58</u></b>
<b>HEGEMONIC MEANINGS OF POPULISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF POPULISM AS A FLOATING SIGNIFIER IN THE PRESTIGE NEWSPAPERS OF SIX COUNTRIES 2000-2018 .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b><u>JUHA HERKMAN, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>59</u></b>
<b><u>BRENDAN HUMPHREYS, ALEKSANTERI INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>60</u></b>
<b>WHITE HOUSE BLUES: SELF-PITY, RESENTMENT, AND EMPATHY AS POLITICAL EMOTIONS .....</b>	<b>60</b>
<b><u>ANNIINA HYTTINEN, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>61</u></b>
<b>POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF HUMOUR AND SATIRE: A VISUAL STUDY OF RESISTANCE OF THE ILLIBERAL RULE IN HUNGARY .....</b>	<b>61</b>
<b><u>MARTINA INSERO, SAPIENZA, UNIVERSITY OF ROME (ITALY).....</u></b>	<b><u>62</u></b>
<b>AFFECTIVE DIMENSION OF POLITICAL POLARISATION: THE ROLE OF EMPATHY .....</b>	<b>62</b>
<b><u>KATJA KAHLINA, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>63</u></b>

ANTI-GENDER MOBILISATION AND STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF POPULISM: THE CASE OF CROATIA .....	63
<u>DOMINYKAS KAMINSKAS, VILNIUS UNIVERSITY (LITHUANIA) .....</u>	<u>64</u>
POPULISM AS AN IDENTITY-BUILDING PRACTICE .....	64
<u>ELISA KANNASTO, SEINÄJOKI UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES / UNIVERSITY OF VAASA (FINLAND).....</u>	<u>65</u>
NON-PROFESSIONAL POLITICAL MOVEMENTS ON FACEBOOK: SUPPORTING “THE MASTER” .....	65
<u>DANIEL KAWECKI, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u>	<u>66</u>
AFFECTIVELY POLARISED VOTERS, PARTISANSHIP AND IDEOLOGY: THE CASE OF THE FINNISH MULTIPARTY SYSTEM..	66
<u>DANIEL KEIL, UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE (GERMANY) .....</u>	<u>67</u>
COVID-19, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE FAR RIGHT IN EUROPE: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FAR RIGHT’S IMAGINATION OF EUROPE BEFORE AND AFTER THE COVID-19 CRISIS .....	67
<u>MINNA-KERTTU KEKKI, UNIVERSITY OF OULU (FINLAND) .....</u>	<u>68</u>
PUBLIC DEBATE AS INCREASING OR DECREASING POLARISATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF LEARNING BY DISCUSSION .....	68
<u>ARTO KEKKONEN, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u>	<u>69</u>
AFFECTIVE BLOCS: UNDERSTANDING AFFECTIVE POLARISATION IN MULTIPARTY SYSTEMS .....	69
<u>IVAN KISLENKO, HSE UNIVERSITY / GHENT UNIVERSITY (RUSSIA) .....</u>	<u>70</u>
EMOTIONS OF “DIGNITY” AND “HUMILIATION” IN SOUTHERN THEORY: AN ANALYSIS OF NARRATIVES .....	70
<u>J MATIAS KIVIKANGAS, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u>	<u>71</u>
EMOTIONS AND AFFECT IN POLITICAL SCIENCE: EXAMPLES OF FEAR AND THREAT PROCESSING IN SECURITISATION ...	71
<u>LORENZ KLUMPP, UNIVERSITY OF PASSAU (GERMANY) .....</u>	<u>72</u>
POPULISM BY OR THROUGH THE MEDIA? VISUAL REPRESENTATIONS OF POLITICIANS ON MAGAZINE COVERS OF “DER SPIEGEL” AND “COMPACT” .....	72
<u>JOONAS KOIVUKOSKI &amp; SALLA-MAARIA LAAKSONEN, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u>	<u>73</u>



CLOWNING AROUND A POLARISED ISSUE: RHETORICAL STRATEGIES AND COMMUNICATIVE OUTCOMES OF A POLITICAL PARODY PERFORMANCE BY LOLDIERS OF ODIN .....	73
<b><u>MICHAŁ KOZŁOWSKI, UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>74</u></b>
AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM AND THE FALLING RATE OF PATRIARCHAL DIVIDEND .....	74
<b><u>BEATA KRÓLICKA, NICOLAUS COPERNICUS UNIVERSITY IN TORUŃ, INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>75</u></b>
A “STAUNCH ALLY” OR A “USEFUL TOOL”? POLITICIANS AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MEDIA DISCOURSE REGARDING THE POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP .....	75
<b><u>ANAM KURAISHI, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX (UNITED KINGDOM) .....</u></b>	<b><u>76</u></b>
INSIGHTS FROM SOUTH ASIA: A CASE OF “POST-TRUTH” ELECTORAL DISCOURSE IN PAKISTAN.....	76
<b><u>ATTILA KUSTÁN MAGYARI, TAMPERE UNIVERSITY (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>77</u></b>
DEFENDING OUR AUTHENTIC WAY OF LIFE: HOW POPULIST AND CONSPIRATORIAL DISCOURSES INTERTWINE .....	77
<b><u>INIAS LAUREYS, KU LEUVEN (BELGIUM) .....</u></b>	<b><u>78</u></b>
LONELINESS AND POPULISM: WHY COVID-19 COULD THREATEN MODERN-DAY DEMOCRACY .....	78
<b><u>VITALIJUS LEIBENKA, GEN. J. ŽEMAITIS LITHUANIAN MILITARY ACADEMY (LITHUANIA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>79</u></b>
THE STATE'S RESPONSE TO LIES IN HYBRID MEDIA .....	79
<b><u>PAULINA LENIK, UCL (POLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>80</u></b>
TRUSTING THE UNTRUSTWORTHY: AN EXPLORATION OF ATTITUDES TOWARDS POPULIST GOVERNMENT IN POLAND USING SURVEY DATA .....	80
<b><u>MARCELA LINS, FEDERAL UNIVERSITY OF MINAS GERAIS (BRAZIL).....</u></b>	<b><u>81</u></b>
FOR A GENEALOGY OF SUSPENSION: BIOPOLITICS AND HEALTH CRISES IN BRAZIL IN THREE MOMENTS.....	81
<b><u>ARTUR LIPÍŃSKI, ADAM MICKIEWICZ UNIVERSITY, POZNAN, POLAND (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>82</u></b>
POPULISM, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND COVID-19: THE CASE OF POLAND.....	82
<b><u>YONATHAN LISTIK, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM (NETHERLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>83</u></b>
A CASE FOR POLITICAL STUPIDITY.....	83

<b><u>ELIANA REGINA LOPES LOUREIRO, UFABC (BRASIL) .....</u></b>	<b><u>84</u></b>
FAKE NEWS, POPULISM, POLARIZATION AND EMOTIONS IN BRAZIL COVID-19 NARRATIVES .....	84
<b><u>MICHELE DIANA DA LUZ AND LETÍCIA BARON, UNIVERSIDADE FEDERAL DE PELOTAS, UFPEL, (BRAZIL).....</u></b>	<b><u>85</u></b>
THE ROLE OF NOSTALGIA IN THE POPULIST FAR RIGHT DISCOURSE IN BRAZIL .....	85
<b><u>JOSHUA MAKALINTAL, UNIVERSITY OF INNSBRUCK (AUSTRIA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>86</u></b>
NEGLECTING SENTIMENTS OF RESENTMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF POSTCOLONIAL LIBERALISM’S BLINDNESS TO THE POLITICAL.....	86
<b><u>LENA MASCH AND ANNA GASSNER, HEINRICH HEINE UNIVERSITY DÜSSELDORF (GERMANY).....</u></b>	<b><u>87</u></b>
ANXIETY, DISTRUST AND THE SUPPORT OF POPULISM DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC .....	87
<b><u>MATTEO MASTRACCI, KOÇ UNIVERSITY (TURKEY).....</u></b>	<b><u>88</u></b>
OY VE ÖTESİ: THE ROLE OF A CIVIL SOCIETY MOVEMENT AHEAD OF THE 2019 ISTANBUL MAYORAL ELECTION RERUN AS A GENUINE POPULIST RESPONSE .....	88
<b><u>NERINGA MATAITYTE, STUDENT (LITHUANIA).....</u></b>	<b><u>89</u></b>
THE ROLE OF EMOTIONS IN THE MOBILISATION OF SOCIETY TO FIGHT CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSTRUCTING EMOTIONAL STATES TO INSPIRE MASS MOVEMENT.....	89
<b><u>MÁTÉ MÁTYÁS, CORVINUS UNIVERSITY OF BUDAPEST – UNIVERSITY OF TARTU (HUNGARY).....</u></b>	<b><u>90</u></b>
MEDIA SYSTEMS, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND POPULISM: THE CASE OF HUNGARY (1990-2020) .....	90
<b><u>DARIO MAZZOLA, UNIVERSITY OF BERGEN, DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS (NORWAY) .....</u></b>	<b><u>91</u></b>
POPULISM AND THE RADICALISATION OF DEMOCRACY: THE FRONTIERS OF DEMOCRATISATION .....	91
<b><u>ANDRZEJ MELER &amp; RADOSŁAW SOJAK, NICOLAUS COPERNICUS UNIVERSITY IN TORUŃ (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>92</u></b>
COMPENSATION OR SUPPLEMENTATION? THE PATTERNS OF NEW AND TRADITIONAL MEDIA USAGE BY POLISH POLITICIANS.....	92
<b><u>FRANCESCO MELITO, JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKOW (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>93</u></b>

FINDING THE ROOTS OF NEO-TRADITIONALIST POPULISM IN POLAND: “CULTURAL DISPLACEMENT” AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION .....	93
<b><u>IRINA MILUTINOVIC (INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN STUDIES BELGRADE).....</u></b>	<b>94</b>
THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN THE POLITICAL POLARISATION OF THE PUBLIC WITHIN THE UNCONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY REGIME.....	94
<b><u>INGEBORG MISJE BERGEM, UNIVERSITY OF OSLO (NORWAY).....</u></b>	<b>95</b>
COVID-19’S EFFECT ON THE YELLOW VEST MOVEMENT IN FRANCE.....	95
<b><u>CARLO MOLL, UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE (UNITED KINGDOM).....</u></b>	<b>96</b>
NOTES ON THE HISTORY OF DEMOCRATIC POPULISM IN ITALY: THE CASE OF LA VOCE, 1909-1914.....	96
<b><u>ALINA MOZOLEVSKA, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR (UKRAINE) .....</u></b>	<b>97</b>
RESPONSES TO THE COVID-19 CRISIS OF THE NEW UKRAINIAN POPULISM: MAIN NARRATIVES IN VOLODYMYR ZELENSKY’S DISCOURSE.....	97
<b><u>BEN JACK NASH, (FRANCE) .....</u></b>	<b>98</b>
IS POPULISM MADE FROM PLASTIC? .....	98
<b><u>VLADIMÍR NAXERA &amp; ONDŘEJ STULÍK, UNIVERSITY OF WEST BOHEMIA (CZECHIA) .....</u></b>	<b>99</b>
THE COMMUNICATION OF THE CZECH PRIME MINISTER ANDREJ BABIŠ IN THE TIMES OF COVID-19: BETWEEN POPULISM AND NEO-PATRIMONIALISM .....	99
<b><u>HAKAN OVUNC ONGUR, TOBB UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND TECHNOLOGY (TURKEY) .....</u></b>	<b>100</b>
SWINGING BETWEEN CULTURAL POPULISMS: HOW TURKEY’S TRADITION OF POPULIST POLITICS HAS RESULTED IN EXTREME SOCIAL POLARISATION.....	100
<b><u>EMILIA PALONEN, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b>101</b>
<b><u>SAM PAGE (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b>102</b>
BORIS JOHNSON AND POPULISM.....	102
<b><u>DOLORS PALAU-SAMPIO, UNIVERSITAT DE VALÈNCIA (SPAIN) .....</u></b>	<b>103</b>
CONSPIRACY THEORIES OF THE PANDEMIC IN THE SPANISH PSEUDO MEDIA .....	103

<b><u>REECE PECK, COLLEGE OF STATEN ISLAND, CUNY (USA)</u></b> .....	<b>104</b>
THE YOUNG TURKS OF LEFT MEDIA: THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVE POPULISM ONLINE .....	104
<b><u>YOAV PELED, TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY (ISRAEL)</u></b> .....	<b>105</b>
THE ASCENDANCE OF RIGHT-WING POPULISM: ISRAEL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE.....	106
<b><u>CAROLINA PLAZA COLODRO, UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA (SPAIN)</u></b> .....	<b>107</b>
POPULISM AND THE PANDEMIA: THE CASE OF SPAIN .....	107
<b><u>CRISTINA PRADILLO CAIMARI, UNIVERSITAT DE BARCELONA (SPAIN)</u></b> .....	<b>108</b>
MOBILISING THE (NATIONAL) PEOPLE: A PSYCHO-POLITICAL APPROACH TO THE CATALAN CRISIS.....	108
<b><u>DARIO QUATTROMANI, TUSCIA UNIVERSITY OF VITERBO, &amp; ROBERTO DE ROSA, NICCOLÒ CUSANO UNIVERSITY, (ITALY)</u></b> .....	<b>109</b>
INDIVIDUALS, SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN THE POPULIST AGE .....	109
<b><u>DAVID RAMÍREZ PLASCENCIA, UNIVERSITY OF GUADALAJARA (MEXICO)</u></b> .....	<b>110</b>
TROPICAL POPULISM AND THE PANDEMIC: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSE IN MEXICO AND BRAZIL .....	110
<b><u>JORGE RAMOS-GONZÁLEZ, UNIVERSITY OF SALAMANCA &amp; PABLO ORTÍZ, UNIVERSITY OF SEVILLE (SPAIN)</u></b> .....	<b>111</b>
RADICALISM AND POPULISM: DO THEY ALWAYS GO HAND IN HAND? A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE IDEOLOGY OF THE RADICAL LEFT AND THE RADICAL RIGHT IN SPAIN .....	111
<b><u>MARK REIFF, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AT DAVIS (USA)</u></b> .....	<b>112</b>
THE UNBEARABLE RESILIENCE OF ILLIBERALISM.....	112
<b><u>INGRID RÍOS RIVERA, UNIVERSIDAD CASA GRANDE/UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE (ECUADOR)</u></b> .....	<b>113</b>
POPULISM ACROSS BORDERS? EXPLORING THE ROLE OF POPULIST DISCOURSES IN BOLIVIAN AND ECUADORIAN ELECTORAL CAMPAIGNS ABROAD.....	113
<b><u>JOSHUA ROOSE, DEAKIN UNIVERSITY (AUSTRALIA)</u></b> .....	<b>114</b>
THE NEW DEMAGOGUES: MASCULINITY, EMOTION AND THE POPULIST EPOCH.....	114

<b><u>METTE MARIE ROSLYNG, AALBORG UNIVERSITY, COPENHAGEN (DENMARK) .....</u></b>	<b>115</b>
CLIMATE CHANGE AS LEFT POPULIST DISCOURSE: THE CIRCULATION OF FACTS AND KNOWLEDGE ON SOCIAL MEDIA	115
<b><u>HRISTINA RUNCHEVA TASEV, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR AT POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT, FACULTY OF LAW "IUSTINIANUS PRIMUS" SKOPJE (REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA).....</u></b>	<b>116</b>
POPULISM IN A PANDEMIC WORLD: AN ANALYSIS OF POPULIST LEADERS' RESPONSES TO COVID-19.....	116
<b><u>SAIJA RÄSÄNEN, UNIVERSITY OF MILAN (ITALY).....</u></b>	<b>117</b>
POLARISING MEDIA POPULISM DURING GOVERNMENT CRISES IN FINLAND AND IN ITALY .....	117
<b><u>MARIANNA SAARTIO-ITKONEN AND TAINA KALLIOKOSKI, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .</u></b>	<b>118</b>
RHETORIC OF EVIL IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA DEBATE DURING THE IMMIGRATION CRISIS .....	118
<b><u>OSMAN SAHIN, GLASGOW CALEDONIAN UNIVERSITY (SCOTLAND) .....</u></b>	<b>119</b>
HOW POPULISTS SECURITISE ELECTIONS TO WIN THEM: THE 2015 DOUBLE ELECTIONS IN TURKEY .....	119
<b><u>VIRPI SALOJÄRVI, UNIVERSITY OF VAASA (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b>120</b>
<b><u>MIKKO SALMELA, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI &amp; UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b>121</b>
RESENTFUL AFFECT AND CONSERVATION VALUES: UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF REACTIONARY ORIENTATION .....	121
<b><u>TUIJA SARESMA, UNIVERSITY OF JYVÄSKYLÄ (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b>122</b>
GENDERED VIOLENCE ONLINE: HATE SPEECH AS AN INTERSECTION OF MISOGYNY AND RACISM .....	122
<b><u>KRISTIINA SAVOLA, STOCKHOLM UNIVERSITY (SWEDEN) .....</u></b>	<b>123</b>
POPULIST COMMUNICATION STYLE IN FINNISH POLITICIANS' SOCIAL MEDIA TEXTS .....	123
<b><u>PATRICK SAWYER, HIGHER SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS (RUSSIA).....</u></b>	<b>124</b>
POPULISM AND CONSPIRACY THEORIES: THE MISSIONARY POLITICS OF DONALD TRUMP.....	124
<b><u>SERGIO SCHARGEL, UFF, PUC-RIO AND UNIRIO (BRAZIL) .....</u></b>	<b>125</b>
A BRAZIL OF TWO BRAZILS: HOW POPULISM AND FASCISM ENLIGHTENS INTEGRALISM AND BOLSONARISM .....	125

<b><u>SOPHIE SCHMALENBERGER, AARHUS UNIVERSITY (DENMARK) .....</u></b>	<b>126</b>
POPULISM AS AFFECTIVE DISSENT: THE AfD, MEMORY AND THE ORCHESTRATION OF FAR-RIGHT AFFECTS IN GERMANY .....	126
<b><u>SARA SCHMITT, UNIVERSITY OF STUTTGART (GERMANY) .....</u></b>	<b>127</b>
DOES SOCIAL MEDIA MAKE EVERYONE A POPULIST? POLICY CONTAGION OF RIGHT-WING PARTIES ON MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S TWITTER DISCOURSE 2014-2019 .....	127
<b><u>JULIUS SCHNEIDER, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX (UNITED KINGDOM) .....</u></b>	<b>128</b>
DEMANDING CHANGE: REPRESENTATION AND IDENTITIES IN THE ESSEX SCHOOL OF DISCOURSE ANALYSIS .....	128
<b><u>CAROLA SCHOOR, MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY (NETHERLANDS).....</u></b>	<b>129</b>
POPULIST AND NON-POPULIST POLITICAL STYLES AND CORONA .....	129
<b><u>SVITLANA SHCHERBAK, SKOVORODA INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF UKRAINE (UKRAINE).....</u></b>	<b>130</b>
ANTI-NATIONALIST POPULISM IN UKRAINE .....	130
<b><u>LAURA-ELENA SIBINESCU, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND) .....</u></b>	<b>131</b>
DEBATING THE FAMILY: ONLINE CIVIC MOBILISATION IN ROMANIA’S 2018 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM .....	131
<b><u>LONE SORENSEN, UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS (UK).....</u></b>	<b>132</b>
POPULIST REPRESENTATION: IDEOLOGY AND PERFORMANCE .....	132
<b><u>FLORIAN SPISSINGER, LEIPZIG UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE (GERMANY)...</u></b>	<b>133</b>
AFFECTS AND NARRATIVES OF THE FUTURE: THE APPEAL OF FAR-RIGHT POPULISM.....	133
<b><u>ALBERTO STEFANELLI, KU LEUVEN (BELGIUM).....</u></b>	<b>134</b>
THE NATURE OF RADICAL BELIEF SYSTEMS: EXPLORING THE ONTOLOGICAL AND ONTIC COMPONENTS OF RADICAL IDEOLOGIES .....	134
<b><u>MIHNEA STOICA AND IOAN HOSU, BABEŞ-BOLYAI UNIVERSITY (ROMANIA) .....</u></b>	<b>135</b>
ALTERING POLITICAL PERCEPTIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY ON ROMANIAN ELECTIONS BEFORE AND DURING THE PANDEMIC.....	135

<b><u>LIV SUNNERCRANTZ, UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER (NORWAY)</u></b> .....	<b>136</b>
<b>MAINSTREAMING THE FRINGE: POPULISM, AFFECT, AND EXPERTISE IN TWO SWEDISH CRISES</b> .....	<b>136</b>
<b><u>LASSE THOMASSEN, UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN (DENMARK)</u></b> .....	<b>137</b>
<b>THE “POPULIST” CONSTITUTION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY</b> .....	<b>137</b>
<b><u>SILVIA TIERI, KING'S COLLEGE LONDON (ITALY)</u></b> .....	<b>138</b>
<b>REINFORCING DISCRIMINATION: MEDIA AND THE COVID-19 CRISIS IN INDIA</b> .....	<b>138</b>
<b><u>IVAN TRANFIĆ, SCUOLA NORMALE SUPERIORE AND MAJA GERGORIĆ, UNIVERSITY OF ZAGREB (CROATIA)</u></b> .....	<b>139</b>
<b>SHINY HAPPY PEOPLE LAUGHING: THE FAR-RIGHT’S MOBILISATION OF EMOTIONS THROUGH VISUAL REPERTOIRES OF THE MARCH FOR LIFE</b> .....	<b>139</b>
<b><u>SALLA TUOMOLA, TAMPERE UNIVERSITY (FINLAND)</u></b> .....	<b>140</b>
<b>THE EMOTIONS IN THE PEOPLE’S IMAGERY OF THE FINNISH-LANGUAGE ANTI-IMMIGRANT ALTERNATIVE MEDIA ...</b>	<b>140</b>
<b><u>MARINA VAHTER AND MARI-LIIS JAKOBSON, TALLINN UNIVERSITY (ESTONIA)</u></b> .....	<b>141</b>
<b>MORALITY AND MORAL EMOTIONS AS A PREDICTOR OF POPULIST SUCCESS? THE CASE OF THE SWEDISH DEMOCRATS</b> .....	<b>141</b>
<b><u>DANIELE VALENTINI, UNIVERSITY OF OSNABRÜCK (GERMANY)</u></b> .....	<b>142</b>
<b>MEMETIC MIND INVASION: ALT-RIGHT AFFECTIVE PRACTICES</b> .....	<b>142</b>
<b><u>DIANA VALLEJO-ROBALINO, EÖTVÖS LORÁND UNIVERSITY, CASA GRANDE UNIVERSITY (HUNGARY)</u></b> .....	<b>143</b>
<b>CHARACTERISING THE ECUADORIAN PUEBLO: TOWARDS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A POPULIST DISCOURSE BY THE HANDS OF AFRO-ECUADORIAN WOMEN</b> .....	<b>143</b>
<b><u>MONIKA VERBALYTE, EUROPE-UNIVERSITY FLENSBURG (GERMANY)</u></b> .....	<b>144</b>
<b>POPULIST ANGER VS. ANGER ABOUT POPULISTS: DISCOURSE NETWORK ANALYSIS OF THE EUROPEAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN 2019 IN GERMANY</b> .....	<b>144</b>
<b><u>LORENZO VIVIANI, UNIVERSITY OF PISA (ITALY)</u></b> .....	<b>146</b>
<b>“I’M (NOT) ONE OF YOU”: POPULIST PERSONALISATION AND CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP</b> .....	<b>146</b>

<b><u>SABINE VOLK, JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>147</u></b>
RESISTING LEFTIST DICTATORSHIP? MEMORY POLITICS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMING IN THE FAR-RIGHT POPULIST PEGIDA MOVEMENT .....	147
<b><u>MARINA VULOVIC, UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI (FINLAND).....</u></b>	<b><u>148</u></b>
DEBATING THE ONTOLOGICAL AND ONTIC DIMENSION OF POPULISM .....	148
<b><u>TOBIAS WIDMANN, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE (ITALY) .....</u></b>	<b><u>149</u></b>
WHO PLAYED DOWN THE PANDEMIC? STRATEGIC EMOTIONAL RHETORIC IN POLITICAL COMMUNICATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE MASS PUBLIC.....	149
<b><u>JITKA WIRTHOVÁ, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY, INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGICAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, CHARLES UNIVERSITY, PRAGUE (CZECH REPUBLIC) .....</u></b>	<b><u>150</u></b>
ANTI-STATE POPULISM IN CZECH EDUCATIONAL GOVERNANCE: RELATIONS AMONG STATE, EXPERTISE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY .....	150
<b><u>KAROLINA WIŚNIEWSKA, JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW (POLAND) .....</u></b>	<b><u>152</u></b>
FREE SPEECH AND THE SPREAD OF FAKE NEWS: MORAL ASPECTS OF APPEALS TO SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE.....	152
<b><u>REJA WYSS, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD (SWITZERLAND/UNITED KINGDOM).....</u></b>	<b><u>153</u></b>
(POPULIST) POLITICS AND SCIENCE: THE CASE OF POSTDOCTORAL RESEARCHERS IN POLAND .....	153
<b><u>TIANHAO YANG, BERKSHIRE SCHOOL (USA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>154</u></b>
HOW MEDIA MISINFORMATION WORSENS POLITICAL POLARISATION .....	154
<b><u>CAN ZENGIN, TEMPLE UNIVERSITY (UNITED STATES OF AMERICA) .....</u></b>	<b><u>155</u></b>
FROM SHAME TO POPULISM: THE ROLE OF PRIDE IN POLITICAL ATTITUDE .....	155
<b><u>SSU-HAN YU, LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE (GREAT BRITAIN).....</u></b>	<b><u>156</u></b>
MEDIATING POLARISATION AND POPULISM: AN INTER-GENERATIONAL ANALYSIS.....	156
<b><u>DECHUN ZHANG, LEIDEN UNIVERSITY (NETHERLANDS) .....</u></b>	<b><u>157</u></b>
MEDIA USE, MEDIA TRUST AND NATIONALISM IN CHINA DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC .....	157





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### **Social resentment and cynical-populist attitudes**

This paper investigates the relationship between social resentment and political cynical-populist attitudes. Starting from a description of the transition from organized modernity to liquid modernity, we propose that contemporary society is characterized by a de-closure of the social contract, the cultural compromise and the political cleavages of organized modernity. We argue that the processes of globalization and individualization are undermining the established principles of integration and demarcation linked to the bounded structuring of national class society. The de-bounding and de-structuring of organized modernity results in resentment and new cultural and socio-economic conflicts of integration versus demarcation that could be mobilized by political challengers. We formulate the hypothesis that populist parties mobilize the social resentment of the losers of modernization by addressing the issue of the genesis of social resentment and its relationship to populist attitudes. The first proposition is that social change will lead more likely to feelings of disintegration, displacement, relative deprivation and social justice, which combined with powerlessness are the belt drive of contemporary resentment. The second proposition is that resentment go together with adjusted schemes of perceptions, appreciation and action, and is resulting more likely – partly driven by cultural and political mobilization – in an ethno-populist habitus masterfully expressed in the slogan of 'our own people first' as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, populism and welfare chauvinism. In this paper, we investigate empirically the relation between social resentment – conceptualized in terms of feelings of disintegration, economic insecurity, relative deprivation and powerlessness – and political cynicism and populist attitudes using survey data from the Belgian National Election Study 2014-2015. The dataset consists of validated item scales of all distinguished concepts.



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### **Melodrama and the “People’s Hero”: Visual imagery and populist politics in Kerala, South India**

Contemporary scholarship on populism in the Indian context highlights the central role that visual imagery and the melodramatic narrative play in populist politics in India, particularly at the state level (Madhava Prasad 2020, Partha Chatterjee 2020). These studies also point out the relationship between linguistic identity, cinema and populist politics which can be called cinematic populism or cine-politics, which compensate, in a symbolic way, for the lack of popular sovereignty. In this paper I trace the trajectory of populism in the south Indian state of Kerala through an analysis of the popularity of the current chief minister of the state, who represents the Communist Party, in the context of the response to the Covid-19 pandemic, and the mobilization of the popular identity called Malayali centred around the Malayalam language. Following the relative success of Kerala in containing the spread of Covid-19 in the initial stage, the “Kerala Model of Development” has again attracted global attention, leading to a sense of “local pride” among the people of Kerala. Coming in the wake of many other calamities that the state has faced in the recent times, the pandemic has provided the “leader” with another opportunity to project himself as a “hero” who addresses the people directly. The press conferences that the chief minister addressed every day at 6 in the evening, which had more viewers than many other television programmes, has been one of the reasons for the rise in the popularity of the chief minister. In addition to this, announcing various welfare schemes, which is seen as another populist measure, has also contributed to his popularity, as is evident from the success of his party in the recently concluded local elections. While the presence of 24/7 news channels as well as the proliferation of social media platforms have made the communication between the leader and the people a direct one, as characteristic of any populist politics, I argue for the need to connect the popularity of the chief minister with the longer and distinct trajectory of populism in India. The paper connects the image of the chief minister as a “hero of the people” with the longer history of populist politics in the state where the communist melodramas of the mid-twentieth century have played an important role in imagining a radical politics for the newly formed linguistic state of Kerala. While cinematic populism has

been absent in Kerala, unlike the neighbouring states where film stars have become successful politicians and chief ministers, the communist party in Kerala has occupied the role that cinematic populism has occupied in other states. Through a discussion of the egalitarian developmentalism, through which a populist mobilization of a common identity or “we-ness” has been carried out, the paper looks at the interaction among language politics, cinema and left politics in the region and contributes to a discussion on the distinct history of populism in Kerala in the mid-twentieth century.



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Mr Alekseev's ongoing research is focused on the ideology and discourse of the European populist radical right, especially the concepts of democracy and rights as they are perceived, interpreted, and utilised by various populist radical right parties in different European contexts.

## **Sovereignty in the political discourse of the populist radical right: The right of the people and the right of the peoples**

This study uncovers how the populist radical right uses the concept of rights and freedoms to (re)construct its vision(s) of sovereignty in the run-up to the 2019 EU parliamentary elections. It highlights a peculiar approach of the PRR to the concept of sovereignty as a collective right to be realised by the people within the country and abroad. The research focuses on the cases of two PRR parties with very dissimilar backgrounds – the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwość and the French Rassemblement National – trying to distinguish similarities in their manipulations of the concept of sovereignty in the electoral context. Both parties are considered to be PRR as their discourses are saturated with elements of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

The work deals with the PRR political discourses focusing on verbal texts uploaded on the official party YouTube channels over their 2019 European elections campaigns. Such discourse is a priori ideologically loaded and serves to construct interpretations of concepts that politicians strive to impose on the voter.

The analysis of texts combines elements of the morphological analysis of ideology (Freeden 1994) with methods and techniques of the discourse-historical approach (Reisigl and Wodak 2016) and the discourse-conceptual approach (Krzyżanowski 2016) to CDA to reconstruct the content of the concepts of sovereignty and place them in their respective semantic fields.

The study concludes that the European PRR constructs the concept of sovereignty as a collective right of the people in an ambiguous way: it blurs the line between the sovereignty of the people (all decisions are to be taken by the people, and not imposed from above by the elites) and the sovereignty of the peoples (all decisions are to be taken within the country and not imposed from abroad). Thus, the PRR promotes a populist vision of democracy to be built within a nation-state.

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Author of many academic articles on law and religious involvement in multicultural societies, orientalism, transnational regulation, and national imaginary, his last book was about the Quran perverted interpretation into west and east as an instrument of institutional radicalization (Istanbul, Aswat, 2018), have participated into many research projects, and also legislative drafts about constitutional transition of Iraq.

### **Forging identity by demonising others: The populist epistemes in the Spanish imaginary**

Fear is the genealogical character of humanity and the main inductee of synoecism. Humans get involved together fearing from others, there's no strong factor of unity then fear. Meanwhile, Grossi has identified many traditional European societies as unified under three factors, the earth as an economical factor, the blond as an ethnic factor, and then the time as a rooting factor (Grossi, 2007, p. 26), these values aren't equal, nor applicable, into all European social imaginary, thus the Spanish.

Spanish society has been forged under the othering concept as a motor of identity, fear became the most rooted construct of national identity, having the most eminent value of all over the national imaginary, without fear neither the othering perspective, Spanish society may not exist as so, a Spanish society.

Thus, could we consider the fearing slogans as a neopopulist waving in Spain? If not, from where it's coming such as populist polarization? Does the pre-existing othering perspectives are responsible for the current Spanish political failing?

This paper would delight, empirically, the current polarization of political discourse in Spain defined, recently, like populism, by referring to it as an epistemological construct related to the Spanish identity itself and not as an emerging populism. Heraldic symbols, coats of arms, flags, cities names are the classical demonetization imaginary toward the others in Spanish nostalgia, but today into school books, legends, and popular speech persist the way of demonizing the others as a cognitive national identity. So could we consider national identity, culture as a populist identity or culture?



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Maxim Alyukov is a researcher and instructor at the School of Advanced Studies at the University of Tyumen, a PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Arts at the University of Helsinki, and a researcher with the Public Sociology Laboratory (Centre for Independent Social Research, Saint-Petersburg). Maxim's research focuses on political communication, media reception, and political cognition. Currently, Maxim works on the completion of his dissertation at the University of Helsinki. His dissertation investigates cognitive dimensions of media reception in nondemocracies. Specifically, it seeks to explain how nondemocratic political environments affect the way people engage with information and form political opinions. At the School of Advanced Studies, Maxim takes part in the research team Cognitive Citizenship: Making Sense of Political Belonging. Within the team, he attempts to bring contemporary psychological theories, such as information processing approach, to citizenship studies. Specifically, he investigates how people reason about matters of public concern and the structure of political cognition.

**News, heuristics, and media credibility under a nondemocratic regime**

To evaluate the credibility of news reports, citizens rely on heuristics drawn from the political and media environment. However, it is not clear how citizens utilize heuristics in nondemocratic contexts where media and political institutions—which typically serve as a major source of heuristics—are not perceived as independent and reliable. While previous research shows ambiguous results regarding the perceived credibility of news sources in nondemocracies, there is no research which addresses the issue of actually practiced heuristics used by citizens to evaluate credibility of the news. Relying on focus groups, this study uses Russian TV viewers' reception of the Russia-Ukraine conflict to fill this gap. The results show that the perceived credibility of the news does not coincide with credibility heuristics. Citizens can regard the news with skepticism but rely on heuristics which lead them to consider specific news episodes as credible or vice versa. In addition, the findings suggest that citizens adapt to nondemocratic environments by drawing heuristics from daily life and cultural stereotypes rather than media or political institutions which are widely perceived as biased. This argument explains the ambivalent findings of previous research and clarifies the process of credibility evaluation in nondemocracies.



## **Timothy Appleton, Universidad Camilo José Cela, Madrid (Spain)**

Dr. Timothy Appleton completed a BA (Hons) in English and Education at Anglia Ruskin University (1992-96), then an MA in Political Theory at the University of Essex (1999-2000), and then an MPhil in the Ideology and Discourse Analysis programme, also at the University of Essex (2001-2004). He completed his Phd at the Complutense University of Madrid in 2015. The topic was political theory after Jacques Lacan. He is co-editor of the Spanish magazine #lacanemancipa and coordinator of the section of contemporary thought in the cultural centre Cruce Arte y Pensamiento in Madrid. His publications include a co-edited volume on psychoanalytic political theory – *Lacan en las lógicas de la emancipación* (Miguel Gómez, 2018) -, as well as two co-written volumes on contemporary thought – *Derrotas y Derivas* (Arena Libros, 2017) & *Pensamiento* (Arena Libros, 2019) -. His debut, *Escupir en la iglesia: Un sí de izquierdas al Brexit* (Lengua de Trapo), which dealt with populist theory and the Brexit vote, came out in Spain in 2020. He is currently working on a follow-up, on the future of populist theory. He has written numerous articles on contemporary politics for Huffington Post and the Spanish newspaper *El Confidencial*. He is currently a lecturer at the Camilo José Cela University in Madrid.

### **Populism vs. hegemony: Towards a populism of singularities**

In the world of political theory, the terms populism and hegemony are traditionally combined, almost to the point of being synonyms. However, what if they are separate, even contradictory logics? This presentation will attempt to show that the future of populism depends on separating out these terms and conceptualizing their ultimate incompatibility. The essential problem, when putting the two terms together, is that hegemony depends on the articulation of a plurality of demands, whilst a populist antagonism is, by definition, a singularity, which, strictly speaking, can not therefore be articulated with anything. Against those who would maintain that conceiving of a populist antagonism as an absolute singularity would annul politics, since the latter is understood to depend precisely on the articulation of a plurality of demands, it will be argued that this deduction is in fact based on a misunderstanding regarding the nature of the social space within which such singularities would supposedly be articulated. It will be argued that once the “dispersivity” of this space is properly conceived, the supposed requirement of setting aside singularity in favour of a logic of articulation between plural elements is removed. This conclusion will be reached via an immanent critique of Laclau’s theory of hegemony, passing along the way through the work of other post-Althusserian thinkers: Alain Badiou, Slavoj Žižek and Jacques Rancière. Finally, some consequences of these conclusions for other aspects of populist theory shall be considered.






## Abdellatif Atif (Finland)

Abdellatif Atif is a Moroccan PhD student at the Free University of Bolzano-Bozen and currently a visiting scholar at HEPP, conducting a research project on populism and education. His work builds on the ontology of the social in the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, postfoundational philosophy, and discourse theory to have a new understanding of the educational discourse. This theoretical work is supplemented by empirical research on how diverse educational discourses enter in the populist construction of the people. Moreover, he is interested in contributing to an emancipatory educational project that builds on the notions of hegemony and radical democracy.

### The ideological dimension in the electoral Labour discourse on education

In my contribution, I study the discourse of free higher education in the Labor party 2019 electoral campaign as an ideological one. I work with a political discourse background to perceive the logics of how it entered in the populist construction of *the people* by Jeremy Corbyn. More specifically, I am interested in its signifying operations and the reactivation of the conditions of how it comes to be by showing its radical contingency. My understanding of ideology is not of a rhetorical ornament or a false consciousness, but of a condition for any signifying operation, thus, the correctness or falseness of the free tuition promise is not my interest but its performative function. This way, I do not see ideology as exclusive to one educational discourse of free or private education, but as inherent to every identity in closing off its radical contingency by rendering other subjects complicit over the radical contingency of the articulated *educational discourse*. The paper shows how the labor party inscribes to the discourse of free higher education the inherent impossible fullness of the educational. In other words, an economic measure to finance this sector is portrayed discursively as equivalent to both an absent emancipation of the people and of the lacking fullness of education. Retrospectively, the price that *the free education measure* pays for inscribing to itself elements that are not necessarily part of it is to undergo a distortion of its very economic identity.



## **Murat Aktas, Mus Alparslan University (Turkey)**

Mr. Aktas is Professor at Mus Alparslan University, the Department of Political Science and Public Administration. He has completed his PhD at the University of Paris 7, Diderot (CSPRP-Centre de Sociologie des Pratiques et des Représentations Politiques) Paris, France. His PhD has involved analyzing Turkish and European Union Relationships in the French press. He is the writer and editor of many books such as: “The Information Society Globalization and Democracy”, “The European Union and Turkey”, “The Arab Uprisings and the Struggle of Soft Powers in the Middle East” and “The Arab Spring: Turkish Model and Seeking Democracy in The Middle East”, “The Presidential System”, “Conflict Resolution and Peace” etc... He has written many articles about different social and political issues such as far-right and populist movements, globalization and democracy, European Union’s Middle East Policy, globalization nation state and democracy, women rights, internet and democracy etc... He has also given many speeches about different subjects in many varied international conferences on globalization, democracy, freedom of expression and human rights, Arab Uprisings etc...

### **Far-right and Populist Coalition in Austria**

Far-right and populist political parties have been increasingly spreading throughout European countries since 1980s. They have attracted the attention of many voters, especially the youth and the workers by campaigning against globalisation, immigration and multiculturalism. In many of these countries, far-right and populist parties grew stronger by forming coalitions. In some countries such as Austria and Italy, they even came to power by forming coalitions. In some countries, they have collaborated in local and regional elections and in the European Parliament elections.

Austria was one of the first countries in which far-right and populist parties came to power by forming coalition governments. In 1999, the Austrian Freedom Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs-FPÖ), led by Jörg Haider, became the country’s second largest political party with 26.9 % of the votes and started coalition negotiations with the Austrian populist People’s Party (Österreichische Volkspartei-ÖVP). The initiation of coalition talks with the ÖVP in 2000 by the far-right FPÖ, which was founded by staff members of the Nazi institutions, created a shock in Europe and garnered great reactions. At that time, many politicians especially European had reacted severely against to the possibility of a far-right party joining the government and declared that was unacceptable. Despite all the reactions the FPÖ maintained its power and became one of the most important actors of Austrian politics until today.

Especially under the leadership of Heinz-Christian Strache, the FPÖ got 26 % of the votes in the elections held on 15 October 2017 and formed a coalition government with the ÖVP. Moreover, the Prime Minister of this far-right and populist coalition, Sebastian Kurz, even took over the EU presidency on 1 July 2018. So how did it come 18 years later that the coalition of the same parties started to be seen as a normal political process? Is it considered normal for far right parties to come to power with populist in Europe? This papers aims to analyse far right and populist coalition in Austria.

Keywords: Far-right, Populism, Austria, FPÖ, ÖVP.

## **Dr Maria Avraamidou, University of Cyprus & Eftychios Eftychiou (Georgia Institute of Technology)**

### **Migrant racialisation on Twitter during a border and a pandemic crisis**

This work examines how the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic reshaped the migration debate on Twitter. Two crises started in Europe beginning of 2020: the Greek-Turkish land-border crisis, Evros area (Evros crisis) and the still-unfolding COVID-19 pandemic. February 26, 2020, Turkey suspended its infamous migration deal with the EU foreseeing the return of all irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands. Subsequently, thousands of people attempted to cross from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria. The Greek government cited the pandemic and hermetically closed its borders. February 26, 2020, Greece also confirmed its first COVID-19 infection and within March most EU member-states entered weeks-long lockdowns. Through co-hashtag network analysis, time-frequency and content analysis, the study shows that the pandemic related with positive and negative stances about migration on Twitter. The positive, focused on the need to protect refugees stranded at camps in Greece from COVID-19. The negative focused on the Evros crisis, using COVID-19 to reinforce migrants as racialized others. The qualitative study illuminated in more depth how COVID-19 was used to exclude migrants and refugees, identifying three analytical themes. The first theme concerns the representation of migrants as a health threat in addition to other threats (e.g., terrorism). The second discusses COVID-19 hashtags uses to build an ambient threat around migrants, and the third downplays COVID-19 as a threat while exacerbating the threat of migration. These findings fit the problematization of positive and negative migrant representations in the Global North as Eurocentric. Regarding camps, refugees fit well within the victim/helpless frame which usually justifies humanitarianism, this time on health grounds. Regarding the border crisis, they fit the also Eurocentric frame of violent/male/inferior other who could spread a deadly virus. Overall, COVID-19 intertwined with migration on Twitter debates reinforcing the racialized, Eurocentric representational field on migrants from Global South.





## **Emília Barna and Ágnes Patakfalvi-Czirják, Budapest University of Technology and Economics (Hungary)**

Emília Barna, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology and Communication of the Budapest University of Technology and Economics, Hungary. She completed a Popular Music Studies Ph.D. programme in 2011 at the University of Liverpool. Her main research areas include music scenes and technology; the music industries and digitization; popular music and gender; and cultural labour. Together with Tamás Tófalvy, she has co-edited the volumes *Made in Hungary: Studies in Popular Music* (Routledge, 2017) and *Popular Music, Technology, and the Changing Media Ecosystem* (Palgrave, 2020). She is a member of the International Association for the Study of Popular Music, and the Working Group for Public Sociology “Helyzet.”

Ágnes Patakfalvi-Czirják is a sociologist-anthropologist and currently a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Sociology and Communication. She completed a Cultural Studies PhD programme at the University of Pécs. Her main research areas are Hungarian nationalism, kin-state politics in CEE and everyday nationalism. She did fieldwork in Romania (Szeklerland), in Republic of Moldova, and in Hungary. Currently she is working as a researcher in the European project “Popular Music as a Medium in the Mainstreaming of Populist Ideologies in Europe.”

### **The system of national cooperation hit factory: The populist aesthetic of Hungarian propaganda songs between 2010-2020**

Our paper explores a populist music aesthetic established in propaganda songs written and produced under the Orbán regime in Hungary (from 2010) for occasions of national remembering. Relying on musicological group analysis (developed by A. Doehring) of selected songs and their music videos, we identify the main elements of this aesthetic, and locate them in Hungarian popular music history and culture, and the context of the Fidesz party’s memory politics. We ask how populist leadership is solidifying its hegemonic status through an extended toolkit that becomes available through the specific local and historical embeddedness of musical culture, and how, as part of this process, it contributes to a redefining of the “people” as a national community. For this purpose, we analyse three patriotic songs and their corresponding videos, namely “Barackfa” [Peach tree] (2013), “Egy szabad országért” [For a free country] (2016), and “Hazám, hazám” [My homeland, my homeland] (2020). All three were written for a historical anniversary, commissioned and coordinated by the government (in the last case, a state-commissioned institution), and they exhibit a unique collaboration of artists representing various music genres, a ceremonial atmosphere and the sense of uniting under a cause, in the style of mega-events such as Live Aid. We interpret an analysis of aesthetic and structural features of the songs and videos in the framework of collective speculation (Csigó 2016) regarding the relations between music and identity (e.g. S. Frith), as well as taste (e.g. A. Hennion), in the local cultural context. We explore the ways in which the exhibited fusion of the particular stylistic and structural elements – including elements of rock, pop, folk, jazz, as well as classical music – serves to create certain affordances that contribute to the construction of an audience and a community – the people of Fidesz’ populism.

## **Gwenaëlle Bauvois, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Gwenaëlle Bauvois (phD, sociology) currently works as a researcher at the Swedish School of Social Science (University of Helsinki) and is based at CEREN.

She has conducted research on the Yellow Vests movement, post truth politics, conspiracy theories, right-wing populism and online mobilisation.

### **Are the Yellow Vests populists? A definitional exploration of the Yellow Vests movement**

The Yellow Vests is one of the most fascinating movements in recent years. Ongoing since 2018, it made a big societal impact in France and beyond. However, just simply defining what the Yellow vests movement is, has been a challenge for journalists and scholars alike, even more so when trying to explore their complex and sometimes contradictory ideological and political linkages.

With their core belief that society is undergoing a profound crisis associated with the polarisation between the people and the elite, the Yellow Vests are described by some scholars as “an example of ‘pure’ populism that is neither left nor right” (Guerra et al, 2019). However, this idea of a ‘pure populism’ in the case of the Yellow Vests is problematic as it can be argued that it is at the same time both left and right. In some countries, the Yellow Vests movement was co-opted and capitalized on by the far left or the far right, sometimes both. The anti-immigration, anti-semitic and conspiracionist positioning of some of the French leading grassroots figures have attracted public attention and circulated widely in social and countermedia, making the hypothesis of a “pure populism” less plausible.

This paper explores the definitional challenges around the Yellow Vests, especially as a ‘populist movement’ and reflects on the difficulty and potential pitfalls in the usage of that populist label to make sense of such a multifaceted and complex movement.



## **Márton Bene, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence (Hungary)**

Marton Bene (Phd in Political Science) is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences - Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence and a lecturer at Eötvös Lorand University. His research focuses on political communication, social media and politics and political behavior. His publications have appeared in refereed international journals such as *Information, Communication & Society*, *Journal of Information Technology & Politics*, *Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly* and *Problems of Post-Communism*.

### **Populism in context: A cross-country investigation of the Facebook usage of populist appeals during the 2019 EP elections**

Recent scholarship demonstrated that Facebook is a convenient space for populist political communication as its unmediated and viral nature make populist appeals highly efficient in voters' mobilization (Engesser et al, 2017; Jacobs et al, 2020; Jost et al, 2020). However, less attention has been paid to the way these populist messages including anti-elitism, people-centrism and references to out-groups appear on politicians' communication, and what post- and page-level factors they are associated with. We investigate these questions in the context of the 2019 European Parliament election based on unique cross-national dataset covering 12 European countries (Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom). In our research project (Campaigning for Strasbourg – CamforS) we categorized more than 11,000 Facebook posts published by 75 parties' central pages using an identical coding scheme. We expect that populist messages are more likely to be presented together with mobilization appeals, private details, visuals, on the topic of labor-social issues and immigration, and they are mostly used in posts focusing on the national level. We also assume that these posts are highly emotional, but while anti-elitism and the references to the out-groups are associated with negative valence, people-centrism is presented in a more positive way. On page-level, we expect that oppositional parties, right-wing parties and parties with more active followers base (engagement rate = mean number of user engagement/number of followers) will produce more populist messages on their pages.

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## **Emre Metin Bilginer, CIES, Istanbul Aydın University (Turkey)**

Emre Metin Bilginer is currently an Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul Aydın University. He received his PhD in International Relations at Kadir Has University in 2020 with a dissertation on "Explaining the Rise of the Radical Right within the European Context: The Case of Golden Dawn". He holds a BA in Modern Greek Philology from Istanbul University and an MA in International Relations with an emphasis on Turkish-Greek Studies from Istanbul Bilgi University. He has worked as a researcher in the "Greek-Turkish Relations and the Perceptions of Their Elites Project" of Kadir Has University. His research focuses mainly on Nationalism, the European Radical Right, Populism, Turkish-Greek Relations, and Minority Issues. He also contributed as a translator in a modern Greek literature book titled Black Greece.

### **The impact of the evolution of nationalism on the recent rise of the radical right within the European context: The case of Golden Dawn**

This paper aims to analyse one of the recent debates on the rise of the radical right movements related to the Greek case through the use of theoretical approach. The debate, the paper will deal with, was escalated by the criminal accusations towards the Greek Neo Nazi party Golden Dawn. Being a highly sensitive issue among the public and politicians alike, nationalist movements became a matter of lively debate in Europe recent years especially after start of the refugee influx in Europe. In the Greek case, Golden Dawn's entry to Greek parliament in 2012 came into prominence with the aftermath of the economic crisis. The recent rise of the radical right is deeply rooted to Europe's historical evolution of nationalism rather than linked to a single case such as economic recession or refugee influx. Revealing the correlation between the emergence of nationalism and the rise of the radical right will help us understand the Greek case in depth. Golden Dawn's sudden prominence should be examined considering the historical background of nationalism in Europe and specifically in Greece. This study intends to cover major arguments regarding the topic in its theoretical aspects and assemble different major perspectives including Anderson's imagined communities, Hobsbawm's invention of traditions, Smith's Ethno-symbolism, while examining the particular Golden Dawn case rather than discussing primordial or perennial aspects. Identifying the organizational structure of radical right politics within the context of a theoretical framework is significant to comprehend the country specific factors in nationalism studies.

One can see that there was a simultaneous emergence of radical movements all over Europe. This study drives upon the causes of the radical right appearance. It adopts the impact of globalization on nationalism as a framework and it analyses the current situation primarily through Ernest Gellner's functionalist perspective. The global impact of nationalism on the radical movements is a stubborn fact since the radical right movements tend to have a contagious effect especially over the last two centuries. This paper aims to reveal that nationalism and relevant radical right movements are renewable materials and they might emerge under the proper context.



## **Thibault Biscahie, York University (Canada)**

Thibault Biscahie is a PhD Candidate in the Department of Politics at York University. His work focuses on the election of Emmanuel Macron and its impact on French political economy and society. In addition to French and European politics, Thibault is interested in Global Political Economy, International Relations and Comparative Politics. During his doctoral studies, Thibault has presented his work in Canada, the United States, Britain, Switzerland and Greece. Before joining York University, Thibault studied at Sciences Po Lille, Université du Québec à Montréal and Aix-Marseille University. In the fall of 2020, Thibault will be directing the course 'Global Power, Governance and Resistance' at York University.

### **The democratic limits of “Anti-Populism”: Perspectives from France and Italy**

Since the 2008 global financial collapse and the subsequent austerity measures experienced in various EU countries, the term “populism” has been widely used to account for the rise of anti-establishment movements across the continent. It has also been widely contested. Indeed, the “populist” epithet tends to amalgamate a myriad of different political tendencies (from the radical-right to the radical-left) and seems to encompass too many political persuasions to remain analytically meaningful, especially when it leaves academic circles to be mobilized by pundits, editorialists and centrist politicians. In consequence, this essay argues that there is a clear distinction to be made between the academic understandings of populism – which are not consensual but rely on a prolific and diverse literature – and the far more deficient journalistic and political conceptions of populism, that do not designate a meaningful political category but fall rather within the realm of value judgment.

The first section of this article explores the effects populist forces have on national political systems by demonstrating that populism can be understood as an ideology, as a discourse, or as a strategy. Secondly, the paper contrasts the widespread anguish regarding the “populist surge” with an analysis of the democratic consequences of “anti-populism” as a political discourse, strategy, and ideology. In France and Italy, referring to one’s adversary as a “populist” is always pejorative and aims to discredit, neutralize and delegitimize any political claim that does not conform to the status quo. This places considerable discursive framing limits on what is politically possible on ideological grounds. Lastly, the paper argues that the combined influence of “populist” and “anti-populist” political actors leads to a symbolic weakening of traditional political cleavages and to their replacement by unhelpful, superficial binary categories such as “nationalists” versus “progressives”.



## **Courtney Blackington, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (USA)**

Courtney Blackington is a Political Science PhD student studying Comparative Politics and Methodology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Her research focuses on conspiracy theories, protest, and partisanship in East Central Europe. She holds a M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill as well as a B.A. in Government from the College of William and Mary. She has completed fieldwork in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

### **In defence of liberal democracy: Who protests against populists and why?**

When incumbent populists attack liberal democratic institutions, who protests and why? In this article, I show that people in the generation who lived through communism are more likely to protest in defense of liberal democratic institutions than people in the younger generation. A memory of living under authoritarian rule and struggling for democracy motivates the older generation to protest against democratic backsliding. By contrast, the younger generation without this memory may view these protests as less important than advocating for LGBTQ+ and women's rights or climate change policy. To test this theory, I analyze about thirty original interviews I conducted with protesters across Poland in 2019. I also incorporate findings from an original online survey of protesters that I ran in 2020 with two pro-democracy protest organizations. My findings suggest that older individuals who remember communist rule and fought to establish democracy are more likely to protest in support of liberal democracy than younger individuals. They also underscore that scholars should more closely analyze how communist legacies shape protest behavior in the region. This article is among the first to analyze who mobilizes to protect democratic institutions in East Central Europe at the individual level and to analyze how legacies of authoritarian rule impact political behavior in response to populism decades later.




## **Ahmad Bostani, Kharazmi University, Tehran (Iran)**

I am an assistant professor of political science specializing in Islamic and comparative political theory. My area of research falls at the intersection between theology, philosophy, intellectual history and politics. I am particularly interested in the non-rational dynamics in politics, e.g. populism, (religious) extremism, fascism, and right-wing politics.

### **A phenomenological approach to populism and imagination**

A populist discourse does not result from or is not reducible to, the individual mentality of a populist leader, but it is connected to a collective imagination or a social fantasy. Drawing on Ricoeur's phenomenological conception of social imaginary, I would like to explain the ideational aspects of populist discourses towards history or the past. According to Ricoeur, social imaginary has two expressions: Ideology and utopia, each of which has both positive/constitutive and negative/pathological functions. The balance between them makes that a social imaginary would be capable of performing its positive role (integration of society and hope for future). Thus, social imaginaries should not be evaluated based on their coincidence with historical reality. Rather, what is of relevance is the function of imaginary, i.e. the capacity to provide a collective identity and to pull disparate people together. However, the pathological form of ideology (distortion of the past) and utopia (fantasy about the future) would be detrimental. I will argue that populist discourses suffer from this dysfunctional relationship between past and future, rooted in an unbalanced social imaginary.

Hence, populist discourse is always based upon the fantasy of a mystical union, which could be understood as the pathological form of the collective imagination. My paper is based upon two main statements: (a) Politics requires the dissatisfaction with the (historical) reality. (b) In politics, the role of imagination and poiesis is central, since they produce fictions supporting solidarity, legitimacy, and sovereignty as the key concepts of politics. However, this poetic capacity, as a collective process, could lose its strength in difficult situations so that the collective imaginary would not be able anymore to perform its constitutive function. The pathological forms of collective imaginary, including populist discourses, are the results of the absence, or the malfunction of, imaginary dynamism in a community.



## **Cynthia Boyer, Institut Maurice Hauriou, Université Toulouse II, (France)**

Cynthia Boyer lectures in U.S Constitutional law and Common law at Université Toulouse 1 Capitole and American studies at the Institut National Universitaire Champollion in France. She holds a Phd in political science and is graduated in U.S constitutional law and politics (University of Massachussets). Her areas of research include Politics and Constitutional law, racial discrimination, judicial decision making, civil liberties. Her scholarship has appeared in the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Yale Law Journal, Berkeley Public Policy Press, the Institute of Governmental Studies and the California Constitution Center, The Constitutional Law Journal, Elon Law Review and other American journals and reviews.

### **Government speech, misinformation and social media in the Trump age**

Within the limit of 140 signs, tweets posted online on Twitter, it is possible for those who use them, to benefit from the fundamental principle of freedom of expression online. The framework and the conditions of their use raise however real ethical obstacles. The use of the media has a fundamental strategic dimension in the conquest or exercise of power and in the recent years political leaders have moved much of their communications with the general public online, through their use of social media and particularly Twitter. President Donald Trump is particularly active with his extensive communications via his account which is also his main communication tool with its more than 80 million followers. Such government social media usage has historically gone unchecked by the courts, but that changed with the Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump ruling. In addition, Twitter began for the first time to suggest that some of President Trump's tweets might lack a factual basis by putting warnings on his posts.

This generates the central question of ethics and misinformation inherent in the social regulation of political speech on twitter, the Internet users who will ultimately be in charge of policing social networks. Platforms approach the moderation problem differently as getting content moderation is not easy. There are likely to be lawsuits and regulatory investigations over how social media interpret their own user rules and define misinformation, and the conflictual relation with political speech and populism. This article will first thus deal with the issue of censorial power of government, "prior restraint" on the speech of social media companies in connection with the ethical and misinformation dimension (1). Then it will analyze the idea of internet platforms trying to police political speech redefining ethics and information (2).



## **Meljana Bregu, University of Tirana (Albania)**

Dr. Meljana Bregu is an Albanian scholar and author and a lecturer at the Faculty of History and Philology (University of Tirana) from 2011 . She has studied Legal Science and earned her bachelor degree with EU law thesis on “The control of concentrations between companies in European Union Law” at Bologna University. In 2008 she finished the second cycle degree program in Law with distinction. In 2010 she obtained a scholarship and successfully completed the Master Course in Diplomacy and International Policy with a particular focus on European Union Law at Faculty of Political Science (Bologna University). She completed her PHD studies in international relations at Tirana University. Since then she has been a visiting fellow with the Jean Monnet Program at Bologna University in 2014 and at La Sapienza University at 2018. Also, she is Coordinator of the Jean Monnet Module the Albanian Society towards full integration into the European Family at Tirana University and a team member of the Jean Monnet Module Human Rights Evolution Protection and Limits. She has written scientific articles in national and international journals and has participated in national and international conference.

### **The impact of Covid-19 and populism on the future of the European Union**

The European Union is facing a sanitary crisis and also the threat of populism that will impact the European integration. Although, populism is not a new phenomena in Europe, it is gaining more prominence due to the ongoing Covid-19 crises. The rise of populist movements and politics has grown from 2008, in many states like France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal due to economic and political crisis.

In 2008 the populist movements were concentrated on the mass unemployment and the financial crisis, then in 2011 on the Eurozone crisis, when they focused on the division between northern and southern member states. Now we face a new fresh of populism rhetoric concentrated on Covid 19.

The populist movements advocate a strict control borders in order to undermine the coordination and cooperation across the Eu member states, and to limit the free movement of people which is one of the founding principles of the European Union. Covid-19 represents an opportunity for populist movements but also a threat for the future of the European Union. The lack of coordination since the start of the crisis has resulted in a number of member states acting and facing the crisis on their own. The weak response of the EU to Covid-19 has benefited the populist movements who want a stronger national sovereignty on the borders and also has highlight the differences between northern and southern states.

Also, the EU failed to help Italy to cope with the crisis at the beginning of the emergency. This lack of solidarity which is a fundamental principle of the EU, has brought a rise of Euroscepticism in Italy. The paper will address the threat that the European integration is facing due to Covid-19 crisis and especially the rhetoric of Lega Nord and Brothers of Italy far-right movements in Italy.

## **Tuukka Brunila, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

PhD student in political philosophy working on de-politicization and the concept of sovereignty. Researcher in Centre of Excellence in Law, Identity and the European narratives (Eurostorie).

### **Populism and the limits of politics**

In post-foundational theory, the distinction between the political and politics is fundamental for understanding populism. For example, Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau have both analysed populism based on this distinction. Laclau writes that “the conditions of possibility of the political and the conditions of possibility of populism are the same”. The political is defined as the concrete possibility of antagonism based on differences of interests between groups. Therefore, populist movements that try to destabilize the dominant hegemony operate by bringing out social divisions and antagonisms within a society.

In this paper, I want to analyse this distinction from the perspective of de-politicization. I argue that de-politicization is something that connects both post-foundational theory and populism. As Mouffe points out, the political as the dimension of antagonism is the same as the Hobbesian state of nature. Like Hobbes, who used the state of nature as an argument for strong sovereign that can limit antagonisms, Mouffe claims that a radical democracy is able to “defuse” or “tame” the political. My idea is that political theory operating with the distinction between political and politics concerns de-politicization.

To theorize the political as a dimension of antagonisms means to argue for a form of politics that is able to limit the political. Similarly, populist movements have a (re-)politicizing effect only to a certain extent. As Laclau points out, a populist leader is “an agent presenting itself, in an antagonistic way, as the whole community.” To represent the whole community is an attempt to depoliticize politics, that is, to limit what the relevant practices and forms of politics should be. My paper suggests that de-politicization is therefore fundamental for understanding both populism and theories about populism.



## **Emanuela Buscemi, University of Monterrey (Mexico)**

Emanuela Buscemi teaches at the University of Monterrey (Mexico). She holds a doctoral degree in Sociology from the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. She is affiliated as a research associate with CEFAS, Kuwait. She taught at the American University of Kuwait (AUK) and was a research fellow at the Center for Gulf Studies in the same institution. Her research interests include social movement theories, informal political activism and resistance, youth, gender and identity politics, narratives of communities and belonging, political transitions. Her geographical focuses are the Gulf countries and Latin America. Her publications have appeared in *AG About Gender-International Journal of Gender Studies*, *Contemporary Social Science- Journal of the Academy of Social Sciences*, *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies*, and in edited volumes (New York University Press, Routledge, Palgrave MacMillan, Peter Lang). She co-authored *Everyday Youth Cultures in the Gulf Peninsula: Changes and Challenges* (Routledge, 2020).

### **Mexican populism and the feminist social movement**

On March 9th, 2020, feminist activists in Mexico declared a one-day strike from work, studies and domestic activities to protest against the rising and worrying levels of gender-based violence in the country, a mere hours away from the International Women's Day when women marched in the streets of Mexican cities with unprecedented vigour and in huge numbers. The following day, a large selection of women and girls from different stances, occupations, socio-economic and age groups, political affiliations, race and religious beliefs decided to stay at home and subsequently muted themselves on the social media, replicating the invisibility and absence that victims of violence had left on the country. The strike involved public and private schools and universities, shops, malls, restaurants and transportation, signalling the success of the initiative. However, on the same day, Mexican president Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador announced that he would be selling raffle tickets for the presidential airplane lottery in a populist operation to raise money for social projects whilst discarding an outdated piece of equipment and implicitly ousting the previous administrations for their squandering of public funds. This move was attacked on traditional and social media by opposition parties and activists for a lack of consideration for the victims of gender violence. When asked to comment, the president remarked that he "hadn't realized it".

The mentioned episode exemplifies the relationship between nationalism, populism, patriarchy and the institutional devaluation of violence against women in Mexico. Despite being considered a fully democratic country, Mexico has been known to display severe social and economic disparities and disproportions based on race, gender and social categories.

The present chapter investigates the nationalistic, populist rhetoric of the state and how it intersects with gender, race and class discourses by exploring the recent resurgence of the feminist movement and street protests in Mexico.



## **Rosemarie Calleja, MCAST Institute for the Creative Arts (Malta)**

Rosemarie is a senior media lecturer at MCAST, Institute for the Creative Arts. She studied her Masters in Media Management, Film and Media Studies at the University of Stirling and she holds a bachelor degree at the University of Malta in Communications with Psychology (Hons). In 2009, she was awarded the Harold Scorey Scholarship in Broadcast Journalism where she did an internship with HARDtalk team at BBC in London. In 2010, she won the National Prize for the European Parliament Journalism Award for Print Journalism Award and came second in the National Prize of the EU Journalist Award "For Discrimination Against Diversity". In 2018, she was chosen by the US Embassy for the SUSI (Study of the United States Institutes) in Journalism and Media, at Ohio University. At the moment she is applying for her PhD research which focuses on Maltese Media Polarization - a Threat to Identity.

### **Political communication and media in times of crisis and polarisation**

The third wave of democratization is rapidly changing. In parallel to this shift is globalisation. Another force is the media where in developed countries it is shaping public opinion. Political communication plays a dominant role in the media. As a result, polarization is increasingly causing a divide in global societies. We are witnessing a threat to liberal democracy. This crisis is manifested in democratised countries, however on different scales, as the public sphere strives to understand their identity. Research identified that the "hostile media perceptions" or the tendency for the partisans on both sides of a political issue to see ostensibly neutral media content as biased against their point of view (Vallone Ross & Lepper, 1985; Giner-Sorella & Chaikan, 1994). Given that Perceived Media Bias (PMB) is inversely related to trust, one expects to observe its impact on political behaviour. People tend to form incorrect impressions of the balance of information and presented news content and categorise them as unfavourable. Reid (2012) argued that social identity proposes that PMB comes from social identity processes instead. But the responses are shaped by the contours of the media and political systems in which audience members are embedded.

This research will analyse how polarised media affects smaller countries, like Malta, an European Union state, where high polarization prevails and hostility towards journalism is on the rise. Malta's media model is based on the Hallin & Mancini model. Since the Pluralism Act in 1991, an explosion of new media outlets have evolved, however the media are largely owned by the two main political parties. This is creating pressure for the Public Broadcasting Services to maintain its impartiality as its business model is flawed, since the two party-system clearly is showing cracks. These challenges will be discussed as the political, institutional and socio-cultural factors are influenced by the polarized media that is strengthened by populist political discourse.





## **Tereza Capelos, University of Birmingham (United Kingdom)**

Tereza Capelos is Associate Professor in Political Psychology and Director of the Institute for Conflict Cooperation and Security (ICCS) at the University of Birmingham. She is President Elect of the International Society of Political Psychology, and Standing Group co-Convener for the Political Psychology Standing Group of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR). Her research examines how emotions interact with cognitive processes and determine political decision making during international crises and tensions. Her publications on political reactionism provide an empirically tested model on citizens' resentful affect which, combined with conservation values, explains anti-immigration and anti-EU preferences, and predicts support for populist parties across Europe. She also examines affective competences in international mediation and conflict, the role of anger and fear on perceptions of foreign policy, political emotions and BrExit, emotions as determinants of reasoning about human rights of migrants, and psychological processes that influence institutional compliance on human rights regulations. She is Co-Editor for the Palgrave Series in Political Psychology, co-Editor of the Palgrave Global Handbook in Political Psychology, and serves at the editorial boards of several international journals. At the University of Birmingham Tereza is programme director of two MSc degrees: MSc Political Psychology of International Relations and the MSc Global Cooperation and Security.

### **Hot reaction: Resentment, values, and reactionary orientations in populist times**

In this paper we investigate the role of resentment and backward values as determinants of reactionary orientations in populist times. Political reaction is a complex political orientation of feeling resentment while being overwhelmed by the present and wanting to return to the past (Capelos, Katsanidou, Demertzis, 2017). It is stimulated and is responsive to 'anti' narratives promoted by populist discourses from the left and the right in times of crisis. Here we examine the psychological process of reaction, by which political frustrations and resentments are acted out in the form of illegal and violent political actions, expressed as their dormant support, or manifested through 'anti' preferences. We use data from seven focus groups conducted between January 2014 and April 2015 in Greece during the financial crisis, which explore participants' individual emotionality and reasoning as well as group processes and collective emotions. Our qualitative data allow for rich conceptualizations and operationalisations of the motivational, affective and cognitive drivers of political reaction. Our findings extend theoretical and empirical work in the field and shed light on the black box of the drivers of political reactionism and its resentful affective base.



## **James Carr, Martin J. Power and Eoin Devereux, University of Limerick (Ireland)**

James Carr lectures in the Department of Sociology, University of Limerick, Ireland. In 2016, he published his first book *Experiences of Islamophobia: Living with Racism in the Neoliberal Era* (London and New York: Routledge). In addition to other scholarly work, James has also authored the *European Islamophobia Report* on Ireland for 2015-20.

Martin Power is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, University of Limerick, Ireland. Martin has published widely on the impact of Neoliberalism in contemporary societies.

Eoin Devereux is a Professor in the Department of Sociology at University of Limerick, Ireland. He is also an Adjunct Professor in Contemporary Culture at the University of Jyväskylä. He has published extensively on media, music and representations of poverty.

### **Let's go fly a kite: Performing populism in the Republic of Ireland**

The Republic of Ireland is routinely heralded as a place where support for Far Right Populism is either non-existent or very low. This paper questions this understanding of Ireland and Populism. Performative populism in its many forms (e.g. Pro-Life Catholicism; Anti Vaccination; Anti Mask and Anti-Immigration and anti-Islam protests and campaigns) have been utilised in recent years in an attempt to recruit new members for an arguably nascent, but distinctly Irish Far-Right movement. While Irish in its claims to a mythicized Celtic and Catholic past, this somewhat disparate movement is interconnected and intertwined with multifarious Far Right groups in the UK, Europe and the USA. Despite these international connections, overtly Far-Right groups such as these remain without widespread public support in Ireland. However, the absence of overtly populist political parties in the centre (and very low levels of voting for newer populist parties) should not be confused with an absence of populism. Our paper argues that there is evidence to suggest how the mainstream political parties have, at times, fulfilled the function of the Far Right in the kinds of rhetoric they have engaged in. This is best exemplified by the 'kite-flying' engaged in by Fine Gael, Fianna Fail and the Labour Party on a range of issues including The Citizenship Referendum, debates over Direct Provision for Asylum Seekers and the 'on/off' positions concerning inward migration (see Haynes, Power and Devereux, 2010; Lentin and McVeigh, 2006 and Garner, 2007). We contend that neoliberal ideologies and discourses are the key to understanding these populist movements in Ireland.



## **Rebecca Carr, Trinity College Dublin (Ireland)**

Rebecca Carr is a PhD candidate in European Studies at Trinity College Dublin. She is researching “the function of cultural mythology in Southeastern European post-conflict films. In her thesis, supervised by Dr Clemens Ruthner, she analyses how films engage cultural myths to evaluate collective identity after the upheaval of war. Her research interests include; cultural trauma, cultural mythology, collective identity, popular culture, and artistic expressions as cultural artefacts.

Carr holds two BAs (Hons), one in Psychology (George Washington University) and one in Film, Literature and Drama (Dublin Business School), as well as an MPhil in Textual and Visual Studies (Trinity College Dublin). For her second undergraduate dissertation, *Defamiliarisation in the Arts of War*, she evaluated the utilisation of the Formalist ostranenie technique in anti-war texts from various artistic mediums.

In addition to writing her thesis, and lecturing at Trinity College about the socio-cultural impact of World War I on Germany, Carr contributes to an online curriculum supplement that educates secondary school students about society through science fiction films. She also tutors secondary school students in film literacy and cultural studies. Carr is dedicated to bridging the public and academic communities through an exchange of culture and theory.

### **Polarising mythology in the films of Clint Eastwood and Emir Kusturica**

This presentation aims to explore the mechanics of potentially polarising films released amidst significant social and political transition. In some nations, the recent hegemonic shifts toward inclusion and international cooperation triggered a populist outcry against the “war on traditional values.” Two self-proclaimed “apolitical” directors, Clint Eastwood of the United States and Emir Kusturica, now of Serbia, directed and starred in mainstream films that depict this perceived threat. In *Gran Torino* (2008), Eastwood portrays a self-reliant, retired Ford factory worker who defends his property and the once-white, blue-collar neighbourhood from a violent gang of refugees. If he once lived the “American Dream,” it has been taken from him, leaving him vulnerable in his twilight years. Kusturica appears as a humble milkman living at the battlefield where the enemies come and go, but the violence is perpetual in the magical realist *On the Milky Road* (2016). Austro-Hungarians, Bosniaks, Croats, and the British all try to rob Serbia of the harmony Kusturica claims it defends. These, as well as other mainstream films, can function as “prosthetic memories” wherein viewers may integrate the narratives as personal experience (Landsberg 2004). Citing films about historical events such as the Holocaust, Landsberg argues identification can increase empathy across divides. However, building on Nidesh Lawtoo’s argument about “reloaded myth”, movies that address current events may have a galvanising effect on audiences whose personal experience relates to those depicted in the film, leading to further polarisation. Each director utilises their culture-specific mythology to articulate declarations of victimhood and challenges to masculinity and heritage that are consonant with the two nations’ right-wing populist stances. *Gran Torino* and *On the Milky Road* demonstrate how films engage national tropes and narratives to advocate for a particular stance, especially in times of significant social, political and economic change.

## **Furkan Cay, University of Szeged, PhD Candidate and Murat Deregözü, Corvinus University of Budapest (Hungary)**

Furkan Cay is currently doing his PhD at University of Szeged, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences. His research interests lie in populism in general and Turkish populism in particular. In his PhD research, he specifically focuses upon Recep Tayyip Erdogan's populist progress in general elections of 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2018.

Murat Deregözü is doing his PhD at University of Corvinus. His research interests including geopolitics and Turkish domestic and foreign policy.

### **Early Turkish populism**

Although populism, one of six fundamental pillars of Kemalist ideology, officially entered Turkish constitution in 1937, its origins can be traced back to the Second Constitutional Period in Ottoman Empire. Among others, Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akçura, the intellectuals of the Mesrutiyet regime, formulated the Turkish populism heavily influenced by the Russian Narodnism Movement, but this concept was interpreted differently during early republican period of Turkey. Previous studies assumed that Turkish populism is a rigid and unchangeable ideology however, unlike assumption, it has always renewed itself and reflected the economic and social conditions of the period. Thus, aim of this study is to demonstrate how understanding and practice of populism has changed from late Ottoman Empire period to early Turkish Republic.



## **Brian Charles, National University of Singapore (Singapore)**

Brian Charles is a Teaching Assistant in the Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore. He recently graduated from NUS with a Master of Social Sciences in November 2020. His M.A. thesis was a genealogical analysis of the term 'populism' as a concept in the academic literature spanning 1890 to 2020. His research interests include political theory, intellectual history, history of ideas, philosophy, sociology of knowledge, political psychology and questions relating to democratic legitimacy. Formerly also a Teaching Assistant in the Department, he has taught extensively across the four subfields of political science. He was placed on the Honour Roll of the Graduate Students Teaching Award in 2020, having received teaching awards three times consecutively.

### **“The Sham(e) of Democracy”: Contemporary Populism and the Politics of Shame**

Over the last three decades writers have increasingly agreed that we live in a “Populist Age”. But this agreement has not been accompanied by consensus over the precise factors accounting for the current surge in populism. Existing research remains divided whether economic reasons (globalization, neoliberalism, unemployment) or cultural reasons (hostility toward immigrants, minorities, and historically disadvantaged groups) best explain contemporary populism. Adopting the framework offered by Salmela and von Scheve (2017), this paper argues that affects and emotions, particularly that of shame, provide an important explanation for the popularity of populist parties and leaders. This finding not only constitutes a crucial missing link in populism studies but also bridges the current divide between ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’ approaches. By offering the ‘politics of shame’ as an explanandum that accounts for the respective limitations of the aforementioned approaches, this framework invites greater scholarly consensus regarding the phenomenon of populism. In this paper I make three distinct, but interrelated arguments: 1) As a gendered concept that is linked to ideas of legitimate sex and sexuality, the politics of shame explains the contemporary popularity and preference for strongmen leaders as a restoration of heteronormative masculinity 2) The ‘politics of shame’ posits that race and class are not separate entities but subsets of the same economic system. The declining position of white majorities relative to minorities and immigrants has triggered a backlash against the latter group, because the overweening dominance that such majorities have come to expect to enjoy over other groups has diminished, and not because they are faring worse than other groups per se. The politics of shame highlights the centrality of race as a category within contemporary populism, serving as an important corrective to previous studies that have tried to sidestep this issue by painting populism as an solely socio-economic phenomenon 3) Distinguishing between ‘repressed shame’ and ‘acknowledged shame’ can help us to identify which forms and expressions of shame are dangerous toward democratic rule and which are constitutive of democratic rule.



## **Ionut Chiruta, University of Tartu (Estonia)**

Ionut Chiruta is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Tartu and a Marie Curie-Skłodowska fellow in Project FATIGUE (Delayed Transformational Fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe: Responding to the Rise of Populism).

Under Dr. Vello Pettai, Ionut's doctoral thesis wants to reveal how populism shapes Romanian politics and reconstructs the memory and political identity of the Hungarian minority. Between 2019-2020, Ionut had his secondment at the Corvinus University of Budapest and the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities from Cluj. Apart from academic responsibilities, Ionut was an intern at Minorities' Rights Group International from Budapest.

In terms of education, Ionut has a MAc in Media Studies from the Universitetet I Oslo (NO) and a BAc in Communication from the Cuza University (RO). Ionut followed other courses at the University of Tartu (EE), Maastricht University, Central European University (HU), and University of Helsinki (FI).

### **COVID-19: Performing control through sedimented discursive norms on mainstream media in Romania**

Amongst the many adverse events that happened during the Covid-19 pandemic was the scapegoating of ethnic communities for the spread of the virus. One of the most pinned ethnic communities in the media was the Roma communities. Labeled as not compliant with the rules emitted by national authorities, the Roma communities were harassed online and in the open by police forces. Aroused by the influx of ethnic Romani people returning to Romania from other European countries, the media expanded its coverage on the ethnic minority. Several incidents in which the police authorities and the Roma communities were involved triggered a hyperbolic treatment in Roma news through the use of clickbait articles. In this study, the main aim is to analyze the input/output dynamism of the information flow created by media and developed further in echo-chambers targeting the Roma community in Romania. Thus, we ask to what degree was the virus ethnicized in the Romanian media?

Also, we ask what new conditions of hate-speech did the Covid-19 produced in terms of ethnic racism on Social Media? Using network analysis, we will analyze how clickbait articles posted on Facebook by conventional news outlets connected and inflamed the racial, ethnic, and cultural stereotypes. Though not having our data collection completed, we estimate two particular findings from our analyses. Firstly, the hyperbolic treatment in the news of the Roma community focused on socio-cultural arguments that alluded the community being responsible for the spread of the disease. Secondly, the coverage of the Roma community from the media developed an entrenched racist and xenophobic set of narratives in echo-chambers groups on Facebook.



**Michael Cole, University of Tartu (Estonia),  
Marianna Lya Zummo Università degli Studi di  
Palermo (Italy), Sara Garcia, and Universitat  
Jaume I (Spain)**

Michael Cole is a PhD candidate at the University of Tartu, and an Early Stage Researcher in the FATIGUE Project. His dissertation examines Russian influence on far-right populist discourses in Georgia and Ukraine. Michael's research interests also include football's relationship with extreme politics and identity in Eastern Europe. The FATIGUE project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under grant agreement No. 765224.

Marianna Lya Zummo is currently a tenured researcher at the University of Palermo, Italy. Her interests cover issues in sociolinguistics, genre, communication dynamics and studies on the dimension of modality and evidentiality. Her research is primarily related to issues in (health and political) communication in online contexts. She has authored numerous articles which have appeared in international journals and edited collections. Recent publications include: *Performing Authenticity on a Digital Political Stage: "The war is over". Militarizing the language and framing the Nation in post-Brexit discourse* (2020), *Politainment as Interactive Practice and (Populist?) Performance* (2020), *Political Identities Constructed on a Social Network: The Labour Party on Facebook Boards* (2019), *Posting for Consensus, Sharing Consensus. The Case of Migrants on Facebook* (2018), *The linguistic construction of confirmation niches in online comment sequences* (2018), *A Linguistic Analysis Of The Online Debate On Vaccines And Use Of Fora As Information Stations And Confirmation Niche* (2017), *New Health Advice: Health Forum Sites as a Change of Discourse Frame, from Doctor-to-Patient to User-to-User* (2016).

**Constructing “Authentic” Populism on Social Media: Visual and Discursive Approaches**

This panel examines the ways in which populist leaders construct affective communities on social media through performances of authenticity. The panel analyses populist leaders' online self-representation, aligning their authentic selves with the common people against the elite. This is examined through social media posts on their everyday personal life (their taste, their lifestyle, their home, their loved ones). The focus of the panel is on case studies that analyse politicians' posts during COVID-19 lockdown, which has obliged them to work from home, showing their domestic, intimate and “most authentic” space, often detached from political paraphernalia. The underlying idea is that, far from banal, these posts attempt to emotionally connect with citizens, creating communities based on shared identities and trust that can be easily mobilised for political goals. The conceptual framework brings together scattered research on social media studies, political communication and popular culture, creating a multidisciplinary conceptual approach for understanding this new yet poorly understood phenomenon in political communication. While there is an incipient debate about the virality of political leaders' intimate social media posts in journalistic publications, yet there is a lack of expert understanding about this novel phenomenon, for which the panel will provide both theoretical insights and concrete data that will help us better understand the specific means by which populist performances of authenticity take place on social media. The panel aims at making a contribution to the field by uncovering the multiple faces of populism from a discursive and an aesthetic perspective (visual rhetoric, multimodal analysis), advancing knowledge about the intersection of popular and populist media in a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013).

## **Luke Collison, CRMEP, Kingston University London (Germany)**

Dr Luke Collison is a recent PhD Graduate from the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, at Kingston University London. His PhD dissertation, completed under the supervision of Peter Hallward and Howard Caygill, concerned the concept of political authority and role of religion in the work of Thomas Hobbes and Carl Schmitt. His current research delves into the 'energy-humanities' and use of scientific analogy in modern political thought. He is co-editor of a forthcoming volume on Jacques Derrida's Politics of Friendship, to be published by EUP in 2021.

### **The political “energy” of Georges Sorel**

Describing the transformation of politics in the nineteenth century Hippolyte Taine complained that the word, 'energy, formerly ridiculous, becomes fashionable and is used on every occasion.' (Taine, 1876) The political demands to halt climate destruction have provoked a similar growth in the 'energy-humanities' today (Clarke, 2001). However, this literature has largely overlooked George Sorel's use of 'energy' in his politics of myth. Beyond the emotional connotations of energy with 'enthusiasm' and 'excitement' typical of the nationalist and populist rhetoric of energy (Barres), I argue that Sorel drew explicitly on the scientific discourse of thermodynamics, in a search for a model for spontaneous political action. I show that Sorel, based on Giambattista Vico's ideogenetic law, attempts to understand the political consequences of the new physics of thermodynamics and Brownian motion. Taking physics as a model, political images become a 'reserve of energy' to be mobilized by opposed groups. As a convertible, transformable resource, energy evokes Laclau's 'chains of equivalence'. But Sorel eschews the register of discourse and turns to the image. Popular political action depends on channeling and harnessing this latent potential energy of the image.





## **Emma Connolly, Open University (United Kingdom)**

I completed my Masters Degree at Leicester University in 2015 with a specific focus on the affective power of the image (The Orange Series which emerged from Guantanamo Bay and depicted the dehumanisation of detainees) and its role in the justification of the G.WoT. This led to a wider interest in affective politics and the role of emotion in political decision making. Broadly speaking, my interests lie in Critical Terrorism Studies, the role of trauma in memory, the impact of technology on Politics and critical thinking on time. My research at the Open University, where I am a PhD student, lies at the intersection of memory, emotion and technology. It specifically explores the role of technology in shaping affective communities after terror attacks and feeds into a wider discourse on the impact of real-time media interactions on memory work.

### **#JeSuisCharlie and #TheyAreUs: Populist politics as affective performance**

After 9/11, there was an increased understanding that commemoration is often seen as something done by and for the state. Emotionally, it is often framed as a collective and unifying experience which helps the Nation and individuals to heal and move on. In opposition to this, there is a large body of literature which explores counternarratives of commemoration but this is often related specifically to war or oriented towards the more distant past. After a spate of recent terror attacks across the Western world, commemoration has become almost instantaneous. A growing number of people are turning to social media to express emotions through the sharing of hashtags so there is a need to fully understand the emotions behind the often polarised and divisive commemorative practices which take place in 'real time' on social media. Not only in terms of how commemorative narratives and counter-narratives are articulated within online communities but in a wider sense, the impact of technology of populist politics.

Focusing on two hashtags #jesuischarlie and #theyareus, this paper looks to explore the way that emotions are implicated in shaping identities of the state, individuals and sub-state groups when terror attacks occur and are commemorated. It conceptualises populism as an 'affective performance' (Maldonado, 2017) that is as much 'a matter of the heart as it is the head'. In doing so, it suggests that it is highly problematic to see these practices as a simple unifying of 'the people' and instead, seemingly unifying commemorative practices should be seen as a fragmented and complex collection (rather than collective) of emotions.



## **Bezen Coskun, TED University (Turkey)**

Dr. Bezen Balamir Coşkun, an expert in international relations, received her Ph.D. degree from Loughborough University (UK). She worked in several higher education institutions and research centers both in Turkey and abroad. Dr. Coskun's areas of specialization are Turkish foreign policy, Turkish migration and refugee policies, Middle East Conflict (War in Syria, Israel - Palestine Conflict), Arab Spring, migration, Human security, gender and foreign policy, and non-governmental organizations. Currently, she is working as an adjunct professor in TED University and Research Fellow at Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik - Center for Applied Turkish Studies (CATS).

### **Syrian refugees in the eyes of the second generation of exchangee (Mubadil) families in Izmir**

Izmir is a province where migration and immigrant cultures are evident. In less than a century, Izmir has experienced several waves of migration from the Balkans. Today there are around 1.5 million inhabitants of Izmir coming from emigrant and exchangee families from the Balkans (Sait, 2013). These families with the history of Balkan emigration still define themselves as emigrants (muhajir) or descendants exchangees (mubadil). With the Lausanne Convention, around 32000 exchangees settled in Izmir between 1923 and 1927.

During our previous ethnographic study on host communities' security perceptions regarding Syrian refugees, we were surprised to observe the negativity of Izmir inhabitants. In Izmir, we were expecting a more emphatic approach towards Syrian refugees. However, despite the dominance of migrant culture and a long history with immigrants, most of the inhabitants of Izmir were very vocal regarding their negative attitudes towards Syrians who seek refugee in Izmir (Coskun and Kilic 2019). Based on this observation, it is decided to design this research to understand Balkan emigrants' perceptions and Syrians' ideas. In this context, this study started to investigate the second generation of Lausanne Exchangees' perceptions of Syrian refugees.

In this study, storytelling ethnography is used to collect exchangee families' migration stories. Before listening to participants' families' migration stories, their views of Syrians were asked. Following the collection of these initial thoughts on Syrians, they were asked to share migration stories of their families. From our conversations with second-generation members of Exchangee families, four common themes were derived: the trauma of uprooting, financial hardship, adaptation/integration, good citizenship. After recollection of their families' memories about being "Exchangee (Mubadil)," they were asked to review Syrians' initial views. It was assumed that the recollection of memories make them re-think about being "migrant." It is believed that after the study, they are more emphatic towards Syrian refugees. Thus, it would have positive outcomes for participants and the wider community.



## **Ayan Das, University of Gour Banga and Debajit Goswami, Netaji Subhas Open University (India)**

Ayan Das is presently serving as Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Gour Banga, Malda, West Bengal, India. He is Currently pursuing PhD in Social sciences from Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Kolkata, West Bengal, India. He has several research articles to his credit and participated in various national and international conferences till date. His current research interests include Political Theory, Political Economy, Populism, Indian Politics and West Bengal Politics.

Debajit Goswami is presently serving as Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administration, Netaji Subhas Open University, Kolkata, India. He is also a member of the UG and PG Board of Studies of Public Administration, Netaji Subhas Open University, Kolkata. He has also served as an Assistant Professor in Amity University Kolkata, University of Engineering and Management Kolkata and Directorate of Distance Education, Rabindra Bharati University respectively. He has several research articles to his credit and participated in various national and international conferences till date. His current research interests include Indian government and politics, public policy, political thought, Indian constitutional law and environmental politics.

### **How to identify a populist political party? Understanding the mode of governance of populist parties: A study of Left Front & Trinamool congress regimes in West Bengal, India**

Broadly, populism may be interpreted as, the opposition of the elite by the poor. In the democratic process, populism gives the masses the opportunity to use representative politics to negotiate for socio-economic equality and justice against the ruling elites. The populist character of a political party depends on the extent to which it is able to realize popular national or regional aspirations. To identify a political party as a populist one, analysis of their policies and programs is utmost necessary. It may not be right to label a political party as a populist without a thorough analysis of the policies adopted and implemented.

Therefore, to identify a populist party, we shall consider the extent to which its policies and programmes voices the popular demands of masses and negates the dominance of the elite classes. Furthermore, the far-reaching effects of their implemented programmes, in establishing economic, social and political equality and justice for the oppressed and marginalized people, is evaluated.

In this context, we examine the policies adopted, implemented, by the Left Front- I government (1977- 1982) and compare it with the Trinamool Congress- I regime (2011-2016) of West Bengal to examine their degree of populist tendencies. We identify that both adopted populist politics and so examine their different type of populism, in their journey from opposition parties to elected government. We explain how a party (basically State Populism) can sustain and manage their populist activities after assuming power.

Understanding Populism from Laclauian perspective, Logic of Equivalence and Logic of Difference are essential elements, however the nature of state populism in West Bengal also necessitates the consideration of Logic of Governance as an expression of governmentality.

## **Emiliana De Blasio & Isabella Borrelli, LUISS University (Italy), Donatella Selva, Tuscia University (Italy)**

Emiliana De Blasio is professor of Media Sociology, Open Government and Media Gender and Politics at LUISS University (Rome, Italy). She teaches in Gregorian University and she gave seminar and lectures in UK, Spain, Germany and France. She is associated to academic networks working on digital eco-systems, e-democracy, political movements, information disorders and the intersection among media, gender and politics in Italy and Europe. In her most recent works, she has investigated populism, leadership and communication, with particular emphasis on how different variants of populism relate with technology and gender. She published books and articles in English, Spanish, Portuguese, German and Croatian. Among her last publications she published the monographs e-Democracy (2019) and Governo Online (2018). Together with Patricia Coll-Rubio, she has guest-edited the special issue of Tripodos on Covid-19 communication (2020), and with Marianne Kneuer, Michele Sorice and Wolf Shuenemann the special issue of Media and Communication on the Transformation of the Digital Public Sphere (2020).

Among her most recent publications: Platform party between digital activism and hyper-leadership: The reshaping of the public sphere (with L. Viviani), Media and Communication; Public Communication and the Barriers to Participation: The Case of Rome from an Open Government Perspective (with C. Colasanti and D. Selva), Partecipazione e Conflitto; Spaces of Struggle: Socialism and Neoliberalism With a Human Face Among Digital Parties and Online Movements in Europe (with M. Sorice), TripleC; Populism between direct democracy and the technological myth (with M. Sorice).

Isabella Borrelli is a Digital Strategist and an intersectional feminist and LGBT + activist. She is teaching assistant of Media Gender and Politics at LUISS University (Italy), taught by Emiliana De Blasio. With a senior experience in institutional communication - specialised in advocacy - she has followed clients such as Vodafone, MIBAC, Oxfam and Policlinico di Milano. Among the 140 feminists in Italy according to Ladynomics and among the 1000 women who are changing Italy according to Startup Italia 2020 and 2019, she teaches at

the Talent Garden and University of Padua. Inspirational speaker for TEDxCaserta, Campus Party, In-EDU and many more. She has published Unconventional Communication (in Comunicazione integrata e reputation management, edited by G.Comin, in Italian).

Donatella Selva is professor of Sociology at Tuscia University (Italy) and at Pontifical Gregorian University (Vatican City), and assistant professor of Open Government at LUISS University (Italy), taught by E. De Blasio. She is part of a research network analysing global leaders' communication in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, distinguishing and comparing populist and non-populist discourses. Her work is focused on the role of emotions in the contemporary public sphere, with particular emphasis on studying how emotions relate to political trends on social media platforms. She has recently published a book titled Digital Emotions (in Italian) in which she explores the opportunities and challenges of a positive reading of emotions in politics and social media. The book takes online solidarity movements as case studies to emphasise how platforms and emotions are part of a wider communicative ecology that nurtures populist as well as counter-populist discourses.

Among her most recent publications: Leaders and emotions in post-representative

democracies (forthcoming); Affective Governance During the COVID-19 Crisis: Building Leadership, Trust, and Good Citizens (with E. De Blasio), Tripodos; Il discorso della solidarietà: migrazioni, Terzo Settore e social media (in Italian), Mondi Migranti; Public Communication and the Barriers to Participation: The Case of Rome from an Open Government Perspective (with E. De Blasio and C. Colasanti), Partecipazione e Conflitto; Emotions in the Public Sphere: Networked Solidarity, Technology and Social Ties (with E. De Blasio), book chapter in B. Fox, Emotions and Loneliness in the Networked Society; Implementing open government: a qualitative comparative analysis of digital platforms in France, Italy and United Kingdom (with E. De Blasio), Quality and Quantity.

### **Countering populism with positive emotions: An analysis of queer movements' communication in Italy**

The pandemic has catalysed the effects of a post-public sphere marked by increasing polarization, disinformation and hate speech. We also argue that it has triggered counter-movements to emerge and articulate a reflection on communication as epistemic common good. The paper analyses how such movements have challenged the politics of hate and populist rhetoric in the Italian public sphere. The particular context of lockdown has constrained activists' repertoire of action into a quasi-exclusively communicative field of contention, mainly situated in social media platforms. During those crucial months, feminist networks and LGBTQIA+ activist groups have increased their commitment to contrast online misogyny and hate speech, articulating an alternative vision of social media, and revitalising a common culture that privileges emotions such as love, compassion, altruism, solidarity, and empathy. The paper addresses the emerging culture of empathy emerging from the Italian civil society by deploying techniques of multimodal and critical discourse analysis. Many of such networks and groups have used positive communication in social media campaigns addressing cyber-bullying and omotransphobia; but their continuous efforts are deputed to contrast such phenomena on a daily basis, through a resemantisation of public issues and common sense. Early findings reveal that such discourses are brought about by atypical social movements: they are not aiming to gain visibility and power, and most of them do not adhere to national and more structured organisations. They address populism and the politics of hate as the main enemy and they engage in campaigns to build in-group solidarity and out-group recognition. During the lockdown experience, they have addressed public opinion through disturbing actions and counter-information. They share a pedagogical approach to stimulate practices of participation and active citizenship. At the same time, they promote a vision about citizens' subjectivity enriched by the moral duty to contrast populism on the social media ground.



## **Georgia Dimari, Center for Political Research and Documentation (KEPET) of the Department of Political Science University of Crete (Greece)**

Dr. Georgia Dimari is a Post Doctoral Researcher at the Center for Political Research and Documentation (KEPET) of the Department of Political Science University of Crete. She explores the transformation of the Greek Migration Policy the post 2015 period. Her PhD Thesis was: The Securitization of Migration in Greece, 2011 - 2019: Theory and Practice of Desecuritization as a Process for the Integration of Migrants in the Greek Society. Her fields of interest are securitization of migration, desecuritization and migration policy.

### **The desecuritisation of migration in Greece: Towards a “Flexicuritization” Approach**

The aim of this paper is to present a desecuritization framework for Greece, through the management and supervision of migratory flows. A pragmatic, utilitarian, flexible and positive form of desecuritization is proposed, "flexicuritization" which presupposes a pragmatic view of security.



## **Veronika Dostálová, Masaryk University (Czech Republic)**

Veronika Dostálová is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Masaryk University. Veronika is currently examining the role of populist attitudes in political behaviour. She is particularly interested in examining the role which populism plays in structuring electoral behaviour of Czech voters. She has co-authored two book chapters devoted to the 2017 Czech legislative election. Furthermore, as a successful AKTION scholarship holder, she has completed a short-term research stay at the University of Vienna, focusing on measurement invariance testing of the CSES populist attitudes scale.

### **Widespread or exclusive to particular sub-groups within society? Measurement equivalence of the CSES populist attitudes scale at the within-country level**

The growing interest in populism at the individual level has initiated development and subsequent application of numerous contesting populist attitudes scales in research of political behaviour. When concerned with examining populist attitudes across a set of countries, researchers tend to check whether the same concept is measured the same way across populations of these countries. However, the same does not apply once scholars explore differences in populist attitudes between society groups, for example, groups with different level of education or political knowledge. They implicitly assume a particular scale to work well across respective groups.

This assumption is rather astounding since a considerable amount of research has argued that true political attitudes are held only by the political sophisticates who show higher level of education, political involvement and political information. This may also be true for populist attitudes. Their seeming widespreadness may result from a plausibly incorrect assumption of measurement equivalence across different society groups. Furthermore, existing research demonstrates that this assumption is violated across many society groups for many scales measuring different constructs, and that ignorance of these violations results in biased conclusions about between-group differences. Until we establish measurement equivalence for a particular scale across particular groups, we cannot be sure that measured differences in a given construct between these groups are true differences.

This paper tests measurement equivalence of the populist attitudes scale employed in the Module 5 of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). Using the CSES Module 5 dataset (the second advanced release) this paper explores whether the CSES scale measures populist attitudes the same way across different society groups. The results show how the assumption of measurement equivalence holds in 10 European countries. Based on the results the paper then draws recommendations for using the CSES populist attitudes scale in future research.



## **Emmy Eklundh, Cardiff University (United Kingdom)**

I'm a Lecturer in Politics at Cardiff University. Prior to this appointment, I was a Lecturer in Spanish and International Politics at King's College London.

I hold a PhD in Politics from the University of Manchester (2015), an MA in International Relations: Global Governance and Social Theory from the University of Bremen, Germany (2011), and two BAs in Political Science and Latin from Lund University, Sweden (2009). My research is located in the interface between European Politics and political and social theory. I'm particularly interested in social movements and political parties on the left, and especially cases of left-wing populism in Southern Europe. I use radical democratic frameworks to further our understanding of democracy in Europe, the challenges to our current liberal order, but also the possibilities for democratic reform.

Future research projects include left-wing populist responses to nationalism, and resistance to European integration from the left. I also have a strong interest in the role of social media for political action, and how emotions and affect influence the way we think about political identities.

### **Performing sovereignty: Populism as the European condition**

It is often argued that there are better and worse forms of populism, most notably the differences between a reactionary right-wing populism and a progressive left-wing version are brought to the fore. Left-wing populists are said to base their identity-formations on a civic populism or on popular sovereignty. This should be seen in stark contrast to right-wing populists, who invoke an ethnic populism, or national sovereignty. Crucially, both versions of populism are seen as antithetical to European liberal democracies.

This paper takes issue with this division, and argues that, in fact, the claims to sovereignty from right- and left-wing populists alike are steeped in a European idea of state formation, which is not very different between left and right populisms, and core to the European democratic project. The paper interrogates three aspects of the ideal European democratic subject: a capacity to rationality, whiteness, and masculinity, and argues that whilst these are rarely explicitly demanded by political actors, they are expected in institutional settings of European democracies. By doing this the paper shows that the distinction between right- and left-wing populism is less stark than previously imagined, but also that the distinction between populists and non-populists is fuzzier and more blurred. Importantly, the heritage of what it means to be a European citizen prevails over these distinctions.





## **Gerly Elbrecht, Tallinn University (Estonia)**

Gerly Elbrecht is a PhD student and lecturer at Tallinn University focusing mainly on legitimation in political discourse - its different uses, strategies, creation etc. The general framework on what she concentrates is contemporary governance and democracy studies. Gerly has been participant in national project proposals for populism studies as well mostly bringing in the side of governmental communication. Gerly has recently also worked in the public sector as a policy performance analyst in the National Audit Office which gives a better understanding of how her study area functions in practice.

### **The concept of democracy as a tool for populist visionaries: Populist legitimation as a tactic for state reform**

Yves Meny has provocatively argued that “the language of populism and democracy is the same, the grammar is different”. (Meny, 2020). He turns attention to the problematic notion that democracy is becoming a bricolage if it constitutes of elements that have not much to do with the essence of democracy. Current article seeks to open up the topic of using populist discourse about deliberative democracy to legitimize technocratic approach to governance. Since the idea of more deliberative and participatory state has been becoming more visible both in academic literature (Bevir, 2010; Stoker, 2017, Landwehr, 2017 etc) and in the governance reports (OECD 2011, 2017) then the idea of such direction is often integrated into the discourses of politicians and civil servants while it tends to be abstract and populist strategy for legitimation of the mixture of different controversial ideas. The case study approach, specifically argumentation analysis (Toulmin, 2002) and discourse analysis (van Dijk, 2004) are applied on the written memoranda and interviews on Estonian state reform policy which is a distinct policy initiation with its specific discourse and approach since 2015. Estonia is an interesting state found to be strong in administrative aspects, performance budgeting, evaluation mechanisms etc. but rated below average in open governing and serving the citizens (OECD, 2017). The discourse of state reform sets democratic open governance as one of its main aims but the idea is used as a populist legitimation tactic for implementing controversial and rather technocratic mechanisms. The article shows how the idea of democratic open government mostly functions as a populist strategy beside technocratic policy design.



## **Tuğçe Erçetin, Istanbul Bilgi University (Turkey)**

Tuğçe Erçetin has a BA degree in International Relations from Kadir Has University and MA degrees in Political Science at Essex University and in International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. She completed her PhD in Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University. She works as post-doc researcher at Istanbul Bilgi University Center for Migration Research, and gives part-time lectures at the same university. She has been researcher in different research projects on othering, civil society and volunteerism, Syrian refugees and social entrepreneurship, and populism. Her current research interests include comparative politics, populism, political psychology, identity, migration, Turkish politics, and nationalism.

### **Reproduction of fear in populist discourse: Analysis of electoral speeches (2015-2018) by the AKP**

Engaging with every aspect of politics, populist discourse articulates both positive and negative categorizations, stressing issues and (re)producing emotional reactions through reproduction of perceived grievances, threats, and insecurity. This discourse frames context-based group differentiations, driving fear-based scenarios over uncertainties and mobilizing the audience with a repertoire that constructs “pure/victim we-ness” and “evil/culprit others”. This paper examines populism with social identity perspective, examining how group differentiation and relevant fear is reproduced by populist discourse. Our paper focuses on three electoral campaigns to understand how populist discourse produces fear, formulating the “we-ness” and “others” by the leaders of the AKP. The electoral campaigns which held in 2015 (general/repetitive elections in June and November), 2017 (the constitutional referendum), and 2018 (the presidential election) were analyzed through the speeches of the AKP leaders who conducted and were involved. We examined three years; however, the observation relies on four campaigns due to repetition in 2015. The analysis comprehends both the transcribed 39 speeches of the former PM Davutoğlu and 38 speeches of the President Erdoğan for 2015; 51 speeches of the latest PM Yıldırım for 2017, and 31 speeches of Erdoğan for 2018. The transcribed speeches of 2015 and 2017 were collected from the websites of the Prime Ministry and the party; however, campaign-based speeches of 2018 were transcribed. All the data is coded in Nvivo and content analysis is conducted. Early findings demonstrate that the electoral campaign of 2015 includes security-based narrative, framing collective victimization and blaming discourse. Resonating terrorism and insecure context, perceived threat is framed over security-based and value-based uncertainties. In 2017, the abortive coup, occurred in 2016 has a symbolic role that reproduces crisis/critical moments in order to mobilize the audience, relying on instability within the country; this leads to construct evil image for the out-group and “hope” for the in-group by identifying with people-centrist messages. Lastly, collective memory is touchstone during the electoral campaign of 2018; particular experiences produce fear scenarios on life-style and values of the homogeneous group of the people. Populist discourse reproduces fear, constructing imagined “dangerous or harmful others” and “victimhood of the in-group that allows to justify populist messages and group differentiation.

## **Emre Erdogan & Pinar Uyan Semerci, Istanbul Bilgi University (Turkey)**

Prof. Emre Erdoğan is the Head of the Department of International Relations at Istanbul Bilgi University. With a doctoral degree in Political Science from Boğaziçi University, he has served as researcher and senior consultant in various projects in academia and civil society. His research focuses on political participation, foreign policy and public opinion, child and youth well-being, methodology and statistics. He extensively studies and publishes about youth in Turkey, integration of Syrian refugee youth in Turkey, othering, polarization and populism.

Pinar Uyan Semerci is professor at Istanbul Bilgi University Department of International Relations. Since 2007, she has been the Director of the Center for Migration Research and since 2017 she has been serving as the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities at the same university. Holding a doctoral degree in Political Science from Boğaziçi University, her research areas specialize in social justice, human development, capability approach, poverty, child well-being, and identity formation. Moreover, she has various publications on child labour, political participation of youth, othering, polarization, migration and social policy.

### **Emotions: The hidden link between populism and polarisation**

The role of emotions is vital for populism and polarization, the two popular concepts of recent days. Populism is known as the voice of emotions having an "extra-emotional ingredient" (Canovan, 1999:6), and it is placed on the opposite pole of the "hyperrational politics" (Maiz, 2011: 32-33). Polarization, especially the affective one, is based on a primary negative emotion, namely, dislike towards the other party's supporters (Iyengar et al., 2012). For populism and polarization, this emotional (affective) characteristic makes them the "other" of the politics we know, and they are accepted as the enemies of the liberal political order (Ekhlund, 2019: 113; Schulze et al., 2020).

Despite some recent attempts at the national and comparative level (Palonen, 2009; Somer&McCoy, 2018; Carothers&O'Donohue, 2019), this common denominator, emotions: the link between populism and polarization, has not been well studied yet. In our paper, we will present how individuals' polarizing attitudes are affected by the rhetoric of competing political actors. Based on a survey data representing Turkey's adult population, collected in Fall 2020 with participation with

Four thousand six individuals, we will elaborate on how polarizing attitudes of individuals are more than a simple feeling thermometer issue (like/dislike). Still, rather they are crystallized on social distance, moral superiority, and political intolerance. Moreover, we will also show how daily political debates are echoed in emotional distance between different political camps. Our dataset will allow us to make a comparison with our previous surveys about polarization in Turkey (Erdoğan & Uyan-Semerci, 2018; Erdoğan, 2016).

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## **Hande Eslen-Ziya, Professor (Norway)**

I hold a PhD in Sociology from Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland and an MA in Social Psychology from Bogazici University, Istanbul Turkey. I also have a Gender Specialisation from Central European University, Budapest Hungary. In 2015, I was awarded Associate Professorship in Sociology by the Turkish Higher Education Council. I was awarded Young Outstanding Researcher by the University of Stavanger (2020). I have an established interest in gender and social inequalities, transnational organisations and social activism, and am currently working on how right-wing populist ideologies by creating alternative troll-science discourses oppose the scientific facts and gender theory. I have also co-authored a book that investigates how men construct their identities throughout their developmental trajectories –titled *The Social Construction and Developmental Trajectories of Masculinities*—published at Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayınları (2017) and another one entitled *Politics and Gender Identity in Turkey: Centralised Islam for Socio-Economic Control* and published at Routledge, that looked at how illiberal regimes use discursive tools and governmentalities rather than actual public policies to foster human capital and co-edited the book titled *The Aesthetics of Global Protest: Visual Culture and Communication* published at Amsterdam University Press.

At the moment I am the Co-I of Covid-19 project funded by the Norwegian Research Council (2020-2022). The project titled “Fighting pandemics with enhanced risk communication: Messages, compliance and vulnerability during the COVID-19 outbreak” to aims to uncover the correlation between risk communication and social vulnerability in the context of the COVID-19 outbreak. I am a Professor of Sociology at the University of Stavanger and founder of the Populism, Anti-Gender and Democracy Research Group at the same institution.

### **Establishing networked misogyny: An analysis of the online anti-Istanbul Convention presence**

Here by studying the online misogynistic narratives developed around the Istanbul Convention I highpoint the conservative and polarising discourses that frames gender-based violence as acceptable in Turkey. I show how Twitter can be used as a platform for misogynistic groups.




## **Eszter Farkas, PhD candidate (Hungary)**

PhD candidate at the Doctoral School of Political Science, Central European University.  
Junior research fellow in Institute for Political Science, Center for Social Sciences  
Research interests: voting behavior, media framing, public opinion

### **Partisan polarisation in measurement evaluation and science scepticism in Hungary related to the Covid-19 crisis**

Studies have identified Hungary as an extreme case of partisan polarization. Despite the high number of opposition parties and their different political profiles, partisan polarisation in Hungary basically manifests in two political groups: people either support or oppose the political position of the current government. Although several previous research showed the wide extent of partisan polarization in Hungary, consequences on particular policy issues and topics are still underexplored. Our research project contributes to this field by focusing on two aspects of the current covid-19 crisis: first, public opinion about government performance in crisis related economic and health measurements, and second, trust and scepticism in scientific information and results. Moreover, opinions will be interacted with perceptions about current media contents and media consumption habits to capture the government-dominated media's role in the evolution of polarized opinions. As a result, we assume extreme partisan polarisation to be present in both policy issues and science scepticism, and the significant contribution of media perception and consumption habits to these trends. The results will further reinforce partisan polarisation in Hungary, while supplementing current scientific knowledge by pointing out the irrelevance of topic in terms of partisan polarization, and the significance of perceived media content in this regard.



## **Xénia Farkas, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence; Corvinus University Budapest (Hungary)**

Xénia Farkas is a junior research fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, and a PhD student of Doctoral School of International Relations and Political Science, Corvinus University Budapest. Her research focuses on visual political communication on social media.

### **Visual populism in the 2019 European parliamentary campaign on party Facebook pages: a 28-country comparative analysis**

Populism can be considered as a major topic and a global phenomenon currently. Populist parties' electoral success has increased both in Europe and beyond. In parallel, scholarly attention has also grown around from various approaches, however, the visual aspects of online populist communication seem to be an understudied area. Admittedly, with the advent of social media platforms, political parties across the globe are learning that they must commit to digital political campaigning if they want to more effectively reach their electorate and compete with their political opponents. As a central logic of the digital platforms where election campaigns are increasingly won and lost, the visual elements of digital campaigns are now a central area of practice and research. Accordingly, research on the visual aspects of political communication has started gaining momentum among academics (e.g. Schill 2012; Veneti, Jackson & Lilleker, 2019). Various studies have demonstrated the resonant power of images to evoke strong emotions (e.g. Coleman & Wu, 2015), to act as a source of political information that is processed quickly (e.g. Graber 1996), and to shape attitudes and behaviours (e.g. Banducci et al., 2008). Still, there are several research gaps, such as the relationship between visual communication and populism. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the better understanding of populist communication by the investigation of images, and identification of visual elements that are used by populist actors. Therefore, the paper analyses twenty-eight countries' image-based political communication in the 2019 European Parliamentary Campaign on Party Facebook Pages.

The investigation of visual communication of political actors who are identified by the literature as populist and non-populist leaders can be an appropriate tool to explore whether specific populist visual communication characteristics exist. The paper provides a detailed visual content analysis in order to dig deeper into populist visual communication.



## **Filipa Figueira, UCL (UK)**

Filipa Figueira's main areas of research are Public Policy, the European Union and Populism. She is particularly interested in challenges to public policy effectiveness such as bounded rationality, populism and EU disintegration/ Brexit. Her methodological approach is interdisciplinary, and combines a political focus on public policy, public administration, (multi-level) governance and social psychology, with an economic focus on bounded rationality, behavioral economics and public choice.

### **The two-sided effect of Covid-19 on populism: A bounded rationality analysis**

This article explores the impact of the coronavirus pandemic on populism, using a bounded rationality approach. I argue that an emergency situation such as a public health crisis can have impacts going in both directions. On the one hand, it can lead to an increase in populism, as it accentuates some of the cognitive biases which facilitate populism, including in particular "groupthink". On the other hand, it can lead to a reduction in populism, if the sense of danger leads to more reasoned thinking, thus reducing people's propensity to cognitive biases. Depending on which effect is stronger, different countries can therefore witness opposite effects on populism, as evidenced by the opposing cases of Hungary and Germany. This analysis is also helpful to understand the result of the recent American elections, as well as the associated public unrest.





## **Sara García Santamaría, Universitat Jaume I (Spain)**

Sara García Santamaría is a doctor in Journalism Studies (University of Sheffield, UK). She works as an Assistant Professor at Universitat Jaume I (Castelló, Spain) and Universitat Ramon Llull (Barcelona, Spain). Her research focuses on three areas: populism and political communication, the intimisation of politics in a post truth era and independent journalism in transitional contexts. Sara is vice-chair of the Political Communication Section at the International Association for Media and Communication (IAMCR) and member of the research team DiscourseNet. She is co-editor of *Media and Governance in Latin America: Towards a Plurality of Voices* (Peter Lang, 2020) and *Cuba's Digital Revolution: Citizen Innovation and State Policy* (University of Florida Press, 2021), and counts with a number of publications in international peer-review books and journals. Sara has been a visiting researcher at University of Nottingham, Universidad de La Habana, la Universidad de Helsinki y la Universidad de California San Diego (UCSD).

### **Politicians at home: Left-wing populism and performances of the intimate self during the Covid-19 pandemic**

This paper analyses the intimate space of politicians at home during lockdown through their personal Instagram accounts, using both live stories (which I have been saving daily), the pictures and videos they post and the accompanying text. In order to do so, it focuses on two young female politicians who have become icons for left-wing movements around the world. They are Ada Colau, Mayor of Barcelona (Spain), and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, representative for New York's 14th congressional district (USA). As previous political outsiders who are deeply involved in activism and belong to what some will call a left-wing populist wave, AOC and Colau interact with their followers in "an authentic way", often posting very intimate and apparently uncurated images of their daily life. The goal of the paper is to examine how they construct authenticity and connect with their constituencies during the COVID-19 lockdown through a qualitative visual rhetorical analysis.



## **Ugo Gaudino, University of Kent (France)**

I joined the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent in September 2019 as a GTA and a PhD student in International Relations. I hold a BA in Political Science (2012-15) and a Master's Degree in International Relations (2015-17) from La Sapienza University (Rome), as well as MA in 'Economy and Institutions of Islamic Countries' (2019) from LUISS University (Rome). I am currently visiting PhD researcher at the CERI (SciencesPo) where I work on securitization of Islam in France as articulated by right- and left-wing parties.

My PhD project is located in the sub-field of critical security studies. Hopefully it will be completed at the end of my third year, in autumn 2022. I am interested in Muslim minorities in Europe, political Islamism and in how Western European politics frame Islam. From a theoretical perspective, I aim to contribute to critical IR, security and terrorism studies.

### **Securitisation of Islam from the right to the left: ideological translations and populism in Italian politics**

The study of how political party ideologies impact on the social construction of threats is underdeveloped in securitization theory. The paper fills this gap by illustrating that Right- and Left-wing parties distinctly speak security according to their beliefs, norms and identities. Firstly, it gives two major contributions. It conceptualises “translation” as an ideological and contextual transfer of meaning that, in its intra-linguistic version, is a useful analytical tool to grasp how the meaning of security circulates across national parties according to their ideological pillars. Secondly, it analyses the interaction between populism and securitisation. In this respect, the securitization of Islam helps to understand how the very same threat pushes parties to protect different referent objects – ethno-religious for the Right, secular and liberal for the Left. I argue that the Right has translated some liberal-progressive discourses (such as secularism and gender equality), while the Left has translated some Right-wing policies on counter terrorism, migration, and citizenship rights. Yet, populism has not percolated into Left-wing practices of securitization. I choose as a suitable case to understand cross-party translation of securitization of Islam. The case is explored through an interpretivist discourse analysis of government and parliamentary acts by the Democratic Party, Northern League and Brothers of Italy, over the period 2013-18



## **Ambar Kumar Ghosh, Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, India (India)**

Ambar Kumar Ghosh is a researcher working in the Political Reform and Governance Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation, Kolkata, India. He is presently pursuing his doctoral research on 'Populism in Indian Democracy' at the Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata, West Bengal, India. He has previously served as a Guest Faculty at the Department of Political Science, Siliguri College, Siliguri, West Bengal, India. His research interest includes Indian democracy and its institutions, political leadership, federalism, citizenship and migration studies. His latest publication includes "Migrant workers: The ethics of care during a pandemic" in Ranabir Samaddar ed., *Borders of an epidemic: COVID 19 and migrants workers* (CRG:April 2020) and "The Paradox of 'Centralised Federalism': An Analysis of the Challenges to India's Federal Design," ORF Occasional Paper, No. 272, September 2020, Observer Research Foundation. He has presented his research in many international workshops and conferences. He presented his latest work on "Interrogating the rise of 'Strong' Leaders in Liberal Democracies: Examining Neo-Liberal dimensions in USA, India and Philippines" in the 9th Biennial Oceanic Conference of International Studies (OCIS 2020) hosted by Australian National University, Canberra, Australia and his paper on "The Impact of Political Institutions in shaping the Discourse of Constitutionalism in India" in the workshop on "Constitutional Resilience in South Asia, 2019" hosted jointly by the Universities of Melbourne, Oxford and Singapore.

### **Locating populism through political communication in India during Covid-19: A case study of Modi's political messaging in response to the pandemic**

The spectacular rise of 'populist' politics has become a modus operandi for comprehending the nature of the contemporary political discourse in many democracies across the globe. The term populism, predicated upon its fluid subjectivity, lacks a rigid programmatic identity. According to populism scholar Ernesto Laclau, it is a way of doing politics that can take various ideological forms according to both time and place and is compatible with a variety of institutional frameworks. It is during the moments of socio-politico-economic conjunctures that the populist political forces posit tall claims of 'efficient' solutions driven by the 'strong and decisive' leader for resolving the intractable crisis. One such major contingent hour of life and livelihood crisis has unfolded due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. In order to study the nature of the populist political response of the democratic leadership to the COVID-19 crisis, India's case, as the largest democracy of the world and one of the countries with a high number of Coronavirus infections, warrants immediate attention. In this context, this paper would analyse the nature of political communication of India's charismatic Prime Minister Narendra Modi in the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak for extrapolating three fundamental aspects of populism. First, the paper would assess whether Modi's political messaging during the pandemic facilitated unmediated political communication between the leader and 'the people' by bypassing the institutional bulwarks of constitutional democracy. Second, the paper would seek to understand whether such a political communication facilitated centralization of power by central government led by Modi and how did it impact the federal political structure of India. Lastly, the paper would evaluate if such political communication coincides with the populist polarized political constructs like "virtuous homogenous people" and the "corrupt and debilitating other" or "enemy" in the war-like rhetoric to fight against the pandemic.

## **Ybiskay Gonzalez, University of Newcastle (Australia)**

Venezuelan Sociologist with a PhD in Politics from the University of Newcastle.

### **Political polarisation: A revisited concept**

This article problematises conceptualisations of political polarisation and offers a new concept of it as a device of power. Thus defined, 'political polarisation' combines insights from governmentality studies and the concept of antagonism to identify what constitutes as polarised politics. First, the article shows two limitations of existing conceptualisations of polarisation: an overemphasis on partisan identity, and the lack of considerations of dynamics of power in shaping politics. Then, it offers an alternative approach that pays due heed to these dynamics, by focusing on three attributes of polarised politics: the visible interactions between antagonistic discourses, the logic behind politics, and the formation of the polarised subject. By doing so, this new concept is able to reveal polarisation, including its dynamics and mechanism of reproduction.



## **Simona Guerra, University of Surrey (United Kingdom)**

Simona Guerra is Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics at the University of Surrey and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe (Bruges). Her main research interests focus on the domestic politics of EU integration. Her first monograph, on Central and Eastern European Attitudes Towards the EU (Palgrave) was published in 2013, and her latest book (with Manuela Caiani), *Euroscepticism, Democracy and the Media* (Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology) was released in 2017. Recently Simona has contributed to the Routledge book on *Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon*, the *Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism*, and articles on Brexit and Euroscepticism.

### **It takes two to tango: The anti-populist narrative that strengthens the Eurosceptic discourse**

Recent analyses examine the role of crisis in the emergence of the populist/anti-populist discourse (Stavrakakis et al. 2017) and the confluence of populism and Euroscepticism at the party level (Pirro and Taggart 2018). In this article, the study focuses on the discourse analysis of the main political actors in the EU institutions, by examining the channels and discourses adopted by different actors in the (de)legitimation of the EU (de Wilde, Trezn and Michailidou 2011; Statham and Trezn 2013). The focus is on the transnational contestation (DiEM25, Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 and VOLT), following Stavrakakis (et al. 2017)'s model of analysis of the mutual construction and reproduction. The analysis shows that the antagonized discourse used by the mainstream narrative further reinforces populism and, answering Stavrakakis (2018), it provides a breeding ground for populism to consolidate itself, while weakening the possible impact of the legitimizing representation of Euroscepticism in the EP.



## **Andreea-Roxana Gușă, Univeristy of Bucharest (Romania)**

Andreea Gușă is a PhD and associate assistant professor at University of Bucharest. For the past 7 years she has worked with several Romanian NGOs, including the national chapter of Transparency International. She has taken part in implementing multiple national and international projects and advocacy campaigns tackling topics like anti-corruption compliance, whistleblower protection and civic education for students. She is also a representative of REPER pentru Management prin Valori Association in the NGO Group for the monitoring of the National Anti-Corruption Strategy, coordinated by the Ministry of Justice.

### **Corruption as a rhetorical strategy of populist parties. Case study: The 2020 electoral campaign for the Romanian Parliament of The Alliance for the Unity of Romanians**

Corruption is linked to populism and populist politicians in two ways. First of all, persistent political corruption is among the societal problems that contribute to a negative change in social optics regarding political life and political representatives. It is claimed that the more corrupt a society is or it is perceived, the more is exposed to the risk of populism. Second of all, corruption is often times used by populist politicians as a rhetorical strategy to delegitimize and cast out their political opponents. Corruption as a populist rhetoric has several particularities such as promoting an "us vs them" mentality alongside Manichaeism-based views, as well as pushing forward constant claims of election fraud. My paper aims to analyse these particularities following the case study of a newly elected party, The Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR) and its rhetorical strategy during the 2020 political campaign for the Romanian Parliament. AUR's right-wing populist agenda has become widely known by the middle of 2020. Its political program founded on the values of the traditional family, patriotism, Christianity, freedom and the union with the Republic of Moldova proved to be appealing to 9% of the voters – a percentage that wasn't properly foreseen by the polls before elections. As AUR's campaign strategy focused mainly on social media (SM) pages, my research focuses on the content and the speeches delivered and posted on SM between November 6th and December 5th of 2020 by the 47 AUR candidates who obtained a Parliament seat, in order to determine how consistent with the theoretical framework of populist rhetoric their approach of the topic of corruption was and what particularities it might have possessed.



## **Outi Hakola, University of Helsinki (Helsinki)**

Dr. Outi Hakola works as senior researcher (Academy of Finland Research Fellow) at the Department of Cultures, University of Helsinki. Her background is in media studies, and her research concentrates on questions of emotions, affects, and public debates in films, television, and social media. She is the PI of the project focusing on populism and masculinity, and the project's book "The Culture and Politics of Populist Masculinities" (ed. by Hakola, Salminen, Turpeinen & Winberg) will be out in the Spring 2021 by Lexington Books.

### **Trumpwave videos: Popular culture, nostalgia and social hierarchies as tools for mobilisation of Trump supporters**

In the US, Donald J. Trump has managed to mobilize his supporters in a way that they have become a significant political force. Participatory culture, particularly social media, has played an important role in this mobilization. In this paper, I focus on Trumpwave videos, in other words, meme-like videos that idealize Trump and that are created and shared by Trump supporters. These videos are combinations of electronic music and borrowed elements from popular culture, including The Apprentice television show that Trump hosted. In addition, the videos utilize 1980s (audio)visual imagery, which give the videos a nostalgic retro style. This style invites nostalgic emotions about the idealized past, and these videos function as part of populist narrative where the participants desire to bring back or strengthen social hierarchies (regarding race, gender, sexuality, and class) that they see being threatened.

While these videos idealize Trump's populist leadership as well as whiteness, heterosexuality, and traditional gender roles, they also bring forward the complex relationship between populism and popular culture. First, these videos show how popular culture can be used to strengthen political and populist brand. Second, they bring forward strategies that are typical for popular culture, including importance of stories and emotions. By using recognizable and accessible stories, politics becomes recognizable for general audiences. Stories often invoke emotions and affects, such as nostalgia, that invite audiences to experience issues from the populist viewpoint and that address the audiences in the level of "normal people". Third, as part of participatory media culture, these videos enable mobilization of "the people", who can then reproduce, modify, and share their stories and experiences with their own popular culture products. In this way, nostalgic Trumpwave videos that reproduce idealized social hierarchies through popular culture have become one way of creating "us" for Trump supporters.



## **Jorge Hardisson Martín, Univesidad de Salamanca (Spain)**

Bachelor in Political Science and Public Administration at Universidad de Salamanca, One year of erasmus at Universitetet i Oslo. Master in Latinoamerican Studies at Universidad de Salamanca. Now in process of PhD on Comparative politics enjoying a predoctoral grant.

### **Affection in postmodern identity**

The purpose of my paper comes from determining the identification process of the people with political parties, figuring out this way the rational or irrational affections with the groups. The aim is not just to find answers in colective process associated with the political parties but to analyse the joining of someone to any social group, imitating his identity with the colective one.

In the same way, it is a paper's purpose, seeking how the afections operates when it comes to create this identity feeling in the individuals, using prior notions from authors as Jacques Lacan, Joan Copjiec or Martha Nussbaun among others. Based on the differents points of view about attachments and desire, an analysis will be made to compare each other in the literature.

Thus, a connection between affection and populist identity, just like some cases that we could link with this populism, this connection will be studied, according to definitions from authors such as José Luis Villacañas or Ernesto Laclau among others. The main goal here is drawing a brief draft about how identity works in the posmodern society, and knowing how identities reveal at the postmodernism just like the differents manifestations of the attachment in it.





## **Pavol Hardos & Zuzana Maďarová, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University (Slovakia)**

Pavol Hardoš is an assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University in Bratislava. He holds a PhD. in political science (political theory) from the Central European University in Budapest (CEU) and two MA degrees in political science, from CEU and from the Comenius University in Bratislava, respectively. His research interests focus on democratic theory, political philosophy, populism, and the epistemic aspects of democratic politics.

Zuzana Maďarová is a researcher at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University in Bratislava and activist working for the feminist organization ASPEKT. Her work focuses mostly on (historical and current) political subjectivities of women and gender aspects of political communication. She has been mapping the emergence and development of the “gender ideology” discourse in Slovakia and its reinforcement with other discourses such as conspiracy, nationalist (anti-EU), and anti-establishment discourse.

### **The conservative people vs liberal elites: How gender ideology actors pursued a new hegemonic frontier**

This paper aims to provide a critical feminist analysis of the spread, mainstreaming, and normalizing of the anti-gender discourse in Slovakia. By applying and critically reviewing Laclau’s concept of populism, we view the process of sharing the anti-gender discourse as a populist practice. Discourse analysis of discussions on the main topics covered by the gender ideology rhetoric will identify the three aspects of populism in the anti-gender discourse: the demands that are unified in an equivalential chain; the construction of a frontier dividing society into two parts; and the formation of a unifying popular identity. Bridging the scholarship on populism and the so-called anti-genderism, the paper illustrates how the term gender became a “symbolic glue” and an empty signifier for an equivalential chain of social demands. As we analyze selected discussions that took place from 2011 to 2020, from those in a conspiracy radio to those in the Slovak Parliament, we trace how the distinction between liberals and conservatives became the main dividing line of society. We argue that it was the populist practice of gender ideology actors that created a new hegemonic frontier between the conservative people and liberal elites. This frontier brings certain selective questions of “morality” and “values” into the political spotlight, while obscuring the articulation of important social issues.



## **Ilana Hartikainen, University of Helsinki, Faculty of Social Sciences (Finland)**

Ilana Hartikainen is a PhD student in political science at the University of Helsinki's Faculty of Social Sciences, studying the roles of memory and contested history in populist movements through the case study of the Czech Republic. Her research focuses on the ways that populist politicians rely on counter-hegemonic understandings of the past in order to constitute the people in their respective movements and how canonical literature can enter politics through the vector of collective memory. Ilana holds a bachelor's degree in English and Slavic Studies from Northwestern University, and an Erasmus Mundus double masters in Russian, Central, and East European Studies and Political Science from the University of Glasgow and Corvinus University of Budapest, respectively. Before starting her PhD, she worked for several years as a journalist, and she is also a member of the Department of Education at the Institute for the Study of Totalitarian Regimes in Prague.

### **The visible virus: Andrej Babiš' response to Covid-19 reflected in Prague**

The Czech government issued one of the fastest and harshest responses to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic in March 2020, closing the borders to leisure travel, enforcing a quarantine across the entire country, and mandating that no one left home without a mask. This had an immediate visual impact on the Czech capital of Prague, where streets normally packed with tourists were suddenly emptied. This situation briefly reversed in the late spring and summer, when first locals began utilizing the reopened city space, and then the Czech government opened the borders to tourism. Partly spurred by this opening, however, the pandemic roared back for a second wave beginning in September, and the openness of the city space has since been in flux; while tourists are gone and lockdowns continue, the national unity that the city's emptiness represented has disappeared, and protests have emerged contesting the lockdowns. The city's fullness has thus become a reflection of Czech PM Andrej Babiš' response to the pandemic. While the nation rallied around the government early on, this unity has disappeared, and Babiš' popularity has plummeted. Relying on a methodological framework of post-foundational rhetoric performative analysis, this paper will use data gathered from social and traditional online media to explore how Babiš' Covid-19 response has been articulated in the city space, and how perceptions of his success or failure are directly tied to the emptiness or fullness of the city in imagery shared online.



## **Niko Hatakka, University of Birmingham (Finland)**

Niko Hatakka is a Research Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies (POLSIS) of the University of Birmingham, where he works in the ESRC funded project “The survival of the mass party”. Niko’s research has focused on the relationship of populism and media, populist political communication, populist parties, and populist online movements. He has previously worked as a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Parliamentary studies at the University of Turku, most recently in the Academy of Finland funded project “Mainstreaming populism in the 21st century”.

### **Hegemonic meanings of populism: A comparative analysis of populism as a floating signifier in the prestige newspapers of six countries 2000-2018**

Recent research has shown that “populism” should be regarded a floating signifier (De Cleen et al. 2018; Dean and Maignascha, 2020) and that in vernacular language the term’s use is prevalently more pejorative than analytical (Bale et al., 2011; Brookes, 2018). Still, there have been no systematic comparative studies analysing the meanings of “populism” over time and in different country contexts. This paper analyses the significations given to the terms “populism” and “populist” in six countries’ mainstream publics over a period of nearly two decades. By conducting a quantitative content analysis of texts (N=3252) published in the most significant daily newspapers in Finland, Sweden, United States, United Kingdom, The Netherlands and Turkey, the paper reveals temporal and cross-country variations in 1) the term’s salience, 2) in the hegemonic understandings of “populism”, 3) and in the perceived effects of “populism” for democracy. The study shows that the prevalence, meaning and perceived repercussions of populism change over time and vary between countries, but that that the term’s mainstream meanings are increasingly compatible with anti-populism.



## **Juha Herkman, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Juha Herkman leads the Academy of Finland - funded research consortium Mainstreaming Populism, and is a PI of the Communication Rights in the Age of Digital Disruption project.

Herkman is a Professor of Media and Communication Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki. He extensively studied media culture and the political economy of the media at the University of Tampere before he orientated to political communication and populism studies. He has worked as a visiting scholar at the Universities of Stockholm, Copenhagen, and Oslo, and, besides the Nordic countries, his large research networks contain especially the European academic field. Herkman worked as a young scholar in the European Science Foundation's research programme Changing Media, Changing Europe in 2002-2004.

In 2005-2010 Herkman led the Communication Research Centre (CRC) at the University of Helsinki and he has directed several research projects funded by national foundations and Ministries. He has been a supervisor of about 15 doctoral students and 100 masters' theses, and he is an active player in Finnish political communication education and public discussions.

In Hepp2 conference, Herkman is a chair of Keynote 1: Covid-19, QAnon and epistemic instability: the circulation of conspiracy theories in the hybrid media environment, Roundtable 1: Mainstreaming Populism and WhiKnow projects, and panel 21.1: Approaches to polarization. He is a co-author in Niko Hatakka's paper [Hegemonic meanings of populism: A comparative analysis of populism as a floating signifier in the prestige newspapers of six countries 2000-2018](#).



## **Brendan Humphreys, Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Senior Researcher at Aleksanteri Institute, affiliated with Urbaria, both University of Helsinki. Historian specializing in Eastern Europe and the Cold War, with an interest in biographical studies. Latest publication: Kivinen and Humphreys (eds) *Russian Modernization, A New Paradigm*, Routledge 2021.

### **White House blues: Self-pity, resentment, and empathy as political emotions**

This paper addresses self-pity as a political emotion, comparing it to resentment, and then its seeming opposite, empathy.

The cases are three American presidents, who all were notable for their self-pity. These are Richard Nixon, (in office 1969-74), Bill Clinton (1993-2001), and Donald Trump (2017-2021).

They served as single term, a double term, and one resigned during second prior to impeachment, which coincidentally all three faced.

The paper argues that Nixon never managed to externalize his sense of the world as being uniquely unfair to him – his writings and (especially) recordings offer much evidence. His notorious hatred of the media did not rise above a personal obsession. Despite a humble background, he had no common touch.

Clinton, as a liberal centrist, rejected the politics of division in which republicans reveled. Privately he felt hard done by; “I’m a colossal failure, and you made me one” (Clinton to Yasser Arafat). Yet in his public persona, as Robert Hughes observed, Clinton had borrowed the language of ‘concern’ and ‘healing’ and deployed a politics – or at least a rhetoric – of empathy (“I feel your pain” etc.).

In contrast to Nixon, Trump has managed to project his self-pity outwards, convincing his electoral base that the political system – indeed the entire universe – is rigged against him (and them). He is plainly incapable of empathy as such, but he has freed up and legitimized resentment among his base – there is a strong personal connection.

Trump hates the media as much a Nixon, but he has changed the rules. He has sidestepped the mainstream media and become – via Twitter – the Broadcaster-in-Chief, the voice of collective self-pity and uninhibited resentment.



## **Anniina Hyttinen, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Anniina Hyttinen is a grant researcher and a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Helsinki. She completed her master's level studies majoring sociology in the Master's Degree Programme in Ethnic Relations, Cultural Diversity and Integration. In addition, she holds a BA in Finno-Ugric Linguistics, Hungarian Language and Culture. Her research focuses on Hungarian nationalism, radical right and more recently on the possibilities for emerging counter discourses and contestation in Hungary, which is moving towards more authoritarian rule. Her main academic interests are nationalism, populism, radical right, Hungary, ethnic relations in Eastern Central Europe and visual ethnographic methodology.

### **Possibilities and limits of humour and satire: A visual study of resistance of the illiberal rule in Hungary**

This paper focuses on the Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party (Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt, MKKP). MKKP can be defined as a joke party and the nature of their activities varies from absurd parody to naïve stunts and irony. MKKP's criticism is often directed towards the corruption flourishing around Fidesz's leadership as well as their simplified and openly racist political communication. However, MKKP's critical attitude extends to the Hungarian politicians in general.

Some of the most known examples of MKKP's activities are counter poster campaigns during the refugee crisis and alternative "Peace marches". MKKP organizes activities also for improving the conditions of life in Hungary and is therefore taking action in matters that should be the responsibility of the state or the local authorities. They have for example fixed roads, built resting places at bus stops and drawn the attention to the bad quality of sidewalks with their "four colour paintings".

Absurdity is one central element of MKKP's humour and criticism. How absurd humour functions in the Hungarian reality, where absurdity is not only a characteristic of an arranged stunt, but part of the political reality in an illiberal regime? Does humour allow addressing problems without further polarizing the society?

Currently MKKP has four elected council members in districts of Budapest, which is changing the party character towards a more serious political actor. MKKP is in an interesting position between the government and the opposition, which might weaken the possibilities of the opposition in 2022 parliamentary election by attracting some of the opposition voters away from the recently united front.

This paper is based on participant observations and photo material collected in MKKP events in 2017-2018 and will be extended with online material. The focus is on the visual character of MKKP's activities and its possibilities in the restricted Hungarian media environment.



## **Martina Insero, Sapienza, University of Rome (Italy)**

Martina Insero is a PhD student in Political Studies at Sapienza-University of Rome. Her doctoral research investigates the “Affective Turn”, in Political Theory, from an History of Political Thought’s point of view. The research investigates the link between politics and this affective dimension; it starts from a historical-conceptual study concerning the concepts of «affects», «emotions» and «passions» as different ways of defining affectivity and, also, as theoretical constructs. She obtained her Master’s degree in International Relations (Sapienza, 2018), 110/110 cum laude, with the final thesis in History of Contemporary Political Thought, “Mythology of politics: Georges Sorel and the metamorphoses of revolutionary thought”, after being awarded with a scholarship for Master’s thesis research in Paris (organized by Sapienza-University of Rome, Department of Political Science), from February to May 2018. The research was carried out in several institutions such as Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Bibliothèque Sainte Geneviève, Bibliothèque du Musée Social, the EHESS. Bachelor’s degree in Political Sciences and International Relations (Sapienza, 2016), 110/110 cum laude, with the final thesis in History of Political Doctrines, “The Political Thought of Hugo Grotius”. She has been selected among the excellent graduates of Sapienza in 2018. In October 2020 she has completed an online course authorized by The University of Edinburgh (offered through Coursera): “Philosophy and the Sciences: Introduction to the Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences”. Her current research focuses on the role of emotions and passions in political-philosophical discourses. These researches not only use philosophical elements but, more than anything, operate in close connection with psychological studies. The analysis of historical and conceptual development of the affective dimension is conducted with particular attention to the implications in contemporary socio-political dynamics.

### **Affective dimension of political polarisation: The role of empathy**

Among the various aspects that concern a discussed phenomenon such as populism, more and more importance is given to emotions. The analysis of its affective dimension can help to understand different dynamics, from populist logics to its strategies and its discourses (Cossarini and Vallespin, 2019; Demertzis, 2006;). The starting point of the populist vision is to establish the distinction “us-them”, and consequently this creates polarization and antagonism in society and among individuals. Polarisation is a complex phenomenon, strongly discussed especially in the United States (Valdesolo & Graham, 2016; Hare & Poole, 2014), characterized by a conflictual logic to which are usually associated feelings like anger, fear, anxiety, hate and despise. Is it possible to reverse this logic and to employ different emotions that are able to counter it? What are the emotions that can help with that? Many scholars today speak about Empathy, even if there is not yet an entirely shared consensus on what it is. This proposal aims to investigate approaches about the functionality and the role played by empathy in populist dynamics, particularly in polarisation, comparing divergent visions between who considers empathy as an element able to counteract antagonism and polarisation, and who considers the contrary (Bloom, 2016; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). The methodological framework of the proposal employs a theoretical perspective that refers mostly to historical-philosophical elements, with particular attention to the aspects of social and political psychology. In this sense it is first of all important to reconstruct the debate that has developed around the multiple meanings of empathy. The proposal aims at reflecting both on the strategic potential of the emotional aspect of the issue and on the analysis of the theories of this debate that can be useful to try to understand and to explain the socio-political dynamics of our time.

## **Katja Kahlina, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Dr. Katja Kahlina works at the University of Helsinki, Faculty of Arts, where she leads a Kone Foundation-funded project Sexuality and Democracy (SEXDEM). Katja is committed to studying sexual politics and political discourse and how they are culturally and geopolitically produced and entangled. She also serves as a Managing Editor of the journal *Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory* published by Helsinki University Press.

### **Anti-gender mobilisation and strategic deployment of populism: The case of Croatia**

Following the rise of right-wing populisms in Europe, a growing number of studies examine the ways in which gender figures as one of the central themes in the political discourses of right-wing populist parties in Europe. However, much less attention is paid to the ways in which populist discourse has been constructed and employed in the context of recent anti-gender/anti-LGBTQ discourses and grassroots campaigns in Europe. This has left the interplay between the two seemingly complementing, yet different phenomena – surge of right-wing populism and anti-gender mobilization – insufficiently explored and theorized. To contribute towards filling this gap, this paper aims at broadening our understanding of how populist repertoire has been used as a strategy of mobilization by the anti-gender actors, particularly those who have otherwise rarely been regarded as populists. It will do so by exploring the ways in which an appeal to “the people” is used by Croatian movement On Behalf of the Family (OBF) in its heterosexist marriage referendum action and its subsequent referendum initiatives. Combining a qualitative discourse analysis and Rogers Brubaker’s account of the inherent semantic ambiguity of “the people”, the paper will show how “the people” have been simultaneously constructed both as demos and as a bounded community in OBF’s mobilizing discourses. The paper will further show how the semantic ambiguity of “the people” in OBF’s mobilization discourse allows OBF to utilize inclusionary populism in its exclusionary campaigns. As the paper will argue, such discursive strategy allows OBF to widen the appeal of their actions and legitimize the otherwise exclusionary demands.





## **Dominykas Kaminskas, Vilnius University (Lithuania)**

Dominykas Kaminskas is a PhD student at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. His academic interests include identity politics, populism, democratic and identity theory.

### **Populism as an identity-building practice**

In academic literature populism is most often defined as either a (thin-centered) political ideology, based on antagonism between the morally good people versus the corrupt elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2018), or as a political strategy in which a leader tries to mobilize the electorate based on a direct and often confrontational style of behavior and rhetorics (Moffitt & Tormey, 2013). Both these definitions face problems when confronted with the huge variety of populist movements around the world. While populist actors need to adapt to local circumstances much like all the other political groups, studies of political communication show little difference between populist and traditional parties, albeit with some exceptions (Bennett et al., 2020). Similarly, analyses focusing on populist ideologies find only broad similarities among such movements. This illustrates the problems with current definitions of populism – as an ideology it is too abstract in defining both in and out-groups and it varies greatly from case to case, as a political strategy the issues still remain – populist actors adapt to local circumstances and employ different styles.

One way to reconcile these is to look at populism as an identity-building practice. In that sense populism is similar to traditional political ideologies in terms of defining an in-group and an out-group and presenting a certain world-view based on a confrontation between members of these two groups. Through use of certain phrases, ring words and visual clues, populists aim to build a community that is more invested and mobilized than the electorate of traditional parties. Looking at populist movements as having a sort of „family resemblance“ allows detection of overlapping similarities in terms of finding identity-building moments in political strategy and some form of political ideology, even though the movements might not fully share the same features as these adapt to local circumstances.



## **Elisa Kannasto, Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences / University of Vaasa (Finland)**

Elisa Kannasto is a Senior Lecturer of Communications and Finnish Language in the Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences and a PhD Candidate in the University of Vaasa, Finland. Her research focuses on construction of personal brands in political campaigns on social media. Her other research interests are on social media, fake news and online discussion.

### **Non-professional political movements on Facebook: Supporting “The Master”**

Parallel to public forums and coffee houses, political discussion organizes now also as discussion threads under Facebook posts, Instagram comments and tweets. Politicians campaigning on social media reach and activate wide audiences. Analyzing online discussions can provide a reflection on how citizens’ perceptions form and what they are, to plan more effective strategic approaches on online communication, for example in political campaigns.

My study presents how citizens can become a movement on Facebook, without strict mobilization strategy, thus influencing campaign communication online. For this, I will use a case example from the Finnish parliamentary election of 2019 and the Finns Party. My first question is what do politicians of the Finns Party post on Facebook? My second research question is what the Finns Party supporters discuss on Facebook comments? Last, is there a common strategy within the politicians and supporters of the party seen in the posts and comments?

The data for the study was collected with Facepager from Facebook in 2019 during the month before elections and consists of 16 200 Facebook posts and comments. Both quantitative and qualitative content analysis are used with an emphasis on the latter. Preliminary results show that the Finns Party politicians have no common communication strategy on their Facebook posts. Their supporters show examples of breaking away from the purely political relationship between a constituent and a politician. Their communication is showing support and promoting their party’s candidate for prime minister, instead of discussing a political agenda. The candidates are approached with a personal tone, by complimenting their looks or using nicknames. The supporters exploit focused attention of the other parties’ party leaders by posting the Finns Party messages on their pages.



## **Daniel Kawecki, University of Helsinki (Finland)**


Daniel Kawecki is a second year PhD student in political science at the University of Helsinki's doctoral programme in political, societal and regional change. His work focuses on the determinants, consequences and prevalence of affective polarization in multiparty systems, particularly in the Finnish and Scandinavian contexts. Other research interests include political psychology, voter behaviour and democratic theory. He currently conducts his research as a doctoral researcher at the Society of Swedish Literature in Finland (SLS).

### **Affectively polarised voters, partisanship and ideology: The case of the Finnish multiparty system**

Finland has long been characterized by consensus-like democracy and low levels of open hostility between parties. Recent studies suggest no substantial increases in ideological polarization. Nonetheless, both the scholarly and the public debates are rife with concern about political polarization. A possible source of these concerns is that polarization in the form of sympathy and hostility towards parties is increasing without being mirrored in changing issue positions. This phenomenon is known as affective polarization.

This paper examines affective polarization in the Finnish electorate between 2003 and 2019 and explores the roles of partisanship and ideological extremity as determinants of affective polarization. I approach the topic by conceptualizing affective polarization at the individual level as absence of neutrality towards parties, thereby addressing both the research gap on affective polarization in Finland and the methodological discussion about the understanding and measurement of the phenomenon in multiparty systems.

The results show increasing affective polarization in Finland with clear differences between supporters of different parties and confirm both the role of strong partisan identity and ideological extremity as determinants of affective polarization. The results further indicate that supporting specific parties has an independent effect of affective polarization, which points towards the agentic role of parties in cultivating affective polarization.



## **Daniel Keil, University of Cologne (Germany)**

Dr. Daniel Keil is habilitating at the University of Cologne with a scholarship of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation. His research focusses on the importance of the far-rights imaginations of Europe in the struggles on the political crisis of the European Union. His main research Areas are the Far Right, Nationalism, State Theory and Critical Theory.

### **Covid-19, the crisis of the European Union and the far right in Europe: The importance of the far right's imagination of Europe before and after the Covid-19 crisis**

The Covid-Crisis took off during a long during multiple crisis of the European Union. Thus, the measures taken by the European Union and its Member-States to battle the pandemic were determined by former conflicts about handling facets of the crises. Paradoxically, new paths to Europeanization opened while conflicts within the EU were deepened with the battle over the rule of law with in struggling over the recovery and resilience facility, installed to mitigate the impact of the coronavirus. Often misrecognized, a crucial part of these struggles is the question of de/legitimizing the ongoing processes of Europeanization through developing imaginations of a future for Europe. Thus, different imaginations of 'Europe' itself form the center of and are shaped by those struggles. Hence, Covid-19 had also a strong impact on the imaginations of (the future of) Europe. As the campaign initiated by the European Commission for a conference on the future of Europe, which was also a big goal for the EU-Council-Presidency of Germany in the second half of 2020, had been pushed in the background by the pandemic, the imaginations of Europe and its future remain important for transnational networks of the far right. The presentation will focus on the far-rights imaginations of Europe before and after the pandemic. Thus, the far right became an important force in European politics, its imagination of a "true Europe" has lost some of its importance in the covid-crises and it seems to be losing its ability to integrate the heterogenous right. Otherwise we can find some rearticulations of Europe in the different far-right approaches to the pandemic. To handle such a wide topic, the presentation will focus on the German AfD and the role of Europe in the European election campaign in 2018/19 and in the debates on the European recovery programs.



## **Minna-Kerttu Kekki, University of Oulu (Finland)**

I am a doctoral student at the University of Oulu. I work as a doctoral researcher in Katariina Holma's research project "Citizenship in Change". The topic of my thesis is the media-based public debate as a place for learning from others. The theoretical background for my investigation is in classical phenomenology (mainly Husserl, Stein, Schutz, and Merleau-Ponty), but the thesis is contextualized by educational-philosophical studies of learning and philosophical definitions of the public debate and democracy.

### **Public debate as increasing or decreasing polarisation: a philosophical analysis of learning by discussion**

The experience of informal and accidental learning by discussions in the public sphere has a central role in how we perceive societal issues and other members of the society. From other discussants, we acquire ideas, evaluations and information about particular topics and reference or interest groups. Here, by the experience of 'learning' I mean an experience of gaining more or new understanding about something.

In this paper, I will present a philosophical argument that learning by public debates is a crucial factor regarding polarization. First, there is an essential difference between learning about other members of the society and learning from them. That is, learning from discussion means not only learning about others as an object of discussion but learning about their perspectives from themselves. While learning about another reference or interest group in the society might create and strengthen stereotypes and even false beliefs about them, learning from those groups, that is, coming to understand what their perspectives are, might provide deeper insights about their situation. In the first case, we still learn from others, but the object of discussion is not them, but rather, we take from them the provided information about another group as a mere object of discussion instead of a party included in discussion. A classic example is the discussion about refugees instead of the refugees being part of the debate and telling about themselves.

My argument is based on the political philosophy of education and the phenomenology of empathy as a post-foundational approach. That is, while I approach the topic of learning by discussion in the public sphere as a topic of philosophy of education, I analyze the learning by public debate in terms of an experience of other's perspective.



## **Arto Kekkonen, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Doctoral student at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Helsinki

### **Affective blocs: Understanding affective polarisation in multiparty systems**

Research has suggested that affective polarization (AP)—the extent to which partisans view each other as a disliked out-group—has increased, especially in two-party political systems such as in the US. The understanding of AP in multiparty systems remains limited. We study AP in Finland, characterized by a strong multiparty system and a low level of ideological polarization, between 2007 and 2019. We find that AP has increased, driven mainly by voters evaluating their least favorite party more negatively. We also propose an approach that goes beyond earlier literature, which has mostly used a single aggregate metric to measure AP. Using latent profile analysis, we find that voters are grouped into blocs that view some parties positively and others negatively. This suggests that the complex dynamics of AP in multiparty democracies involve relationships between not just individual parties but between what we call affective blocs that span across party lines.



## **Ivan Kislenko, HSE University / Ghent University (Russia)**

PhD student at HSE University (Moscow, Russia) and Ghent University (Ghent, Belgium).


Acknowledgements:

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### **Emotions of “Dignity” and “Humiliation” in southern theory: An analysis of narratives**

In the discourse of southern theory, there is a claim that northern sociology must recognize the right of southern scholars for their own sociological concepts. It is also suggested to the adherents of northern universalism to take into account the fact that the southern discourse has long been ignored and excluded from the sociological agenda. It provokes a variety of discussions in this field, which are often accompanied by emotional statements. In this case, the narrative of dignity of representatives of southern sociology plays a significant role. Appealing to the colonial past of countries where sociology has taken shape as a science, they demand the recognition of their particular aspirations. Here comes the idea of humiliation, or rather recognition of the merits of southern sociologists in the formation of the entire project of sociology as a scientific discipline. The idea of excluding authors from the global South generates similar emotions in its representatives and makes them reproduce the practice of responding to this state of affairs, focusing on their scientific merit.

It is proposed to analyze the selected presidential addresses of sociologists of various organizations (International, American, European associations), as well as the most cited works (according to Scopus) on the southern theory and to make a narrative analysis of the discussion on this issue. It is supposed to highlight the discourse of dignity and humiliation in order to demonstrate that such a state of affairs is not only declared in the debates, but is actually present in the publications of various authors.



## **J Matias Kivikangas, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

J Matias Kivikangas (PhD in psychology) is a post-doctoral researcher at University of Helsinki. He has studied the psychology and psychophysiology of emotions and their role in behavior and experiences for more than a decade, writing more than 30 peer-reviewed publications. Since 2015, his focus has been in theory and neuroscience of emotions and how affective processes and traits are associated with morality and politics.

In addition to UH, Kivikangas has worked in Aalto University and KU Leuven, Belgium, and collaborated with the National Broadcast Company's (YLE) voting advice application, where he was in charge of the section focusing on personal values. His article "Moral foundations and political orientation: systematic review and meta-analysis" was recently published in *Psychological Bulletin*, 1st ranking journal in multidisciplinary psychology, and it established how culture, race, and political interest is associated with the differences in the associations between moral foundations and liberal-conservative or left-right self-labeling. His current projects include modeling how the fundamental automatic survival instincts are associated with the broader affective system and related to psychological traits relevant in politics; developing a method for mapping physiological concomitants to emotions; and the collaboration on the affective basis of accepting securitization, including processes like threat processing and traits such as authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.

### **Emotions and affect in political science: Examples of fear and threat processing in securitisation**

What are emotions and what is their significance for political science? In this interdisciplinary collaborative work, we combine psychology, cognitive science, and neuroscience with political science to see what can modern empirical understanding of emotion and affect provide to research on politics. We briefly review influential emotion theories and their empirical evidence, note the problems with the most widely used theories that assume basic emotions, and broaden the focus from named emotions to affective processing in general. Affective processing is not a separate domain but an inextricable part of cognition, and the basis of motivation, prioritization, values, and action. As an example, securitization - where an issue is framed as a matter of security in order to enable action that would not otherwise be considered - includes more than just fear. Examining threat processing, the psychological traits that influence it, and how different forms of media and communication exploit these, may help predicting factors that make securitization easier or more difficult. By furthering the understanding of this topic, the aim is to contribute to building societal resilience by improving media literacy and judgment of citizens and various actors in the public sector and media.





## **Lorenz Klumpp, University of Passau (Germany)**

2011-2014: B.A. German-French Studies (University of Regensburg, GER; Université Clermont Auvergne, FRA)

2014-2018: M.A. Governance and Public Policy (University of Passau, GER)

Since 2018: PhD student, research assistant in the project "Visualisation of democracy ViDe(m)o" (University of Passau, GER) which is part of the Bavarian research association "ForDemocracy" (<https://www.fordemocracy.de/en/projects/project-06/>)

### **Populism by or through the media? Visual representations of politicians on magazine covers of “Der Spiegel” and “Compact”**

By drawing on a communication based approach to populism, the paper argues that research should put more emphasis on the performative and stylistic dimension of populism (Moffitt 2016) including its visual elements in different media formats. The study theoretically refers to the distinction of populism by and through the media, which has been discussed to a great extent in populist political communication research (e.g. Esser et al. 2017). Empirically it focuses on visual representations of politicians on the covers of the German news weekly Der Spiegel as well as those of Compact – a right-wing populist monthly which has only been content-analysed on a textual level to date. It is argued that political magazines notably mirror a society’s political culture, especially by the visual messages they convey via their front pages. Because of their emotional appeal and their better recall compared to textual information, it can be assumed that visuals shape the way we think of politics. An image type analysis of both magazines’ covers between 2010 and 2020 is conducted (n=110) in order to create categories of the visual imagery of politicians disseminated by the magazines. On the one hand, the comparison of a mainstream and a right-wing alternative medium enriches the theoretical debate of how populism is strengthened by opportunity structures through the media. On the other hand, it is inquired into how populism is actively promoted by the media. Against this background, implications for public discourse are discussed.



## **Joonas Koivukoski & Salla-Maaria Laaksonen, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Joonas Koivukoski is a doctoral candidate at the University of Helsinki. Koivukoski's dissertation deals with political humor in today's media publicity. Koivukoski works in the Whirl of Knowledge project.

Salla-Maaria Laaksonen is a postdoctoral researcher in the Center for Consumer Society Research at the University of Helsinki. Her research areas are technology, organizations, and new media; including organization–society relationships in the hybrid media system, the organization of social movements in the online context, and the use of data and algorithms in organizations. Further, she is an expert on digital and computational method.

### **Clowning around a polarised issue: Rhetorical strategies and communicative outcomes of a political parody performance by Loldiers of Odin**

For decades, political activist groups have used humor for ridiculing their opponents and attracting media attention. This study analyzed the online presence of the Loldiers of Odin, a clown-disguised activist group created as a parody of the anti-immigration group Soldiers of Odin. By analyzing the rhetorical strategies of Loldiers' performance, we show how absurd and naïve parody stunts were used to criticize anti-immigration street patrolling, distort radical rightwing discourses, and mobilize like-minded progressives. Further, by analyzing Facebook commentary of the performance, we trace its communicative outcomes: support and legitimization, but also problematization and delegitimization. Our results highlight the unpredictable and ambivalent nature of humor in facilitating a political protest. We argue that while humor offers a compelling way for citizens to discursively engage with political issues such as the immigration question, the polysemic nature of parody paradoxically works to amplify and support existing polarized positions in online discussions.



## **Michał Kozłowski, University of Warsaw (Poland)**

Michał Kozłowski – philosopher, sociologist, historian and journalist. Associate professor at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw. Received his PhD in 2004 from EHESS PARIS. Co-editor of the polish edition of *Le Monde Diplomatique* and of quarterly magazine *Bez Dogmatu*. Books: *Le contrepouvoirs de Foucault* (Paris 2011), *Sprawa Spinozy [Spinoza's Case]* (Cracow 2011) *The Art Factory. The division of labor and distribution of capitals in the Polish field of visual art.* (co-author, Warsaw 2013), *Znaki równości [Signs of Equality. On social construction of Egalitarianism]* (Warsaw 2016). Co-editor of the volume *Joy Forever: The Political Economy of Social Creativity* (London 2014). Published among other in *Open Democracy*, *Il Manifesto Globale*, *Les Contretemps*, *Les Possibles*, *Politics and Culture*. Recently published "Red Nationalism? The Brief Overview of the Origins of Polish Stalinism. (*Studia Litteraria et Historica*, 2019(8).)

### **Authoritarian populism and the falling rate of patriarchal dividend**

In my paper i argue is the current legitimacy crisis understood as global phenomenon is closely related to the process of women's empowerment – a tendency no less universal. By empowerment I mean capturing a significantly larger amount of essential social resources. I will argue that "gender relations variable" efficiently pushes and shapes the authoritarian-populist and isolationist articulation of this crisis.

There are reasons to believe that the resemblance between the political imaginaries and discourses developed and successfully employed by leaders such as Jair Bolsonaro of Brasil, Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, Mateo Salvini of Italy, Jarosław Kaczyński of Poland and Donald Trump of the USA is not the mere consequence of political mimetics. The emergence of this kind of new charismatic leadership invested with figures of excessive stereotypical virility is a problem interesting on its own right yet, quite obviously, makes part of a larger resurgence of nationalist sentiment across the world, articulated in numerous discourses and social or political mobilisations.

Women's empowerment process presents itself as nonlinear and non-homogeneous, at each time relative and reversible and yet powerful and coherent enough to yield a series of homological political phenomena rooted in very different socioeconomic and cultural realities.



## **Beata Królicka, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Institute of Sociology (Poland)**

Graduate in linguistics; currently a graduate student in sociology at Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Poland.

### **A “Staunch Ally” or a “Useful Tool”? Politicians and collective identity in media discourse regarding the Polish-American relationship**

2015 was a turning-point for Poland with massive changes in its political landscape. The Law and Justice Party (PiS) was victorious in both the presidential and parliamentary elections held in this year, becoming the first party to win an outright majority of seats since the 1989 transition.

The election of Andrzej Duda, the presidential candidate endorsed by PiS, was quickly followed with a strengthening of mutual relations between Poland and the USA and the recognition of a strategic partnership between the two nations.

Simultaneously, the relationship between Poland and the European Union was deteriorating because of Polish judiciary reforms and EU immigration policy.

My goal is to examine how the perception of Poland, in the relationship with the USA, is presented to the Polish collectives themselves. I will pay particular attention to the emotional inferences and triggers identifiable in the discourse of Polish politicians. My research sample consists of recordings chosen from television and radio journalism from 2015 to 2020. I will use discourse analysis as the research method.

Preliminary research indicates that the ruling party emphasised the agency of Poland as an ‘equal partner’ and ‘staunch ally’ of the USA. The opposition milieus stressed the high financial and optical costs of these relations, referring to the American ambassador as the ‘governor of Poland’ and Poland itself as an ‘American Trojan horse in the EU’, used as a pawn within US-EU-German relations.

The research idea is based on the assumption that political journalism is an encounter which, by its conventions, is highly ritualised in terms of how participants engage with one another and with the audience. I will explore this assumption by applying Durkheim’s and Collin’s theories of rituals to the constructed nature of these encounters and how this ritualisation contributes to the cohesion of a collective’s identity.



## **Anam Kuraishi, University of Essex (United Kingdom)**

I am a PhD candidate at the University of Essex, Department of Government.

My research interests lie at the intersection of comparative politics and political theory, with a regional specialization in South Asia.

In my work, I develop a theoretical framework for conceptualising an alternate understanding of post-truth (understood as a phenomenon), along with the empirical illustration of 'post-truth' texts (post-truth understood as an adjective – the attributive traits associated with the term) through both qualitative discourse analysis of news articles pertaining to elections in Pakistani newspapers and an online priming experiment to gauge the reception and sustenance of 'post-truth' electoral discourse.

### **Insights from South Asia: A case of “post-truth” electoral discourse in Pakistan**

Although there exist numerous conceptualisations of post-truth, a gap in literature remains with regards to empirically illustrating it. This gap is present due to the lack of operationalisation of the term 'post-truth'. This paper deals with this limitation; it discusses 'post-truth' as an adjective whereby certain attributive traits are associated with the term allowing us to evaluate and categorize texts and narratives as 'post-truth'. This paper presents a qualitative evaluation and analysis of 1205 news articles and opinion pieces covering news pertaining to major incidents and trending political issues and election speeches from the three major English newspapers (Dawn, The News International, The Express Tribune) circulated in Pakistan for three electoral years (2008, 2013 and 2018). The narratives categorized as 'post-truth' have been analysed through the lens of the logics of critical explanation approach - fantasmatic logic (Glynos and Howarth 2007) and Lacanian logic of lack and fantasy.

I identify three traits peculiar to a post-truth narrative: fantasmatic ideal – a fantasy meant to offer identification with what the audience is aspiring to achieve in their lives, and provide the offer of fulfilment for that aspiration; lack - individual's aspirational tendency – things individuals aspire to achieve in their lifetimes to fulfil a longing or a desire; emotionality – a strategic tool used to create the fantasy and induce affect. For a narrative to be categorized as post-truth, it has to fulfil three necessary conditions: 1. address a specific lack; 2. provide a specific fantasy, and 3. include emotionality as a means of conveying the message. This is a first of its kind study which presents a qualitative assessment on what constitutes 'post-truth' texts. The empirical illustration extends the application of the theoretical components of post-truth in practice, allowing us to reflect on the influence a constructed narrative has on the credibility and acceptance of them as being truthful, raising questions about the implications on how truth is experienced in today's democracy. It also contributes to the emerging literature on post-truth by shifting the focus towards ethnically and religiously diverse, politically stable developing democratizing countries.

## **Attila Kustán Magyari, Tampere University (Finland)**

Attila Kustán Magyari is currently research assistant at Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University and 2nd year master's student in Global and Transnational Sociology programme, Tampere University. Having 15 years of professional experience in journalism, working for a time as Foreign Affairs column editor, he is interested in conspiracy theories, populism, the common grounds of these discourses, focusing primarily on Hungarian politics. He studied cultural anthropology and sociology in "Babeş–Bolyai" University (Cluj-Napoca, Romania), his bachelor's thesis analysed articles of Hungarian conspiracy theory portals. He currently focuses on Hungarian populist discourse and aspires for PhD position in Tampere University for expanding his research in the field.

His book *Awakers. Introduction to the Nature of Conspiracy Theories* (Cluj Napoca: Polis Book Publisher) appears in early 2021 in Hungarian language, his co-written article *Soros Conspiracy Theories and the Rise of Populism in Post-Socialist Hungary and Romania* has appeared in 2020 in the volume *Conspiracy Theories in Eastern Europe. Tropes and Trends* (London: Routledge).

He is an enthusiastic reader with an evergrowing personal library.

### **Defending our authentic way of life: How populist and conspiratorial discourses intertwine**

Populism and conspiracy theories – both on the rise over the past few years – often intertwine and hold similar ideas: both build on a claimed antagonism between two homogenous groups, “the elite” and “the people”. Moreover, an earlier neglected phenomenon seems to unfold in populist and/or conspiratorial discourse: both offer interpretations of social change in a similar way.

This paper analyses 16 speeches of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, between 2015 and 2020, focusing on the populist and conspiratorial discourse and several highlighted aspects: the ontology of the environment, the actors and the norms/ideals attached to them. I build on the theoretical framework of epistemic governance developed by the Tampere School of Thought in Global Sociology (TCuPS) and the methodological tools of membership categorization analysis (MCA).

I argue that social change is explained by both discursive tools in a similar way: the authentic way of life of a certain society (in our case, Hungarians) is endangered by a conspiracy of the elite.

The elite consists of mostly foreign actors (Brussels, United Nations, George Soros, NGOs etc.) with ideas which are aimed for destroying national sovereignty and its cultural background, while local actors (opposition parties, public intellectuals, human rights activists etc.) assist these aspirations without their ideological standpoints having real roots in the society. This is a crucial aspect since it gives space for rearranging the actors in comparison to the ideal-typical liberal representative democracies: opposition parties, supranational organisations, non-governmental organisations are not considered partners or opponents with equal legitimacies, but morally unacceptable and even dangerous. It is claimed that their ideological standpoints – antiracism, facilitating or ignoring immigration, LGBTQ+ rights, feminism and so on – are disrupting the authentic, traditionally embedded national frameworks and insist on social changes which are against “the will of the people”.

## **Inias Laureys, KU Leuven (Belgium)**

I am a Research master student of Philosophy at the Institute of Philosophy of KU Leuven, Belgium. In 2020, I graduated as a Master of Philosophy. Right now, I am planning on applying for a PhD in Philosophy. In my research, I mainly focus on the connection between liberal democracy and populism. After writing my Master's Thesis on Jean-François Lyotard's postmodern philosophy and its connection with Claude Lefort's notion of the empty place of power, I am now -- in my Research Master's Thesis -- focussing on the affective dimension of representative democracy. This will be done by starting from the work of Hannah Arendt and her ideas on loneliness and political action.

### **Loneliness and populism: Why Covid-19 could threaten modern-day democracy**

As the coronavirus contagion keeps spreading around the globe, it is increasingly exposing major socio-economic fractures that could undermine social life dramatically. According to UNICEF, the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic “could push up to 86 million more children into household poverty by the end of 2020”. In addition, WHO neurologist Dr. Konstantinos Petsanis warns, that “unless we act now to address the mental health needs associated with the pandemic, there will be enormous long-term consequences for families, communities and societies”. This raises questions as to what extent political life too will undergo evolutionary changes. In this paper, I will argue that the latter can most certainly be the case. Starting from the ideas of German-American thinker Hannah Arendt, I will argue that COVID-19 could threaten modern-day democracy significantly. To support this statement, I turn to Arendt’s notion of ‘loneliness’. Often underestimated, this specific notion provides many interesting perspectives from which the impact of the current crisis can be philosophically framed. Especially when connected to contemporary populism, Arendt’s idea of loneliness offers many reasons to believe that the current crisis is indeed one of the most influential events that could have taken place.



## **Vitalijus Leibenka, Gen. J. Žemaitis Lithuanian Military academy (Lithuania)**

I have been a Lithuanian officer since 1993. I am currently a Gen. J. Žemaitis Lithuanian Military Academy third-year doctoral student. The topic of my dissertation is "State Decision Making in the Background of the Information War". I am currently preparing the theoretical part of my dissertation and organizing the practical part of my dissertation - an interview. I am also currently preparing an article for a Lithuanian publication. This year I attended a conference at the University of Valencia on 11-13 November, where I read a presentation on "Analysis of Russian propaganda in the context of global crises after the annexation of Crimea". 2018 I prepared an article in Lithuanian "The Fourth Generation War. Accents of Hybrid Threats", which was published in the Lithuanian-language magazine Kultūros barai.

### **The State's response to lies in hybrid media**

After 2014, the annexation of Crimea is placing increasing emphasis on hybrid warfare, which has helped Russia achieve its goals. As a result, the world and NATO nations have drawn attention to the increasingly war-destroying actions of hybrid warfare, which can affect not only military action but also political games.

Especially against the background of hybrid warfare, the use of various forms of information warfare by different media types / means in the Baltic States became apparent. This includes radio, newspapers, television, websites, social networking sites, user-generated platforms, blogs and search engines, and it is all part of the media system. What is being done through the media anyway? In particular, the propaganda that Russia uses to achieve its goals in an attempt to influence Russian-speaking individuals by destabilizing their views and positions on historical facts. Secondly, Russia, using its opportunities and capabilities, is trying to wage a disinformation struggle by making false reports of fictional events in order to influence the moods and opinions of the people of the Baltic States.

What should be the response of countries as small as the Baltic States? It is likely that the response to the threats should be hybrid, encompassing hybrid media. In addition, this should include not only the dissemination of clean information in Lithuania as a form of public activation, but also the adoption of state decisions related to the media. Moreover, this must be about not only the creation and development of additional and necessary institutions to prepare responses through the hybrid media, but also the decision-making of the state through certain decisions in order to curb the spread of lies through the hybrid media. Polarization of information is inevitable, but information must be true and clean.





## **Paulina Lenik, UCL (Poland)**

Paulina Lenik is an Early Stage Researcher at the UCL Horizon 2020 Fatigue Project. She holds a MSt in Diplomatic Studies from Blackfriars Hall, University of Oxford (2018) and Postgraduate Diploma in Foreign Service, Department of Continuing Education, University of Oxford (2017). In 2014 she graduated with honours with a Master's Degree in European Studies from the Centre for European Studies, Jagiellonian University in Krakow. In 2012 she obtained her first-cycle degree in International Economic Relations, Cracow University of Economics. Her current research interests include: illiberalism, democracy, economic determinants of populism, energy politics, data surveillance, multi-stakeholder governance. She is supervised by Julia Korosteleva and Elodie Douarin at UCL and by István Benczes at Corvinus.

### **Trusting the untrustworthy: An exploration of attitudes towards populist government in Poland using survey data**

Despite a long academic tradition, we still struggle to define the concept of 'trust' and its influence over the performance of democratic regimes (Catterberg & Moreno, 2005). Rooted in social capital theory, the notion of 'social and political trust' is essentially combining the study of community building with political representation (Bauer & Freitag, 2018; Wrightsman & Wuescher., 1974; Zmerli & Newton, 2008). This paper seeks to anchor certain aspects of this debate onto the new wave of research concerned with illiberal governments and populism. I argue that there is a need to re-evaluate the recent electoral turn towards populism, particularly with a country-specific focus. This paper explores the notions of trust, and satisfaction from governance taking Poland as a case study. The principal research question is which of these dimensions have the strongest influence on the political preference of the Polish public towards the incumbent populist government. The study uses quantitative methods to analyse individual-level data from the three consecutive waves of the ESS (ESS Survey 6-9, 2012-2018). Rationale for this, is to explore relationship between accommodators of liberal democracy, that is trust and satisfaction from governance (Hughes, 2008) during the period of populist governance. The key variables of interest are operationalised using social, political as well as government satisfaction items from the European Social Survey (ESS) as indicated by Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) which findings are furthermore validated by Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Poland (CFA). I match the electoral preferences with the identified factors using a multinomial logistic regression (MNL) interacting these key factors with years before and after PiS came into power. The major finding of the model is that the political preference of Poles is greatly influenced by the attitude towards the policy outcome (government satisfaction) and to a lesser extent by normative political expectations (political trust). In line with the previous literature, the paper found insufficient evidence for the social trust as a determinant for populist support.



## **Marcela Lins, Federal University of Minas Gerais (Brazil)**

Marcela Lins has a degree in journalism at the Federal University of Pernambuco, a master's degree in the Postgraduate Program in Social Communication by the same institution and is currently a PhD candidate at the Federal University of Minas Gerais.

### **For a genealogy of suspension: Biopolitics and health crises in Brazil in three moments**

This proposal is part of an ongoing doctoral research, which seeks to investigate how State management discursivizes three major health crises that have affected the Brazilian territory over three centuries. Namely: the outbreak of yellow fever that occurred in the 1850s; the Spanish flu crisis, which spread in the country in 1918; and the pandemic caused by the new coronavirus, which arrives in Brazil in 2020. The articulation between the three events is carried out from an archaeological and genealogical perspective (FOUCAULT, 1969; FOUCAULT, 1975) and aims to understand which knowledge-power regimes that are sustained by the voices that undertake crisis coping policies. With this, we seek to identify the continuities and, above all, the discontinuities of the changes in the dynamics of the management of space and bodies - it is, therefore, an exercise of excavating the past and diagnosing the present. In this work, we point out how there are approaches to the ways of managing and discursivizing Covid-19 with ways of managing and discursivizing in the past, as an exercise in a precarious biopolitics (LEITE, 2020), ie, a management incident on the life it produces precariousness; as well as an ideological use of the disease, revealed in the political crisis management; however, we also believe that there are processes that mark the uniqueness of our time, such as multiple antagonisms - the virus was not established as an antagonistic reference par excellence - and a strong denial about the status of the crisis.



## **Artur Lipiński, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan, Poland (Poland)**

Associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Journalism at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Poland. Currently, he coordinates the activities of the Polish team within H2020 consortium project DEMOS “Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe”. He has published articles in „Problems of Post-Communism” and „Journalism Studies” and book chapters with Palgrave and Routledge.

### **Populism, presidential elections and Covid-19: The case of Poland**

When the COVID-19 pandemic hit Poland during the presidential campaign, all political parties were completely focused on the electoral competition and the health crisis was, to a large extent, overshadowed by this issue. For Law and Justice the victory of its candidate, incumbent A. Duda, would allow the party to advance its radical reforms; for the oppositional Confederation, a good electoral result of its candidate Krzysztof Bosak could provide an opportunity to promote its party radical agenda (i.e. anti-LGBTQ, euro-rejectionist, anti-semitic and xenophobic slogans) and would be a good starting point for future parliamentary elections. PiS used the health crisis to present its leadership as skilful and competent and its decisions as non-political. It also tried to take advantage of the uneven political field created by the pre-emptive COVID-19 measures which had imposed limits on the campaigns of opposition candidates. However, the health crisis and its economic consequences opened a window of opportunity for all opposition parties, including Confederation.

The aim of the paper is to elucidate how PiS and Confederation, two right-wing populist parties who differed in their institutional positions, dealt with the double challenge of the COVID-19 crisis and the presidential elections during a pandemic. It presents the political context, the evolution of pre-emptive measures and policies used to prevent the spread of COVID-19, discursive reactions of the parties, and their strategic decision on how and when to introduce and construct the pandemic as a political issue.

Empirically, the paper is based on the Facebook posts and parliamentary speeches. Methodologically, it employs selected tools of critical discourse analysis to analyse political discourse of the right wing populist actors and their strategies to (de)politicize the public health crisis. In particular, it analyses ways of constructing us and them divisions and nomination, predication and argumentation strategies.



## **Yonathan Listik, University of Amsterdam (Netherland)**

Yonathan Listik is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the University of Amsterdam. He spent 2 years as a researcher and graduate teaching assistant at the University of Essex. He has an MA in Philosophy from the Tel Aviv University with an exchange at the Sciences Po Paris. He has a double BA in Philosophy and Sociology & Anthropology from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His research focuses on political philosophy, more specifically, the possible connections between contemporary ontology in the continental tradition, political theory and aesthetics. The way these themes appear in Critical Theory and Heideggerian philosophy but also new approaches to those traditions such as the philosophies of Nancy, Stiegler, Agamben and Ranciere.

### **A case for political stupidity**

The mainstream response to current phenomena such as the election of Trump, Duterte and Bolsonaro is the diagnosis that democracy is in crisis. Typically, this crisis is presented as an external disruption that undermines what would otherwise be a reasonable political regime. My article proposes to challenge the account that the current challenges to democracy are disruptions of its natural development. This assumption masked a deeper repressive and undemocratic tendency inherent in political philosophy: the polis is the public realm of intelligence where those capable of making decisions grounded on reason are free while those lacking the capacity to participate [the idios] are to be safeguarded in private realm. There is an underlying assumption that if one controls the degeneration (the stupid masses), harmony would be established. One of the central concepts in the Bolsonaro campaign was the good citizen, in the sense that the obedient citizen has nothing to fear. In other words, the intelligent and reasonable citizen has nothing to fear, only the idiots and criminals are in danger and, moreover, they should be since they are not proper members of the polis. I aim to provide a conceptual framework for understanding this relation between intelligence, stupidity and power. My contribution to the debate will be to provide a new account of the relation between intelligence and stupidity and develop on the political implications of this relation. In understanding the administrative logic of intelligence my aim is twofold. Demonstrate that what is portrayed as democratic is in fact to a large extent undemocratic. And, moreover, attempt to provide an account of what could be democratic exploring the way stupidities disruptive power of intelligence is a form on democratic intervention.



## **Eliana Regina Lopes Loureiro, UFABC (Brasil)**

PhD student in Human and Social Sciences (UFABC), master in Communication and Consumer Practices (ESPM), postgraduate in Journalism (Senac-SP) and graduated in Advertising and Marketing (Mackenzie). Professor at Faap's post-graduate course in Communication and Digital Marketing and free courses at Belas Artes, Mackenzie and ESPM; Web Analytics instructor at Alura. Part of the Observatory of Conflicts on the Internet research group and was metrics coordinator at InformaSUS-UFSCar project, focused on fighting fake news during the pandemic with scientific information. Her research is focused on pandemic political fake news, its relations to the Brazilian president and also its textual and emotional persuasion strategies. E-mail: eliana@wndr.com.br

### **Fake news, populism, polarization and emotions in Brazil COVID-19 narratives**

Contents checked by the fact-checking agency Lupa about the new coronavirus pandemic and labeled as false were submitted to the following analysis methods: 1) Highest number of shares/views. 2) Content analysis. 3) Emotional semiotics. 4) Relationship to political facts. The objective was to analyze the fake news narratives about the new coronavirus during the pandemic crisis in Brazil and its political relations, mainly with president Bolsonaro's populist government and how they managed to convince the population to go against measures recommended by Science. In the Content Analysis the categories were divided by: misleading media; Pandemic and Covid denial (we have better recommendations than WHO); Quarantine doesn't work and impacts the economy; Others (schemes and optimistic narratives); Pandemic politicization. Based in the work of Fuks and Marques, Jasper and Gerbaudo, the findings were an evidence of affective polarization encouraged by contents that evoked mainly outrage and anger, and helped shape the group identity, find other members and increase internal radicalism of Bolsonaro's supporters, in a populist tactic as well as correspond to the agenda defended by the Brazilian president. It's possible that a smokescreen strategy was used and a counter-narrative once there was a relation between content and political facts (we compared the fake news texts to the political newspaper headlines).



## **Michele Diana da Luz and Letícia Baron, Universidade Federal de Pelotas, UFPel, (Brazil)**

Michele Diana da Luz is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Universidade Federal de Pelotas. She works on discourse analysis, political communication and right-wing populism. Currently researching right-wing discourses on social media.

Letícia Baron is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the Universidade Federal de Pelotas. Works on discourse analysis and Latin American comparative politics. Currently researching right-wing governments in Latin America.

### **The role of nostalgia in the populist far right discourse in Brazil**

The paper discusses the relation between populism, identity, identification and affection. Defining populism as a mode of political identification that constructs and gives meaning to “the people” as a political actor, it critically adopts a discursive approach of populism, derived mainly from the works of Ernesto Laclau, to explore the construction of identities in a reactionary discourse. Arguing that political identities are complex and built in a relational, challenging, incomplete and binary way, it explores the current far right discourse in Brazil reflecting over the nostalgic feelings mobilized by it about the “old days” and the idealized perception of it. In that sense, it explores the role of the “nostalgic voice” in retrieving, from a mythical moment in the past, an unachievable feeling of completeness, the symbols incorporated by it and the underlying meanings associated with it in the social imagery. In this terrain, it furthers the debate to address the dichotomous perception of society resulting from it and how it provides a sense of belonging through signifiers like religion, morality, tradition and order, meanings more commonly articulated by reactive discourses of the far-right. Outlining cultural and historical characteristics of the Brazilian case, it aims at enhancing the discussion about the way in which reactionary discourses mobilize negative affects in order to generate identification.



## **Joshua Makalintal, University of Innsbruck (Austria)**

Joshua Makalintal studied political science and is currently in the early phase of his graduate studies in sociology, focusing social and political theory at the University of Innsbruck in Austria. At the same time, he works as a student assistant in research and administration with the university's scientific networks department. He was a board member and lead editor of the student-led Innsbruck Journal of Political Science and Sociology from 2018-2020 and has contributed to Al Jazeera, New Mandala and the Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, among other publications. Most of his writings have concentrated on the sociopolitical developments in the Philippines since Rodrigo Duterte's ascent to power. His research interests are focused on critical political philosophy, which include Marxist theory, postcolonial studies, agonistic perspectives on radical democracy, and critical approaches to international relations and law.

### **Neglecting sentiments of resentment: An assessment of postcolonial liberalism's blindness to the political**

The following paper investigates the history and modern trajectory of liberalism as a hegemonic ideology and regime in the postcolonial world. It sketches the intersection of liberalism's tendency to sustain imperial continuities and the consequent widespread sentiments of discontent which define the current conjuncture. Central to this link is the neglect of recognition against the backdrop of injustices and traumatic events of the past which the post-colonies had to endure and confront. This leads to the experience of failure. In considering how this failure is experienced, the paper engages in a discussion of the extent of how memories of such dark histories have played a fundamental role in the continuity of a coercive and repressive political order as well as in the construction of an ambivalence towards its repercussions. This in turn have created the conditions for the further proliferation of negative emotion as well as violence that remain relentless, manifested in widely diverging conflicts within postcolonial society and beyond. Building on Chantal Mouffe, who has described the contemporary conjuncture as a "populist moment," I argue that these developments are to be interpreted as a direct consequence of postcolonial liberalism's failure to understand the nature and roots of antagonisms due to its impoverished conception of politics characterized by its blindness to the political. By underlining the need to genuinely address this impotence, the following paper ultimately argues that there is an imperative to embrace an agonistic approach that does not ignore the ineradicable affective dimensions of conflictual dynamics. Such an approach must be placed on a stronger foundation for which liberalism cannot provide, because as long as liberalism in the post-colonies continues to be blind to the inherently antagonistic aspects of human society, its efforts to build and sustain social harmony will continue to fail.




## **Lena Masch and Anna Gassner, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf (Germany)**

Lena Masch is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Political Science at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf.

Anna Gassner is a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Sociology at Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf.

### **Anxiety, distrust and the support of populism during the Covid-19 pandemic**

Recent developments following the COVID-19 pandemic have led to the spread of misinformation, insecurities, and uncertainty in many countries of the world. Preventive measures such as social distancing, lockdowns and the absence of a vaccine create anxiety among the populace. This global pandemic and its consequences of potential crises pose a threat to democratic stability as distrust in scientific facts and political institutions increase the likelihood of individual support for right-wing populism. Populist rhetoric is likely to feed on this crisis, offering oversimplified solutions for the complex issues of the pandemic, including scapegoating attempts. We assume that individual emotional states affect whether individuals are susceptible to a populist rhetoric, fearmongering, and scapegoating. Individuals who have low baseline levels of trust in democratic institutions and state health departments and who experience emotions such as anxiety and depression are more likely to disregard preventive measures and support populist and authoritarian ideas. Therefore, we examine the role of individual emotional states of citizens during the pandemic (e.g., anxious, lonely), their individual political distrust (e.g., in political leaders, government, WHO) as well as their support of populist parties and authoritarian ideas. To answer our research question, we use regression modeling and draw from current panel data that is representative for the German population.





## **Matteo Mastracci, Koç University (Turkey)**

Matteo Mastracci is a PhD. Researcher at Koç University (Istanbul, Turkey). His main research interests include Comparative Constitutionalism, Populist Constitutionalism, Legal Theory, and Turkish politics under authoritarian rule. He holds a master's degree in law from University of Teramo (Teramo, Italy), an LL.M. degree in International Criminal Law and Corporate Crimes from LUISS School of Law (Rome, Italy) and an LL.M. degree in Public International Law and Human Rights from Riga Graduate School of Law (Riga, Latvia). Currently, he is conducting comparative studies, through a mixed-method approach, on European populist parties and their impact on the resilience of constitutional regimes. Since 2020 he has been working as a reporter for the Oxford Reports on International Law (ORIL), International Human Rights module.

### **Oy ve Ötesi: The role of a civil society movement ahead of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election rerun as a genuine populist response**

Since it came to power in the 2002 general election, the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has been playing the leading role in Turkish politics as a powerful populist actor. Thus, and by its very nature, AKP has conducted highly divisive rhetoric, followed by extreme polarization in which the latest piece is the electoral rerun that took place in Istanbul on June 23, 2019. In actual fact, after the defeat that occurred in the first round, local AKP members filed a complaint with the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) asking for a novel electoral episode and hoping for a better fate. During this fragile and over-polarized scenario, the paper claims that various form of civic engagement and the role of civil society, in particular the contribution that has been given by Vote and Beyond (Oy ve Ötesi), have played a decisive part in raising public awareness and eventually in reducing the gap between electorate and political choices. In the final analysis, the impact of Vote and Beyond, as the name suggests, seems to exceed the phenomenon of mere participation in typical electoral arenas as it appears to successfully shape civil consciousness towards a less polarized path.



## **Neringa Mataityte, Student (Lithuania)**

Received bachelor's diploma in Political Science in 2017 and master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy in 2020 at Vilnius University, Institute of International Relations and Political Science (IRPS VU). In 2020 started PhD studies at IRPS VU with the goal to analyse emotions in international relations and implement my research which is focused on collective emotions of societies and its mobilisation in crises such as climate change ("Emotions as the Mobilizing Power in International Politics: the Role of Anxiety in Mobilizing Society for the Climate Change Movement").

Academic interests include cultural approach to emotions, its role in international relations and security as well as collectivisation of emotions and creating emotional communities.

### **The role of emotions in the mobilisation of society to fight climate change: Constructing emotional states to inspire mass movement**

The research paper "The Role of Emotions in Mobilization of Society to Fight Climate Change: Constructing Emotional State to Inspire Mass Movement" examines emotions as foundation to mobilize society for a common goal in the case of climate change strike initiated by Greta Thunberg. This paper raises the question of how favourable emotional environment in Greta Thunberg's case was constructed in order to mobilize international society to join the climate change strike. The aim of this study is to reveal the role of emotions as mobilizing power in international crises such as climate change. Based on constructivism approach and the theoretical model linking the emotions and social movements, it is assumed that mobilization to join Greta's strike was significantly built on emotional basis which was collectivised through emotional discourse. Discourse analysis implemented by applying methodological model of Emotional Discourse Analysis (EDA) revealed that G. Thunberg's speeches are full of emotional potential which contributes to provoking emotions such as fear, anger and hope in the global society. It was shown that specific emotional environment that encouraged mobilization for the climate change strike was constructed by encouraging reactive emotions and creating the sense of insecurity. Such findings relate to the concept of emotional community which is established and strengthened on emotional grounds.

This study contributes to the research field of emotions in international relations by exploring in more depth its role as a mobilizing power which unfolds through provoking specific emotional states of society and its sense of community in the case of climate change.



## **Máté Mátyás, Corvinus University of Budapest – University of Tartu (Hungary)**

Máté Mátyás is an early-stage Marie Skłodowska-Curie Research Fellow at the Corvinus University of Budapest and the University of Tartu of the EU Horizon 2020 populism research project FATIGUE. He participated in several high-ranking international conferences such as the APSA 2019 and the UACES 2020 annual conferences held in Washington D.C. and online, respectively. As a doctoral candidate, his main research areas include several converging fields of study building on constructivist, relational ontological foundations. It emphasises the networked interpersonal, intersubjective construction of social realities. Hence his current research project scrutinises interpersonal networks within Hungary's media system — focusing on civil society media and mass media outlets under the populist government of PM ORBÁN Viktor (since 2010). His research interests are nevertheless gradually moving towards international comparisons. This stems from his global education having graduated in International Relations (BA) with distinction from the Corvinus University of Budapest — after also being a visiting student at the University College London —, and having completed his graduate studies in Public Administration (MSc) at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University and the University of Southern California.

### **Media systems, party systems, and populism: The case of Hungary (1990-2020)**

This empirical single case study assesses the relationship between electoral behaviour (electoral outcomes) as the independent variable and the media system — conceptualised based on Hallin and Mancini's authoritative *Comparing Media Systems* — as the dependent variable. The media system is construed as a triadic interrelationship of three variables: media consumption structures, media production structures, and media policies.

This investigation is carried out in the context of post-communist Hungary (1990–2020). Hungary is selected due to its remarkable trajectory from one of the frontrunners of post-communist transformations to the first non-democratic, competitive authoritarian regime of the EU — according to the creators of the concept, Levitsky and Way. Using process tracing, the independent variable, the results of general elections are compared to the dependent variables of the triadic interrelationship (media consumption, media production, and media policies). Data is collected from both secondary (Hungarian and foreign scholarship) and primary (statistical data and social network analysis) sources which also includes both qualitative and quantitative data from a unique series of elite social network survey-interviews of the largest Hungarian media outlets' editors-in-chief.

The paper demonstrates strong co-movement patterns between the media system and electoral outcomes in post-communist Hungary. Within the interrelationships of the media system (media consumption, media production, and media policies), populism represents a new era in media policies and the political economy of the media whose roots are identified already in the early 1990s. Populism's resounding, sustainable success — especially under the rule of PM Orbán's Fidesz since 2010 — is found in the relentless pursuit of an anti-pluralistic political strategy in the media system: creating and extending clientelistic personal, professional, and ownership networks. This lends support to the strategic-behavioural conceptualisations of populism, and its political communication explanations. Therefore, this research suggests novel policy recommendations for safeguarding pluralistic democratic political systems.

## **Dario Mazzola, University of Bergen, Department of Comparative Politics (Norway)**

I am a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Bergen (UiB), Department of Comparative Politics, and Executive Scientific Coordinator of the H2020 PROTECT Project. I research the right to asylum from a normative yet realistic perspective, and with a special focus on the Global Compacts. I obtained my PhD from the University of Milan, and I have been a visiting fellow at the InCite – Institute for Citizenship Studies of the University of Geneva. I have published on the ethics of migration and on issues in political and moral theory in academic journals, both in Italian and English.

### **Populism and the radicalisation of democracy: The frontiers of democratisation**

The political, social, and cultural phenomenon of populism is often read in the context of, or in opposition to, democracy. In my paper, I analyze populism by putting it into the perspective of a radicalization and evolution of democratic ideals and institutions. These dynamics take place on several levels.

Historically, classic Western democracies are based on ideas and institutions which have become established from the age of the earliest revolutions in the 18th century to the end of World War Two. In some cases, the accomplishment of substantial democracy is more recent, as there are European countries where women have been allowed to vote as late as 1971. Still, society has undergone thorough transformations from half a century ago. A possible reading of the contemporary explosion of populist movements therefore identifies it with the radicalization of the egalitarian and libertarian ideals of modernity, expressed in various, context-dependent, and oftentimes contradictory or oppositional forms, and with the challenge to institutions and practices based on “classic”/outdated conceptions of democracy.

A connected point is the evolution of democracy due to technological and technical transformations. In an age when citizens almost “live” on the internet, the sacrality of “casting the ballot” - and the practical reasons which dictated corresponding procedures – has become open to question. This is all the more evident with the COVID-19 crisis, as suggested by the way remote voting and automated counting have offered occasions for an explosive right-wing populist contestation.

Indeed, right-wing populism can possibly be read as a conservative reaction to such evolutions, and left-wing populism as a progressive one, but both are often open to important mutual contaminations.



## **Andrzej Meler & Radosław Sojak, Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń (Poland)**

Andrzej Meler is a Nicolaus Copernicus University's Institute of Sociology graduate. He received the Polish Sociological Association award for his master's thesis, which focused on the analysis of media discourse on the Polish judiciary system. As a third year student he started participating in social and market research (Research Team "Pryzmat", ASM Centrum Badań i Analiz, Pentor, F5 Konsulting). He worked as a specialist in research department of Polska Press Group (media corporation) for ten years. His fields of interest cover the press and online media markets and innovations in payments as well.

Radosław Sojak is a husband, father, sociologist, postdoctoral researcher; Fulbright scholar at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville, fellow of the Polish weekly "Polityka" within the program "Zostańcie z nami" (stay with us); author and co-author of dissertations *Zagubiona rzeczywistość* (Lost Reality, 2004 – written with Daniel Wicenty) and *Paradoks antropologiczny* (Anthropological Paradox, 2005 FNP monograph), *Spełniona obietnica* (Promise Fulfilled, 2014) and *Arystokraci i rzemieślnicy* (Aritocrats and craftsmen, 2015 written with Łukasz Afeltowicz). He has worked for NCU's Institute of Sociology since 1998. Unceasingly, he has been searching for theoretical holders which would facilitate understanding of the current social reality. He has been interested in the quality of public debate for as far as he can remember.

### **Compensation or supplementation? The patterns of new and traditional media usage by Polish politicians**

Politics and media were symbiotic systems. Politicians produced the events and dramas for journalists to cover; journalists offered themselves to politicians as most efficient mediating actors to reach electorate. The advent of social media has changed this 'game' substantially. It lowered the entry fee for politicians and complicated the gate-keeping processes for journalists. We entered the era of hybrid media system (Chadwick 2017) making the research on hybrid media usage by politicians of utmost importance. Since July 2018 we have gathered data on the activity of the members of Polish parliament both in traditional (TV and radio) and social (Twitter) media. We have covered the appearances of MPs in most important political talk-shows and interview programmes as well as the number of tweets they published. Up to September 2020 we collected data on over 1700 traditional media appearances (24 programmes broadcasted by 4 leading TV stations and 6 major radios) as well as over 1 million tweets gathered using API including near 0.5 million original tweets (not retweets).

The main analysis was conducted using segmentation by Ward method (Ward 1963). This allows for modelling the main patters of political communication within hybrid media system as well as measuring to what extent social media are being used by Polish MPs to compensate for rather restricted traditional media access.

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Ward, Joe H. 1963. „Hierarchical Grouping to optimize an objective function”. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* (58:301):236–44.

## **Francesco Melito, Jagiellonian University in Krakow (Poland)**

I am a doctoral candidate at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, and a MSCA Fellow in the EU's Horizon2020 Project "Delayed Transformational Fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe: Responding to the Rise of Illiberalism/Populism (FATIGUE)". My PhD investigates the neo-traditionalist discourse in Poland by focusing on its counter-hegemonic potential.

### **Finding the roots of neo-traditionalist populism in Poland: "Cultural displacement" and European integration**

This article investigates the roots of populism in Poland in its current traditionalist-conservative fashion. In contrast with the liberal hegemony and, more specifically, with its 'true European values', right-wing populists in Poland claim to speak in the name of those people who refuse this external system of values and who experienced a 'cultural displacement'. The article examines whether the consensual process of European Union (EU) integration has created room for a populist moment. Particular emphasis is given to the importance of culture in the construction of an alternative neo-traditionalist project. While the post-structuralist literature on populism has mostly focused on Western Europe and socio-economic demands, the concept of neotraditionalism reveals the confrontation between two different blocs also in Central-Eastern Europe. The author analyses the neo-traditionalist discourse in Poland, most notably produced by the conservative party Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), as a counter-hegemonic project. Opposing mainstream EU values, PiS appealed to 'ordinary Poles' and adopted a traditionalist-conservative narrative. The article will show how the neglect of a neo-traditionalist world view by the European elite and the threat to identity posed by liberal and individualistic values have been exploited by right-wing populists to forge a new common sense.



## **Irina Milutinovic (Institute of European Studies Belgrade)**

### **The role of media in the political polarisation of the public within the unconsolidated democracy regime**

The subject of this research is media discourse constituted around the two selected topics of public interest in the Republic of Serbia: (1) escalation of verbal violence in public discourse, and (2) Covid-19 pandemic. The theoretical basis of the research is Jürgen Habermas' public sphere and deliberative democracy concept, and the underlying premise is the thesis on the lack of quality social debate in Serbia. The political context in which media in Serbia operate is defined as an unconsolidated democracy regime – so-called transitional or hybrid regime. This system of government is characterized by fragile democratic institutions, a combination of democratic and authoritarian governance instruments, poor protection of civil rights and political freedoms and a steady decline in media freedom index value. Media control function as the “Fourth Estate” and “watchdogs of democracy” is intensively derogated. The first part of the study presents how the media are used to manage verbal conflicts over certain polarizing public issues generated on social networks among their users; while, the second one – on the example of the media discourse on Covid-19 pandemic – shows how these mainstream media further compound public polarization related to acute social crises. In the research, case study is applied as a holistic method. Secondary research methods include media content analysis and linguistic text analysis (as a level of Critical discourse analysis). In the conclusion, it is argued that: in Serbia's transitional society, the media are predominantly biased in reporting on events of public interest, framing them according to interests of political government actors; an important feature of media discourse is the unbalanced perspective due to an unbalanced concentration of communicative power between government actors on the one hand and the stigmatized opposition, on the other. The mainstream media increasingly tend to function as accelerators of politically instrumentalized polarization of the public.



## **Ingeborg Misje Bergem, University of Oslo (Norway)**

I started as a doctoral research fellow in French literature and culture at the Faculty of Humanities at the University of Oslo this fall. My project is concerned with the Yellow vest movement and its relation to the crisis of representation in France more generally. Among other things, I will focus on how the Yellow vests play into the realignment of the French political landscape these recent years, a realignment that president Emmanuel Macron and his La République en Marche! can also be considered a part of. Moreover, my project will focus on whether the Yellow vests should be considered a populist movement and how populist movements differ from traditional populist parties. In 2021, I will conduct qualitative interviews with participants of the Yellow vest movement. Lines of questioning will be the crisis of representation, reasons for engaging in the movement, socioeconomic situation, effects of the Covid-19 epidemic and political affiliations.

My PhD-supervisor is associate professor at the Faculty of Humanities Kjerstin Aukrust.

### **Covid-19's effect on the Yellow Vest Movement in France**

In this paper, I will explore how participants of the Yellow Vest Movement (YVM) in France respond and adapt to a Covid-19 and a pandemic world by presenting findings from interviews with some of the movement's activists. A central focus will be how the pandemic affects the participants' view of political authorities. The YVM, often defined as populist (Rosanvallon, 2020), is dominated by the working and lower middle classes, who are likely to experience the effects of the pandemic most severely. Given their already low level of confidence and trust in the authorities, the epidemic might lead to an even further divide between the movement's perceived 'people' and what they deem to be corrupt political elites.

The YVM has been relatively subdued since the global outbreak of covid-19. The movement's favored mode of engagement, manifestations in streets and roundabouts, have not been possible to conduct on a large scale due to national guidelines to prevent the risk of infection, although some activists have persisted with their mobilization locally. Recently, some YVM participants have added another requirement to their preexisting demands: that the government change its approach to the battling of the epidemic in general and that the mandatory wearing of mask be lifted in particular. Research conducted by the Fondation Jean Jaurès shows that the demographics of those opposed to wearing masks (so-called "anti-masques") correlate with the demographics that dominated the YVM. I will be conducting interviews with participants in the movement in winter/spring of 2021 and present findings from my work in progress at the conference. One line of questioning will be how the Covid-19 affects their trust in government, and how and if they continue their involvement with the YVM in a pandemic world.





## **Carlo Moll, University of Cambridge (United Kingdom)**

I am a post-doctoral researcher living and working in London and a visiting scholar at the University of Cambridge. In 2020, I received my PhD in History from the University of Cambridge (supervised by Prof. John F. Pollard) with a thesis on counter-cultural radicalization and the construction of hegemony in Italian nationalism and fascism, 1884–1935. Prior to my doctoral studies, I did an MPhil in Modern European History at the University of Cambridge (St. Catharine's College) and a BA in History and Political Science at the University of Munich. My research focuses on the politics of Italian modernism, the Italian literature of the Great War (so-called *letteratura di guerra*) and Fascist underground resistance in Allied-occupied Italy during the Second World War.

### **Notes on the history of democratic populism in Italy: The case of La Voce, 1909-1914**

The Florentine journal *La Voce* (1908-1916) has variously been described as a platform for the formulation of an early, 'proto-Fascist' ideology, a cradle of Italian modernism and an outlet of Italian nationalism before the First World War. Uniquely modern in its style and layout, the magazine's founders and contributors included an assortment of often autodidactically educated, highly intelligent individuals such as the journalists Giuseppe Prezzolini and Giovanni Papini, the artist Ardengo Soffici, the philosopher Benedetto Croce and - perhaps most significantly - Benito Mussolini, who would, in different ways and on different sides of the ideological spectrum, decisively shape Italian politics, academia, culture and history. By drawing on a corpus of articles published in *La Voce* between 1909 and 1914, it will be shown how the magazine and its contributors tried to build an inclusive, democratic-populist movement that would educate Italians about the alleged fundamental incompetence and corruption of Italian bureaucracy and the need to enact change locally and concretely through grassroot-initiatives and civic activism. On this basis, it will be argued that *La Voce* has to be seen in a long line of anti-elitist populist movements in modern Italy that had their roots in journalistic outlets, including post-war *Qualunquismo* and the *Movimento Cinque Stelle* (M5S), which sought and seek to solve perceived crises of Italian liberalism, including the 'corrupt' rule of parliamentary elites interested in 'talk' rather than 'action', public mismanagement and the chronic neglect of the country's South (the *Mezzogiorno*), through public education campaigns, private initiatives and the electoral enfranchisement and engagement of broad swathes of the nation's population. Understanding the populism of *La Voce* can thus improve our knowledge of the long intellectual history of democratic, yet anti-liberal populism in Italy and help distinguish it from other, authoritarian forms of Right-Wing populism, such as Fascism.

## **Alina Mozolevska, Associate Professor (Ukraine)**

Alina Mozolevska, Associate Professor of Institute of Philology at Petro Mohyla Black Sea State University in Mykolaiv, Ukraine. She has a PhD in Linguistics with a major in Romance Languages from Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv, Ukraine (2014). She is a member of of the Association des professeurs de Français d'Ukraine and La Asociación de Hispanistas de Ucrania. Her research interests include Media Studies, Border studies, Critical Discourse Analysis, and Text Linguistics.

### **Responses to the Covid-19 crisis of the new Ukrainian populism: Main narratives in Volodymyr Zelensky's discourse**

At the present time, we observe the shift of national borders and re\de-bordering processes in the world caused by globalization, immigration, climate change, and the emergence of a new global challenge – the pandemic of COVID-19. In this context new populist political discourses emerge that are aimed at restoring old borders between nations, erecting walls between countries and at the redistribution of social services and goods that even more polarize society in the face of a global threat. Thus, the categories of inclusion and exclusion become a part of contemporary political communication. However, for now researchers know very little about how the society perceives this new reality, in which way pandemic impacts the collective identity of the nation (“self”) and how populist politics can shape the relation to the “other”.

In this paper we are going to focus on the study of the response of Ukrainian political discourse to the global health crisis and to explore varied discursive strategies which are used to verbally construct new global reality. We aim to analyze the peculiarities of verbal and visual means of communication of V. Zelensky, comedian, producer and TV star who was completely new in politics but managed to win the presidential race in 2019 and become the President of Ukraine. Our corpus consists of a heterogeneous dataset that is composed of Twitter messages, posts from the official Facebook page of the President and official presidential addresses for the nation. The analysis uses analytical tools of Critical Discourse Analysis, with emphasis on those discursive strategies which are implied in shaping the relationships between power institutions and the nation as well as in the re-identification of in-groups and out-groups. The study explores key patterns of discursive construction of new global challenges in the Ukrainian context and stereotyped representations of “self” and “other” that are being structured in symbolic and ideological dimension in Ukrainian political discourse.



## **Ben Jack Nash, (France)**

Based in Strasbourg and London, British/ French artist Ben Jack Nash has been practising for over ten years specialising in installations, architectural interventions and performance for public institutions, commissions and private galleries. His work centres around the relationship between material and abstract states and their cross over between the physical and socio-political landscapes. He has received and been nominated for several major art prizes and had his work exhibited internationally in solo and group shows across including New York, London, Copenhagen, Rome and the Venice Arsenale. He was included as part of Aesthetica magazine's '100 Contemporary Artists' and had his work curated by notable sculptors such as Richard Deacon, Richard Wentworth and Yinka Shonibare. He is represented by Radial Gallery, Strasbourg.

Ben has also a cross disciplinary and collaborative side to his practise working with a number of institutions and presenting theory through print publications and academic talks that stretch outside typical art forums and across different subject areas including politics, sociology, philosophy and science. Recent presentations include for the Max Planck Institute (Berlin), CIUHCT (Lisbon), University of Oxford and Birkbeck College London. He has a forthcoming publication with MPIWG.

### **Is populism made from plastic?**

The proposed paper approaches the subjects in question from the less typical perspective of a practising artist using a model developed in the studio rather than the library. It argues how an understanding of concepts such as political ideologies can be understood in a similar way to how I understand physical matter through my lens as a contemporary sculptor. It will explore how culture, values and beliefs are closely comparable to the behaviour of material, space and movement. It will pick up on some of shortfalls of populist causes and definitions and suggest that how this art based view is able to fill the gaps.

I will argue how the expansionist nature of neo-liberalism - greater mobility of people and trade, enlarged definitions of social acceptance, transparency etc are typical characteristics of an abstract entity. Populism on the other hand rallies in the opposite direction. It is identified with characteristics which convey an idea of limits, confinement and clearly defined roles. It favours more traditional, nativist and protectionist policies. It seeks the leadership of 'real' people over the more removed elite. These more inward looking traits typically represent a more material and tangible entity.

A similar matter based approach will be taken with regards to the recent pandemic. Covid-19, like any virus, is quintessentially abstract matter. An important part of an abstract identity is the ability to move freely filling up space. This is best achieved below the radar, under an ephemeral and intangible shroud. Other large abstract forces such as the digital dimension, the stock exchange or ideas show how these less perceptible characteristics provide the toolkit to effect profound change upon our existence as is currently evident. Taming the virus has effectively meant taming an abstraction by deploying its counterpart - materiality.

A more material version of space is no longer open and accessible but embodies containment, limits and lockdown. The paper will consider how when it concerns their own country, authoritarian populist leaders are quick to close in on themselves to limit a perceived abstract threat. But when it came to shutting down the virus, the likes of Johnson, Trump and Bolsonaro were decisively slow. The talk will conclude with illustrating how the world has been witnessing a move more generally towards a more abstract state at breakneck speed in terms of technology, climate change and communication and that the shifts from neo-liberalism to populism are part of this more general trend.

## **Vladimír Naxera & Ondřej Stulík, University of West Bohemia (Czechia)**

Vladimír Naxera is an assistant professor at the Department of Politics and IR, University of West Bohemia. His research is focused on the issues of corruption, populism, anti-corruption, and anti-immigrant rhetoric of political actors, and the use of history as an argument in contemporary politics. He is the author of several papers dealing with these issues published in international journals (e.g. *Studies of Transitions States and Societies*, *Romanian Journal of Political Science*, *Revista UNISCI*, or *Journal of Nationalism, Memory and Language Politics*).

Ondřej Stulík is an assistant professor at the Department of Politics and IR, University of West Bohemia. His long-term research interest is covered by liberal democracy, normative perception of the roles of different actors in society, the epistemology of political science and its approaches and methods, and history of political thought (problems of rationality, virtue, justice, and dignity). Currently, the main scientific targets have shifted closer to policy analysis studies (social policy, transportation), analysing discursive practices of political parties and political elites in the Czech Republic, especially populists and extremism. Ondřej Stulík is the author of several scientific articles and conference remarks to mentioned fields, for instance: “Do we have all the necessary data? The challenge of measuring populism through metaphors”, published in *QUALITY & QUANTITY*, or “Protection of Sovereignty Populist Abuse of Civil Rights and Its Democratic Ethos”, which was presented in COST action conference in Bucharest.

### **The communication of the Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš in the times of Covid-19: Between populism and neo-patrimonialism**

This conference paper contributes to the contemporary discussion about the political consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic situation. The goal of the paper is to identify and analyze the neo-patrimonial rhetoric of Czech Prime Minister Babiš (who is standardly seen as a populist politician) in connection with his handling of the pandemic. Babiš' rhetoric is analysed in the context of the rhetoric of Deputy Prime Minister Jan Hamáček, who is labeled as a “traditional politician” by Babiš himself. His rhetoric is seen as comparatively referential to the Babiš' one. Using the quantitative and qualitative content analysis of their speeches from the governmental press conferences, we show, that Babiš' rhetoric has shifted after the beginning of the crisis from standard populist anti-elite position to neo-patrimonial. The purpose of this paper is to point out the rhetoric shift bounds to problematic consequences on the exercise of his function and the neutrality of the bureaucratic apparatus, which must apply during states of emergency, and to show a new possible way how to evaluate populist speeches with a brand-new category, i.e., populist-neo-patrimonial.



## **Hakan Ovunc Ongur, TOBB University of Economics and Technology (Turkey)**

Hakan Ovunc Ongur is an Associate Professor of political thought in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Turkey. He is the author of "Consumer Society, Neurotic Culture and Fight Club" (Ayrinti Publishing) and "Minorities of Europeanization: The New Others of European Social Identity" (Lexington Press). He also has several research articles and book chapters across his research interests, which include political theory, critical theory, Turkish political thought, identity politics, nationalism and minorities, and consumption.

### **Swinging between cultural populisms: How Turkey's tradition of populist politics has resulted in extreme social polarisation**

This study offers a Bourdieusian framework to understand how the Turkish society has been going through from one form of cultural populism, i.e., of the foundational ideology of Kemalism, to another, i.e., of the neoliberal conservatism of the current Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the last two decades. It is argued here that the measures of the Kemalist revolution in the early twentieth century, particularly in education and culture, to Westernize and secularize the Turkish society and to carve out a homogeneous nation had managed to diffuse mostly into the urban population, but failed to make significant changes on the social and political 'taste' of the remaining rural segments. Following the mass migration movement from the rural areas to major cities after the 1960s, the ambivalence between these two segments has begun to highlight the shortcomings of the Kemalist strategy. It is proposed in this study that the roots of the AKP movement must be sought for within this culture clash and a further explanation could be offered with regards to the current socio-political polarization in the Turkish society. To put another way, those who remained exempt from the transforming influence of the Kemalist revolution is what the AKP has addressed as the primary target of its socio-political discourse since the early 2000s and it is due to this ongoing cultural ambivalence between the two parts of the Turkish society that their addressing has inevitably produced a polarizing version of populism that demands not simply political but indeed fully cultural loyalty from the electoral base, but at the same time estranges those in the opposition further with its practical or discursive actions.



## **Emilia Palonen, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Emilia Palonen has studied hegemony theory, political identities and populism for 20 years with a particular focus on Hungary, Europe and Finland. She is the PI of the WhiKnow and Now-Time Us/Space projects, and leads a WP in the MaPo consortium.

Besides research on populism, her postdoctoral research includes work on European identities, particularly the cultural capitals of Europe and local participatory planning and democracy. Her background is in area studies of Central and Eastern Europe (BA SSEES/UCL, London). She took an MA and PhD at the University of Essex at the Government Department's programme on Ideology and Discourse Analysis, and a postdoc with Ernesto Laclau at Northwestern University. She has visited several research institutions (IWM Vienna, Collegium Budapest, and Humboldt University in Berlin) as a junior researcher, before returning to her native Finland. She is an active science communicator in both scholarly societies and the wider community in Finland and abroad.

Supervising several doctoral students and teaching Ideology and Discourse Analysis at the University of Helsinki since 2006, and a Helsinki Summer School in Rhetoric-Performative Post-Foundational Discourse Analysis, and engaging in the Masters' Programmes of European and Nordic Studies and Global Politics and Communications, she has established a vibrant community in Helsinki. From 2020 as a Senior Researcher in Political Science, she leads both the projects and this research hub.

In Hepp2 Conference, Palonen is a chair of Roundtable 2: Covid-19 pandemic, and panels 11.1 Thinking with Chantal Mouffe and 17.2 Affective Polarisation. She is a co-author in Marina Vulovic's paper [Debating the ontological and ontic dimension of populism](#).



## **Sam Page (Finland)**

Sam Page's research has thus far focused on analysing electoral and party politics in the UK and the US using the concepts of assemblage, affect and the war machine. His PhD in Political Geography at University College London on the UK Labour Party's 2015 General Election campaign through the introduced a topographical approach to political parties to political geography and electoral geography.


His recent publications have focused on populists on both the left and the right. Particularly, he questions whether the Deleuzo-Guattarian notion of 'the war machine' can be a useful tool in order to understand the desire for and against figures such as Jeremy Corbyn in the UK, and Donald Trump in the US.

He has taught qualitative geography theory, methods and political geography at the London School of Economics. He also published research on the recent brewery-boom in London with Dr Adam Dennett (CASA, UCL).

## **Boris Johnson and Populism**

In 2019, as the world reacted, both for and against, populists around the world, Boris Johnson became Prime Minister of the UK on the promise of getting 'Brexit done.' First, he was gifted the premiership by an incumbent party. Then, he fronted a landslide victory at the 2019 UK General Election, affectively defeating the left-wing populist candidate, Jeremy Corbyn. There have been many claims that Johnson contains all the hallmarks of the current populist rise happening in the Americas, Europe, and Asia.

Using the Deleuzo-Guattarian concept of the 'war machine' and recent work by Franco Berardi, I analyze Johnson's political performance. I argue that the 'war machine' provides a useful understanding of current populists, and contrarily, Johnson is not of this ilk. Instead, while he claims to be herding the pro-Brexit body of voters who may be understood as 'suicidal' (in Deleuzo-Guattarian terms), he is a man of the state. In this, he is trying not to change the state, but preserve it.



## **Dolors Palau-Sampio, Universitat de València (Spain)**

Dolors Palau-Sampio (PhD, Autonomous University of Barcelona) is a lecturer of journalism at the University of Valencia (Spain). Prior to her academic career, she worked as a journalist for nine years. Her research focuses on journalistic genres and styles, accountability, quality, and narrative journalism.

### **Conspiracy theories of the pandemic in the Spanish pseudo media**

The pandemic has promoted a wave of conspiracy beliefs (Boberg, Quandt, Schatto-Eckrodt & Frischlich, 2020) and skepticism (Brubaker, 2020) over the preventive measures and vaccination against the Covid-19. The current hybrid media context (Chadwick, 2013) has favored the dissemination of conspiracy theories (Bruder & Kunert, 2020; Romer & Jamieson, 2020) and disinformation regarding the coronavirus (Nguyen & Catalan, 2020). Most of them have been feed by a conglomerate of digital pseudo-media (Rathnayake, 2018) created worldwide in the last years, aimed to serve as a loudspeaker of the alt-right parties, but at the same time to take advantage of the economic gains of a clickbait economy (Munger, 2020).

The aim of this paper is to analyze the pseudo-media ecosystem in Spain regarding the disinformation provided on the coronavirus issues. To develop this research, we have analyzed ten pseudo-media outlets in Spain from March —when the increasing levels of infection lead to a severe lockdown— to December 2020 —with the start of the vaccination process. The following research questions have guided the analysis:

RQ1: Which are the most dominant frames regarding the lockdown, the hygienic measures and the vaccination?

RQ2: There is any relationship among the conspiracy theories launched by the analyzed media?

RQ3: Which arguments are underlined by these media outlets to undermine the scientific criteria?

RQ4: Are the disinformation channeled by these outlets among the most relevant hoax identified by the fact-checking platform Maldita.es?

The relevance of this research is supported by the increasing levels of disinformation and polarization in Spain and their implications to democracy (Bennett; Livingston, 2018; Casero-Ripollés, 2020), particularly in a country with low levels of trust in media (Newman et al., 2020).



## **Reece Peck, College of Staten Island, CUNY (USA)**

Reece Peck is an Associate Professor at the Department of Media Culture at the College of Staten Island, CUNY. He is the author of *Fox Populism: Branding Conservatism as Working Class* (Cambridge, 2019). His research engages the media dimension of the American political right and specifically examines how conservative news outlets have used tabloid media styles and populist political rhetoric to reconfigure the meaning of social class in the United States. He also provides commentary on television and politics for news outlets such as the Washington Post, Columbia Journalism Review and New York Magazine.

### **The Young Turks of left media: The rise of progressive populism online**

My book, *Fox Populism*, uses a cultural genealogical method to stress the point that there is nothing inherently conservative about the populist style of journalism Fox News deploys. This chapter seeks to advance this argument further but from an entirely different vantage. Shifting the focus on conservative media and cable news, this chapter examines the inverse: left-wing populism and its manifestation primarily in digital media online. The main case study I plan to use is the progressive online network The Young Turks (TYT).

In addition to its title as “the home of progressives,” another one of TYT’s big claims to fame is that it stands as the longest running daily news webcast. Since joining YouTube in December of 2005, TYT has been a primarily YouTube-based operation. In fact, TYT was one of first content providers to partner with YouTube, which is to say, it was one of the first creators on YouTube to strike a monetization deal. In course of this 15-year relationship, YouTube and TYT have become financially and stylistically entwined. By exploring TYT’s deep institutional ties with YouTube, this study strives to reveal something broader about YouTube’s political culture and industrial system.

The example of leftist media groups successfully deploying the rhetorical frames and performative styles of the populist tradition could challenge, or at least, complicate the commonly held association between populism and right-wing politics. Moreover, TYT seems particularly relevant to television scholars in light of the growing trend toward cord-cutting, especially among 18-34-year-olds who are rapidly dropping pay-tv services for online sources of video news. The rising success of a streaming network like TYT could be a harbinger for the end of cable news or, at least, its reinvention through another technological medium.



## **Yoav Peled, Tel Aviv University (Israel)**

Yoav Peled is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Tel Aviv University.

### Selected Publications:

#### Books

Y. Peled, H. Herman Peled, *The Religionization of Israeli Society*, Routledge, 2019.

Y. Peled, *The Challenge of Ethnic Democracy: The State and Minority Groups in Israel, Poland and Northern Ireland*, Routledge, 2014.

G. Shafir, Y. Peled, *Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship*, Cambridge UP, 2002. Albert Hourani Award for best book in Middle East studies in 2002, Middle East Studies Association of North America.

Y. Peled, *Class and Ethnicity in the Pale: The Political Economy of Jewish Workers' Nationalism in Late Imperial Russia*, Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1989.

#### Edited Volumes

J. Ehrenberg, Y. Peled. *Israel and Palestine: Alternative Perspectives on Statehood*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2016.

Y. Peled, N. Lewin-Epstein, G. Mundlak, J. Cohen (eds.), *Democratic Citizenship and War*, London: Routledge, 2010.

S. Ben-Ami, Y. Peled, A. Spektorowski (eds.), *Ethnic Challenges to the Modern Nation State*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.

#### Articles in Refereed Journals:

Y. Peled, "Toward Religious Zionist Hegemony in Israel," *Middle East Report*, 292/3, 2019.

Y. Peled, "The Viability of Ethnic Democracy: Jewish Citizens in Inter-War Poland and Palestinian Citizens in Israel," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34:1, 2011, 83-102.

H. Herman Peled, Y. Peled, "Post-Post-Zionism? Confronting the Death of the Two- State Solution," *New Left Review* 67, 2011, 97-118.

D. Navot, Y. Peled, "Towards a Constitutional Counter-Revolution in Israel?" *Constellations*, 16:3, 2009, 429-444.

Y. Peled, "The Evolution of Israeli Citizenship: An Overview," *Citizenship Studies*, 12:3, 2008, 335-345.

Y. Peled, "Citizenship Betrayed: Israel's Emerging Immigration and Citizenship Regime," *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, 8:2, 2007, 333-335.

Y. Peled, D. Navot, "Ethnic Democracy Revisited: On the State of Democracy in the Jewish State," *Israel Studies Forum*, 20:1, 2005, 3-27.

Y. Peled, "Profits or Glory? The 28th Elul of Arik Sharon," *New Left Review*, 29, 2004, 47-70.

## **The ascendance of right-wing populism: Israel in comparative perspective**

In November 2019 Israel's Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was indicted for bribery, fraud, and breach of trust in three different cases. Netanyahu responded to his indictment in a series of speeches full of classic populist tropes: The indictment was nothing less than an attempted coup d'état, which the police and the prosecutors carried out under pressure from the "Left" and the media; his enemies are trying to topple him judicially, since they cannot defeat him democratically; but "the public" has no confidence in the law enforcement system and stands with him.

After three general election campaigns in one year, Netanyahu failed to assemble a governing coalition which would have enabled him to form a government, primarily because one right-wing party refused to join his government while he was under indictment. So after the third round he had to form a dysfunctional government of national unity with the main opposition party.

In spite of Netanyahu's repeated failure to form a government, and his inept handling of the Corona crisis, his support within his own Likud party remains solid. The Likud leadership has remained loyal to him because so did his "base," made up mainly of working- and lower-middle-class Mizrachim (Jews originating in Moslem countries). This is typical of populist movements – total loyalty to the leader and indifference to allegations of corruption. The power of Israel's right-wing populism, which dates back to 1977, has persisted through bad and good economic times for its base. My argument is that, unlike the US and several European countries, in Israel right-wing populism does not feed on economic deprivation but primarily on two political emotions: resentment against the Labor party, which governed at the time of the Mizrachim's arrival in the country, and fear of the Palestinians.



## **Carolina Plaza Colodro, University of Salamanca (Spain)**

Carolina Plaza Colodro has a degree in Sociology from the University of Barcelona, a Master's in Political Science and a PhD in Comparative Politics from the University of Salamanca. She has been visiting researcher at the Università degli Studi di Milano, University of Leicester and Universidade Nova de Lisboa. Carolina is currently a postdoctoral researcher in the Political Science Area of the University of Salamanca. Her main lines of research have to do with electoral competition, the study of populism and Euroscepticism in Southern Europe. She has published in journals such as *West European Politics, Electoral Studies and Politics*, as well as in several published volumes on the topics in which she is a specialist.

### **Populism and the pandemia: The case of Spain**

The current triple crisis that has shaken the political scene and changed the parameters of the public debate of contemporary democracies, has elements that can facilitate the emergence and strengthening of left-wing populist actors. This article asks how populism has reacted to the challenge of the pandemic in Spain, where populist actors differentiated by their government-opposition role and their ideological nature coexist. For this, both populist parties and their electorate are analysed. The main findings indicate that, above all, the fact that the left-wing populist party, Podemos, is part of the coalition government, neutralizes them as a challenging party and favours the Right-wing populists actors as Vox channel discontent, even though this crisis does not naturally favour the relevance of the issues that mobilize these types of parties.



## **Cristina Pradillo Caimari, Universitat de Barcelona (Spain)**

Degree in Psychology by the University of Barcelona (UB). Master in Social Exclusion Advanced Studies by the UB and Campus Docent Sant Joan de Déu. I currently work as a predoctoral researcher at the department of Social and Quantitative Psychology, UB. My PhD research is supported by the fellowship FI-2019 granted by the government of Catalonia and the European Social Fund.

### **Mobilising the (national) people: A psycho-political approach to the Catalan crisis**

This presentation explores the lay experience of the current Catalan Crisis where the main demand is the independence of Catalonia from the Spanish State. The massification of the secessionist claim started in 2012 implying several mass protests, institutional acts and judicial proceedings. During these years, many demands were included under the independentist's umbrella, involving significant changes in the ways by which nation is constructed. We argue that this cycle of protest has modified the constructions of who "the (national) people" are, among lay social actors.

Drawing on a psychosocial approach to subjectivity, we introduce the concept of 'political subjectivation' as the processes through which identities, affects, social practices and political discourse become (re)configured in accordance with the specific socio-political context significantly affecting everyday life. We focus on the psychosocial dynamics in which ordinary citizens enact, channel and contest political meanings, paying special attention to national meanings.

Through 26 open-ended interviews collected following a theoretical and maximum diversity sampling method, we contacted people who lived in Catalonia during the cycle of protest and were not involved in formal politics. We used an analytical strategy based on the rhetorical psychology which enabled us to explore the dilemmatic character of the national constructions and the relevant role of the affective dimension when we talk about ways of belonging. Finally, we stress how this kind of national populism is involved in social change processes.



## **Dario Quattromani, Tuscia University of Viterbo, & Roberto De Rosa, Niccolò Cusano University, (Italy)**

Dario Quattromani (PhD in Political Sciences – Government and Institutions), is Adjunct Professor in Political Science at Link Campus University of Rome and Tuscia University of Viterbo, Teaching Fellow in Political Science at the University of Roma Tre, Teaching Assistant in Political Sociology and International Relations at the University D’Annunzio of Chieti-Pescara, Political Communication Officer at the Metropolitan City of Rome. He is currently involved in research projects in the area of Political Science.

Roberto De Rosa (Ph.D. in Communication Science and complex organizations, L.u.m.s.a. University - Rome) is Senior Research fellow/Assistant professor in Political Science at the Faculty of Political Science, Niccolò Cusano University in Rome, Italy. He is also Adjunct Professor in Political Science and Political Sociology at Niccolò Cusano University (Roma). He has published several scientific works, included monographs and articles (<https://ricerca.unicusano.it/author/roberto-de-rosa/>) and he is involved in research projects in the area of Political Science.

### **Individuals, society and culture in the populist age**

Contemporary age has a narrative which points out populism as a pathology of modern democracies in crisis (Meny and Surel 2002). Nevertheless, the idea that Europe is currently facing a populist Zeitgeist appears to be quite scholarly accepted, a landscape in which both government and opposition parties are expressing some of populist features in their discourse. (Mudde 2004). From being an endogenous threat to liberal democracies, populism has become a possible government alternative in many European countries. Recent world economic crises have significantly influenced electors and parties’ political programs worldwide, producing relevant changes in well-structured national political systems: thus, it is now possible to observe unprecedented varieties of political landscapes, on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. We have witnessed the rise of new political movements and the significant growth of small and niche parties, and so the classical categorizations of populism, generally referring to right-wing political forces in Europe, and left-wing in the Americas, are facing new and challenging options. Populist parties should be perceived as a threat to modern democracy, or maybe their accusations and requests could lead to a regeneration and even produce missing strength and stability of democratic systems? The aim of this paper is to focus on the transformation of modern democracies, rather than criticizing their aspects, in order to deepen existing knowledge on recent political phenomena.



## **David Ramírez Plascencia, University of Guadalajara (Mexico)**

Born in Mexico (Guadalajara, 1980), he is a teacher and researcher. He holds a bachelor's degree in Law (2002) and a master's degree in Political Science (2006) from the University of Guadalajara, as well as a doctoral degree in Social Sciences from the College of Jalisco (2013). He is a full-time researcher and teaches subjects related with new information and communication technologies and their impact on society at the University of Guadalajara. He coordinated the University of Guadalajara's master's degree in Public Management in Virtual Environments and founded Paakat: Journal of Technology and Society. He has published essays and articles on technology and society and is a member of the National Research System of Mexico (Sistema Nacional de Investigadores, SNI), Level 1.

### **Tropical populism and the pandemic: A comparative study of presidential discourse in Mexico and Brazil**

This paper analyzes the public discourse employed by populist governments in Mexico and Brazil during the COVID-19 emergency. The two cases hold important similarities: since the first outbreaks in Mexico and Brazil, both presidents, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador and Jair Bolsonaro, have a negationist and disdained attitude towards the disease, trying to maintain their popularity and limiting the impact of the pandemic in their countries. These positions, however, translated into an uncoordinated national strategy to contain the disease, causing several thousands of casualties and a huge economic impact in Mexico and Brazil. In spite of the adverse public health stats, both leaders have already declared the return to “the new normality.” Besides the huge negative impact of COVID-19 in their countries, both presidents have managed to maintain favorable public approval levels. The main aim of this research is to compare Lopez Obrador and Bolsonaro’s presidential discourse into two specific periods “the irruption of the pandemic” (March-May 2020) and “The back to the “new normality” (June-July 2020). The main aim is to describe how both leaders were able to build an efficient populist discourse during the pandemic which preserved their popularity in spite of the pandemic’s negative outcomes and the uncertainty of the forthcoming future.



## **Jorge Ramos-González, University of Salamanca & Pablo Ortíz, University of Seville (Spain)**

Jorge Ramos González is a PhD candidate in the Rule of Law and Global Governance programme. He is hired as a pre-doctoral researcher under the Ministry of Science and Innovation for the Training of Research Staff (FPI), within the research project "Populism, political preferences and political representation: changes in party systems after the Great Recession". Graduate in Political Science and Public Administration from the University of Salamanca and Master's in Political Theory and Democratic Culture from the Complutense University of Madrid. His main lines of research are related to political theory, populism, discourse analysis and new political cleavages in Europe.

Pablo Ortiz Barquero is PhD Candidate in Social Sciences (with a Ministry of Education Grant: FPU) in the Department of Sociology at the Pablo de Olavide University (UPO) (Seville, Spain). He holds degrees in Sociology and Political Science (UPO, 2016 – with Extraordinary Prize) and MA in Society, Administration and Politics (UPO, 2017). He has been awarded with the Best Academic Trajectory Prize in Political Science (Andalusian Academy of Social Sciences and Environment, 2017). His thesis project analyses the evolution and the performance of Spanish far right since the end of francoist dictatorship until now, focusing on the recent electoral breakthrough led by VOX. His main areas of interest include right-wing extremism, party competition theories, party building process and populism.

### **Radicalism and populism: do they always go hand in hand? A comparative analysis of the ideology of the radical left and the radical right in Spain**

In recent years, Spanish political landscape has been dramatically transformed: from a two-party system dominated by mainstream centre-left and centre-right (PSOE and PP respectively), to a new polarised multi-party system with at least five important parties at national level. In this sense, two new parties play a crucial role in this complex context: Podemos and VOX. On the one hand, Podemos has been defined as a radical left party whose ideological pillars are post-Marxism, democratic socialism and favourable economic policies to stronger Welfare State and redistribution of wealth, always within the liberal democracy. Also, it should be noted that Podemos is currently participating in national Government coalition together with PSOE. On the other hand, VOX is a radical right party which promotes a kind of conservative, exclusionary, centralist, authoritarian and aggressive Spanish nationalism.

Despite their ideological differences, both parties have been defined as populist. This populist nature has been pointed out before in the case of Podemos, but is less clear for VOX due to the recent institutionalization process of the party. The purpose of this research is to examine the existence of populism at supply-side level in the case of these two new Spanish parties. We conduct a qualitative analysis of manifestos and speeches in order to study the ideological discourses. Discourse-Theoretical Analysis (DTA) is used as main theoretical and epistemological guide for the analysis.

The results show that the relation between radicalism and populism is not mechanical or self-evident, but complex and affected by strategical decisions. Regarding to Podemos and VOX, the two parties have different ideological articulations of radicalism, populism and other dimensions (i.e. nationalism). These findings point the need to develop a research agenda which conceives populism in a more systematic way and not only as a rhetoric useless concept.



## **Mark Reiff, University of California at Davis (USA)**

Mark R. Reiff is the author of five books: *In the Name of Liberty: The Argument for Universal Unionization* (Cambridge University Press, 2020); *On Unemployment, Volume I: A Micro-Theory of Economic Justice and Volume II: Achieving Economic Justice after the Great Recession* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); *Exploitation and Economic Justice in the Liberal Capitalist State* (Oxford University Press, 2013); and *Punishment, Compensation, and Law: A Theory of Enforceability* (Cambridge University Press, 2005). His papers on issues within political, legal, and moral philosophy have appeared in leading academic journals in the US, the UK, France, and Canada. Dr. Reiff has taught political, legal, and moral philosophy at the University of Manchester, the University of Durham, the University of California at Davis, and the Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, and in 2008-09 was a Faculty Fellow at the Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University. Dr. Reiff is also a lawyer, and prior to returning to academia to obtain his PhD at the University of Cambridge practiced civil trial and appellate litigation in California for many years. He is also admitted to practice as a solicitor in England and Wales.

### **The unbearable resilience of illiberalism**

The rise of Donald Trump and Trumpism, and the rise of similar forms of illiberalism throughout what was thought to be the irrevocably liberal-democratic world, suggests that racism, sexism, xenophobia, homophobia, religious hatred, tribalism, a rejection of the rule of law and reason, and an attraction to authoritarianism is endemic in the human psyche, and therefore in human culture. The purpose of the book in which this paper is based is to explain how complacency and a misunderstanding of the precepts of liberalism have allowed its antithesis to rise once again. Drawing on the work of a great many illiberal thinkers from both the right and the left, many of whom are little known within liberal circles, I construct an unconventionally thick description of how the fundamental presuppositions of liberalism and illiberalism differ, a description that enables us to see that the liberal-illiberal axis is as important and multi-faceted as the traditional left-right axis along which political theorists, politicians, and political parties are typically evaluated. I shall then discuss how the battle between liberalism and illiberalism might be joined, and more importantly, what counts as an argument in this battle and what does not. For one cannot use an argument based on a fundamental presupposition which the other side rejects without begging the question of which set of fundamental presuppositions are correct, something that explains why liberals and their opponents so often find themselves unable to make sense of one another. I shall then offer some suggestions about how liberals can more effectively respond to the rise of illiberalism in their own communities and in others, and explain how we can better organize and prioritize our efforts to keep the ever-present attraction of illiberalism at bay. I end with an explanation of why things are likely to get worse before they get better, and specifically discuss whether and if so how the public health and economic ramifications of the coronavirus pandemic will affect the struggle between liberalism and illiberalism.



## **Ingrid Ríos Rivera, Universidad Casa Grande/Universidad de Chile (Ecuador)**

Ingrid Ríos-Rivera is an Associate Researcher at the Universidad Casa Grande (Ecuador). She is a PhD Candidate in Latin American Studies at Universidad de Chile. Her research areas include populism, social movements, political communication and decolonial studies. Ingrid is coordinating the book “Populismo, Anti-Establishment y Pluralismo Democrático en el Comportamiento Político” (Universidad Casa Grande); and has recently published in Revista Empiria and Análisis Político.

### **Populism across borders? Exploring the role of populist discourses in Bolivian and Ecuadorian electoral campaigns abroad**

Paralleling the ever-increasing presence of populism around the world, scholars and practitioners establish that studies on populism still have a long way to go, especially in the context of the health crisis caused by Covid-19, which is already being a crucial issue on the populist agenda. This context not only justifies the need to continue delving into this phenomenon, but also forces theorists on the subject to raise new concerns that reflect on mainstream populism and allow it to be addressed in other arenas of electoral participation, for instance across national borders. As most politicians currently go abroad to capture non-resident citizens' votes, this article attempts to respond: to what extent populist discourse plays a role when homeland candidates and/or political parties campaign abroad? If so, how and why politicians employ a manichean discourse, separating the 'pure' emigrants from the 'corrupt' (homeland and/or international) elites when they visit emigrant communities. Through the social discourse theory we examine the discourses of political candidates in the electoral campaigns of Ecuador and Bolivia in 2019 and 2020. Our results illustrate a strategic reminiscence of the discursive shift toward emigrants in the homeland arena, basically appealing to the country's history to create a feeling of belonging and allocate the responsables for their departure as the antagonist 'other'. This (re-)construction creates a dichotomy of 'rightful' emigrants versus 'guilty' politicians. The continuous waves of migration, entail a (re)configuration of the material and discursive nation space, reconstructing the social and political subjects inland and outland, which indeed is reflected in the discursive network of sense of the electoral campaign. Given the junction between populism and non-resident citizens' electoral participation, this article aims to contribute to the existing literature on transnational populism, which currently fails to incorporate emigrants and their descendants as one relevant non-state actor on this phenomenon.



## **Joshua Roose, Deakin University (Australia)**

Joshua Roose is a Senior Research fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University in Melbourne. Prior to this position he was Director of the Institute for Religion, Politics and Society at the Australian Catholic University. His primary research interests include religious and political extremism, populism, masculinity and law and religion. Joshua has previously been a visiting scholar at the East Asian Legal Studies Program at Harvard Law School and the Hagop Kevorkian Centre for Near Eastern Studies at NYU and in 2019 was awarded an ICLRS-Oxford program fellowship on Religion and the Rule of Law. He is a current fellow of the Institute for Research on Male Supremacism (US) and has advised Australian state and federal governments on violent extremism and social cohesion. Joshua's latest book is titled 'The New Demagogues: Religion, Masculinity and the Populist Epoch' (Routledge 2020).

### **The new demagogues: Masculinity, emotion and the populist epoch**

This paper explores the argument that populist hyper-masculinity irrespective of the national context in which it is displayed, is indicative of deep seated social and emotional injury and that the combination of religious invective, social injury and wounded masculine pride is particularly volatile yet also profoundly modern. Based upon research conducted across the UK, USA, Europe and Australia for my new book *The New Demagogues: Religion, Masculinity and the New Populism* (Routledge 2020), the paper will explore the expulsion of working-class men from the so-called 'new economy' and the impact of this on both communities and individual notions of honour and dignity. It moves beyond the working-class to consider deep seated prejudice against women that is increasingly evident in the white-collar professional classes; a new development that has paralleled the rise of the new demagogues and populism. The paper also explores questions of intersectionality with an emphasis on religion, race, gender and class and brings them into conversation with the concepts of male supremacism and 'ideological masculinity' to understand how masculinity has been weaponised in the service of demagogic strongmen.



## **Mette Marie Roslyng, Aalborg University, Copenhagen (Denmark)**

Mette Marie Roslyng is Associate Professor of Media and Communication at Aalborg University, Copenhagen. She works on how discourses of science, technology and the environment are represented, contested and politicised in the media and in public debates. She is particularly concerned with citizen engagement and the role of digital and alternative media in science debates. Her work is published in international journals such as *Critical Discourse Studies*, *Science as Culture*, *International Journal of Cultural Studies* and *Risk, Health & Society*. She is the chair of ECREA's Science and Environment Communication Section.

### **Climate change as left populist discourse: The circulation of facts and knowledge on social media**

As climate change is pushed forward on the international political agenda, dilemmas of how humans interact with nature, technologies, capital and each other once again become ever more present in public debate. Moreover, recent developments in social and digital media have raised the issue of factuality and truths in public debate, and these issues have become the focus for public scrutiny on different media platforms. The election campaign leading up to the European Parliamentary and the national election in Denmark in 2019 is indicative of this development.

The paper therefore addresses the research question: How is climate change discussed and politicised during the EP election campaign and how does facts and knowledge travels across media?

To answer this question the paper draws on Ernesto Laclau's (2005) work on populist logics along with Chantal Mouffe's (2018) work on a new left populism in order to argue that popular demands relating to climate change and environmental justice played a pivotal role in the debates on social media leading up to the elections. These demands put climate change on the mainstream political agenda in a way that was both the political and antagonistic. Moreover, the demands allowed different political actors to challenge central signifiers in the debate in relation to: factuality, science, pseudo-science, emotions, politics, ethics etc.

The project draws on the WhiKnow dataset collected in Denmark from Twitter during the European Parliament election in 2019. It includes 16.054 tweets regarding EP and national elections in the period 1/5-31/5 2019. This project combines big data analysis with qualitative textual discourse analysis to examine how facts, knowledge and opinions on climate change travels within and across digital media and how different political actors engage in debates on climate change and environmental issues.



## **Hristina Runcheva Tasev, Associate Professor at Political Science Department, Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus" Skopje (Republic of North Macedonia)**

Hristina Runcheva Tasev is an associate professor at political science department of the Law Faculty "Iustinianus Primus", Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. She is an author of numerous scientific articles published in domestic and international academic peer-reviewed journals and proceedings and has participated in different academic projects and international conferences. She graduated from the Faculty of Law with an average grade of 9.89. She received an Award and Golden coin by the Rector of the Ss. Cyril and Methodius University of Skopje for the best student of the generation and she has also received the 26th of July- Frank Maning prize for the best grades in the final year of studies. In 2011, Runcheva Tasev has obtained her MA degree in EU Institutions and Policies at the Faculty of Law "Iustinianus Primus" in partnership with the Karl- Franzens University of Graz and the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. She obtained her PhD in law in 2015.

Hristina has been a Member of Parliament for two terms and has also served as a foreign policy associate in the Cabinet of the Speaker of the Parliament. She is one of the founders of the Macedonian Institute for European Studies (MIES) and Vice President of the International Academic Institute (IAI).

<http://www.pf.ukim.edu.mk/runcheva-tasev-dr-hristina/>

### **Populism in a pandemic world: An analysis of populist leaders' responses to Covid-19**

Many countries led by populists, some of them with authoritarian streaks, are among the most affected by the corona virus outbreak, such as Russia, USA, Brazil, Hungary, the UK, Turkey. Although they shared the same challenge, the populist leaders had different responses to the pandemic. Hungarian Prime Minister, Orban, and Czech Prime Minister, Babis, have imposed extensive lockdown measures and on the contrary President Trump and President Bolsonaro have tried to downplay the crisis. The lack of a uniform response of populist leaders worldwide, indicates that the crisis management has been quite challenging for them and although some approached with denial and inconsistency, lack of transparency and doubt into science, still many of them had a serious approach with liberal or illiberal policy responses, following the public health recommendations. Their worldview has caused serious problems in dealing with the crisis and poor performance of their governments. The poor results of crisis management do not introduce the fall of populism worldwide because the deeply rooted reasons for the rise of populism have to be properly addressed before new movements like the "orange vests" gain force. The paper explores how the coronavirus pandemic affected populism worldwide and what are the expectations for the future: will the pandemic mark the end of populist wave and revive democracy or will it become an even more powerful and multiplying political force?

## **Saija Räsänen, University of Milan (Italy)**

Saija Räsänen is a Ph.D. candidate in Sociology and Methodology of Social Research (SOMET) in a joint research program between Universities of Milan and Turin. Her PhD project compares political communication between Italian and Finnish populist actors concentrating on the change in their communication when they leave the "alternative" field of politics and become part of institutions, entering national governments. Apart from the change in communication of populists themselves, the research focuses on the change in news coverage representing populist parties and the parties' reactions to it. Saija's main areas of interest regard populism, political communication, connections between media and politics and European public sphere. She is currently collaborating with the international ProDem research team ("Protests and Democracy: How Movement Parties, Social Movements and Active Citizens are Reshaping Europe"), conducting media analysis on Finnish populism. She has worked as a teaching assistant at the University of Milan for the BA-level course Sociologia della Comunicazione in 2020, and will teach in the MA-level course Datafied Societies in 2021. Saija graduated from the University of Helsinki in 2015 in Media and Communication studies with a thesis on Five Star Movement's populist rhetoric, and before starting the Phd, she worked as a journalist in Finnish media companies and in the field of organizational communication.

### **Polarising media populism during government crises in Finland and in Italy**

In 2019, a government crisis occurred in Finland and in Italy: two European countries in which, in recent years, populist parties have become "mainstream", entering national governments. Using critical discourse analysis, this work studies the communication of Finnish Finns Party (FP), Italian Lega and Five Star Movement (FSM) and their leaders during the government crisis in their Twitter and Facebook channels, as well as representations of them in both countries' "elite" newspapers (La Repubblica and Helsingin Sanomat) and in commercial/populist media outlets (Ilta-Sanomat and Il Fatto Quotidiano). Despite different political contexts, populists adapted similar communication strategies during crises. They constructed a narrative of lies and truth, accusing other parties of having betrayed the citizens and representing themselves as the only pure and honest actors. The narrative of lies was linked to far-right's important theme, immigration: In Finland the Green League and Social Democratic Party were represented as willing to let dangerous terrorists enter the country, while in Italy the Lega depicted the FSM together with the centre-left Democratic Party as eager to open the ports in the Mediterranean. Together, the Greens, FSM, and left-wing parties were represented as "radical chick", disconnected from the needs of common citizens.

I show that in both countries this divisive rhetoric was strengthened by mainstream media, in contrast to previous expectations that elite media would be particularly critical towards populists - populist right-wing leaders were represented on one hand as a threat to democracy, but also as clever political masterminds, almost with an admiring tone. This reveals that, in the hybrid media environment, populist actors' social media messages can be amplified by both elite and commercial media, exacerbating the polarization in society – and making the countries less united.

## **Marianna Saartio-Itkonen and Taina Kalliokoski, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Marianna Saartio-Itkonen is a doctoral student of social ethics in the faculty of theology.

Dr. Taina Kalliokoski is a postdoctoral researcher of social ethics in Helsinki University with varied research interests in collectives, collective action theories, modern conceptions of evil in the public debate, and the ethics of Artificial Intelligence.

### **Rhetoric of evil in the social media debate during the immigration crisis**

After immigration increased in 2015 the Finnish public discussion heated and polarized significantly. At the same time, hate speech including what we call rhetoric of evil, intensified. This paper analyses the rhetoric of evil in two social media forums, MV-magazine and the Facebook page of a blog, Uuninpankkopoika Saku Timonen, regarding the debate that followed a suicide attempt of a refugee in Helsinki downtown on March 2017. The text material contains emotional comments from both immigration critics and refugee advocates. Both collectives discussed the suicide attempt of the refugee and considered the evil of the other collective in a surprisingly similar manner.

This paper asks, what categories of evil are applied to the debate, and what are the reasons for and potential consequences of using them? In the analysis, we apply the philosophical theories of social action and social groups and the philosophical categories of evil. Different ways of defining evil in the other person or a collective in our research material resemble the traditional philosophical categories of metaphysical, moral and natural evil. Our analysis of the rhetoric of evil builds a bridge between the slanderous populist debate in social media and philosophical discussion on evil.



## **Osman Sahin, Glasgow Caledonian University (Scotland)**

Dr. Osman Sahin earned his B.A. and M.A. degrees in International Relations from Koç University, Istanbul in 2005 and 2008 respectively. He was accepted to political science Ph.D. program of Sabanci University in 2009 where he successfully defended his dissertation on democratic consolidation in 2016. Throughout his career, Osman worked individually and as a team member in several research projects including a TUBITAK project where his partner and he made a nation-wide research on people's attitudes towards democracy and rule of law in Turkey. Osman Sahin was also a consultant to KONDA, a public research company, in its April 2015 research on women in Turkey. He conducted face-to-face interviews in different cities of Turkey. In Summer 2017, Osman coordinated a project on seasonal migrant workers in hazelnut sector. This project financed by Fair Labor Association and conducted in collaboration with Turkish Ministry of Labor and Social Security and U.S. Department of Labor.

Osman has taught graduate and undergraduate courses in several universities and published articles in peer-reviewed journals. He has expertise on qualitative and quantitative research methods. Currently, he works as a research fellow for DEMOS - Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe. This Horizon 2020 funded research project explores the practical value of 'democratic efficacy' as the condition of political engagement needed to address the challenge of populism in Europe. Osman's research interests include populism, authoritarianism, democratic breakdown and ethnic conflict.

### **How populists securitise elections to win them: The 2015 double elections in Turkey**

This study presents a new theoretical framework for understanding one of the ways in which populists generate support in elections. It argues that populist movements securitize elections by triggering perceptions of ontological insecurity among voters. Through this strategy, populist movements amplify voters' negative image of the country they live in and the challenges they face, which contributes to populist movements' electoral success.

Building upon this theoretical framework, this study offers an explanation for the 2015 double general elections in Turkey. The AKP experienced disappointment after losing its parliamentary majority in the June 2015 elections. However, the AKP increased its votes by 8.6% in the November 2015 elections. Between these two elections, the AKP had used the Kurdish question to trigger perceptions of ontological insecurity, which enabled it to securitize the elections in November. This strategy helped the AKP win the November elections.





## **Virpi Salojärvi, University of Vaasa (Finland)**

Virpi Salojärvi is an Assistant Professor in the School of Marketing and Communication at the University of Vaasa and is also affiliated with the discipline of Political Science at the University of Helsinki. She is a work package leader in the Academy of Finland-funded projects Mainstreaming Populism (MaPo) and Whirl of Knowledge (WhiKnow). She has published on populism and media, polarisation, social movement and social media research, visual analysis and Latin American studies. Salojärvi acts as a vice-chair in IAMCR's (International Association for Media and Communication Research) Crisis, Security and Conflict Communication Working Group.

In Hepp2 Conference, Salojärvi chairs panels 1.1 IAMCR's Crisis, Security and Conflict Communication Working Group special panel: Inequality, crisis and technology at a crossroads, and 11.2 Constructing "Authentic" populism on social media: Visual and discursive approaches, in which she also presents her own work on populist male leaders and performativity. Salojärvi leads Keynote session 3: Pandemic under populism: Cultural wars and the collapse of the communication commons. She participates in a debate in Roundtable 2: "Performing Control" of the Covid-19 Crisis and participates in a debate and presents her own work in Roundtable 1: Mainstreaming Populism and WhiKnow projects, as a part of a project team of Political polarisation in Twitter campaigns of the 2019 EP elections-project.



## **Mikko Salmela, University of Helsinki & University of Copenhagen (Finland)**

Mikko Salmela is an Associate Professor at the Center for Subjectivity Research, University of Copenhagen, and an Adjunct Professor in Practical Philosophy at the University of Helsinki. Salmela is specialized in theoretical and applied philosophy of emotions from an empirically informed perspective. In recent years, his research has focused on collective emotions and their functions in the dynamics of social groups; with interdisciplinary interaction, urban housing; and the emotional dynamics of political populism as applications of his more theoretical research. Salmela is affiliated with the Helsinki Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarization and the research projects "Whirl of Knowledge - Cultural Populism in European Polarized Politics and Societies" (Academy of Finland, 2019-2022) and "'Now-Time' and 'Us Space' in Hegemonic Articulations: Politics of Time and Space in Central and Eastern Europe" (Kone Foundation, 2020-2023) there. Salmela's publications include peer-reviewed articles in philosophical and social scientific journals as well as an edited volume *Collective Emotions* (with Christian von Scheve, OUP, 2014), and a monograph *True Emotions* (John Benjamins, 2014).

### **Resentful affect and conservation values: Understanding the psychological determinants of reactionary orientation**

In this presentation we investigate the role of resentment and conservation values as determinants of reactionary political preferences in the most recent UK National Elections. Using original panel survey data, both pre- and post-election, we introduce an original measure of political reactionism and examine its complex affective drivers and correlates going beyond simplistic accounts of anger or fear. We also employ an original measure of resentment which captures citizens' experiences of perceived injustice, envy, shame, and suspicion, and examine the political preferences of reactionary resentful voters. Our findings extend theoretical and empirical work in the field and shed light on the black box of the affective drivers of political reaction.



## **Tuija Saresma, University of Jyväskylä (Finland)**

Tuija Saresma is a senior researcher in Research Centre for Contemporary Culture, the Department of Music, Art and Culture Studies. She holds a Title of Docent in Culture Studies and Gender Studies at the universities of Jyväskylä and Eastern Finland. Saresma's most recent publications include a co-edited anthology *Violence, Gender and Affect* (Palgrave 2021) and co-written journal articles "The Role of Social Media in the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Finland" (in Tumber & Waisbord [eds.], *The Routledge Companion to Media Misinformation and Populism*, forthcoming); "Performing 'Us' and 'Other': Intersectional Analyses of Right-Wing Populist Media" (*European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 2021); "Poliittisten toimijoiden kokema vihapuhe sukupuolittuneena väkivaltana [Hate speech experienced by political actors as gendered political violence]" (*Sukupuolentutkimus – Kvinnoforskning* 2020); and "Discursive Constructions of White Nordic Masculinities in Right-Wing Populist Media (*Men and Masculinities*, 2018). She is the co-chair of the Association of Gender Studies in Finland (SUNS) and the treasurer of Association of Cultural Studies (ACS).

### **Gendered violence online: Hate speech as an intersection of misogyny and racism**

Social media has been adopted by radical right populists and alt-right demagogues as a platform for circulating misogynous and racist hate speech and affectively mobilising supporters. In this presentation, we examine hate speech as a form of gendered and racist violence, focusing on social media posts by two influential right-wing populist politicians: Jussi Halla-aho, the leader of the Finns Party, and Donald Trump, the former president of the United States. We demonstrate how these politicians intertwine misogyny and racism in blog posts and tweets that target women in particular. Their affective online communication is interpreted as a new form of gendered violence. This digitally mediated violence, although a relatively new phenomenon, is an integral part of the chain of violence that links intimate violence, violent societal structures and ideological and political violence. Discursive expressions of hatred are spread through social media and shape our understanding of reality. They are not only violent themselves but also pave the way for an ideological readiness to use other types of violence.

The presentation is based on an article "Gendered Violence Online", published in the volume *Violence, Gender and Affect: Interpersonal, Institutional and Ideological Practices* (2021, eds. Husso et al.).



## **Kristiina Savola, Stockholm University (Sweden)**

Kristiina Savola is a PhD student of Finnish at the Department of Slavic and Baltic Studies, Finnish, Dutch and German at Stockholm University. She carries out her PhD project under the theme 'Language and Power' within the Doctoral School of the Humanities. Also Savola's supervisors Prof. Jarmo Lainio and Prof. Charlotta Seiler Brylla have collaborated within the same theme.

Savola's research interests lie in political discourse analysis, discourse linguistics and antagonistic communication as well as linguistic self-identifying practices in politics. In her PhD project, Savola works on a political discourse analysis on antagonistic discourses and their linguistic realisations in Finnish politicians' social media texts. Populism is a central concept for Savola's study, and the project concentrates also on mainstreaming of populist discourse in the Finnish political field.

Savola has a master's degree in Finnish language from The University of Helsinki. Currently, she is based in Stockholm.

### **Populist communication style in Finnish politicians' social media texts**

The European politics have changed rapidly during the 21st century as the new populist movements have seized much space in it. Also in Finland, the right-wing populist party the True Finns has established a firm position for itself in the national politics during the past years, and in parallel, the Green Party is flourishing. Polarisations of the European societies are discussed widely, whilst social media platforms enable a straight, polarising, and even hostile, political communication due to its rather unmediated conditions.

In my paper, I will approach populism as a political communication style and a discursive process of self-identification based on a division between 'the people' and 'the others'. My approach is linguistic and follows the traditions of Critical Discourse Analysis with its core interest in construction of social realities and meanings, and power structures behind them.

The focus of my paper lies in discursive realisations of populist communication style and discursive processes leading to its normalisation in the political field. I will look closer at these realisations in Finnish politicians' social media texts released during Finland's parliament election years 2015 and 2019. The writers of the texts are members of the Finnish Parliament, positioned on opposite sides of the political field. In my paper, I will provide a sample analysis of the populist communication style and its linguistic realisations, such as lexical choices, metaphorical mappings, and discursive strategies, in politicians' social media texts.

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## **Patrick Sawyer, Higher School of Economics (Russia)**

Patrick Sawyer is a PhD candidate in the Doctoral School of Political Science at the Higher School of Economics and a lecturer of Political Science. His research interests include the study of populism, the radical right, conspiracism, protests, and political parties.

### **Populism and Conspiracy Theories: The Missionary Politics of Donald Trump**

This article systematizes the literature on populism and conspiracy theories and lays the groundwork for a theoretical framework based on the emotional side of cognitive processes for understanding the mobilizational capacity of conspiratorial rhetoric by populist candidates. In it, the author argues that conspiratorial narratives can be used instrumentally by populist leaders as a means to mobilize their base of supporters. This can be achieved through two specific mechanisms: (1) the populist can demonize and delegitimize opponents, making it the imperative of voters to defeat them; (2) the populist can rally supporters by position themselves as a “defender of the people” who will restore order and “decency” to the country from the conspiring forces. To demonstrate these mechanisms empirically, the author follows the path of Donald Trump, an otherwise uncharismatic and wealthy New York City elitist who appealed to the populist current in American politics through the use of conspiracy theories, leading them on a journey of salvation to “take America back” from the forces of conspiracy.



## **Sergio Schargel, UFF, PUC-Rio and UNIRIO (Brazil)**

Sergio Schargel is a Ph.D candidate in Political Science at UFF, Master candidate in Literature at PUC-Rio, Master candidate in Political Science at UNIRIO. He holds a bachelor in Social Communication, Journalism and Social Communication, Advertising and Marketing, both from PUC-Rio. CNPq fellow. Works as a freelancer Communication Analyst at the Igarape Institute. His research and artistic production are focused on the relationship between literature and politics, covering themes such as political theory, post-memory, anti-Semitism and the work of Sylvia Serafim Thibau.

### **A Brazil of two Brazils: How populism and fascism enlightens integralism and Bolsonarism**

The worldwide process of democratic recession, now in its fourteenth consecutive year according to the Freedom House, has revived the discussion on which term to use to name the anti-democratic movements that are spreading all over the planet. The planet reacted with surprise when Jair Messias Bolsonaro, a self-declared anti-democrat, was elected in the 2018 Brazilian elections. Bolsonaro, despite having been a deputy for over 30 years, sold himself as an outsider, with the traditional populist discourse to fight the elites, spreading manichaeon polarization and aiming to return to an imaginary past. Much has been discussed about authoritarianism, totalitarianism, reactionaryism, populism, fascism, among other concepts. In the specific case of fascism, there is a disagreement about the possibility of expanding and moving the concept beyond its emergence in Italy in 1920. If possible, this inevitably ends up expanding it and considering that, in a different space-time, fascism will acquire new characteristics, although it retains points that allow it to continue to be understood as such. Thus, this paper will deal with the opposition between the concepts of populism and fascism in the light of Bolsonarism, as well as its relationship with other Brazilian populist/fascist movement, the Integralism. Oppositions and similarities between the contemporary application of both objects will be worked on, taking specific characteristics as points of intersection. This will make it possible to expand the state of the art regarding the conceptual discussion of fascism and populism and to understand which concept has the best applicability for the specific case of Bolsonarism.



## **Sophie Schmalenberger, Aarhus University (Denmark)**

Sophie Schmalenberger holds a B.A. in Media and Communication Studies (Freie Universität Berlin, Germany) and a M.A. in European Studies (Aarhus University, Denmark). Since September 2018 she is a PhD Student at Aarhus University's School of Culture and Society, working on German far-right populism in a memory cultural perspective with a focus on the affective dimension of commemoration. In particular, she is interested in how, in post-Holocaust, post-1989 Germany, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) utilizes memory elements (symbols, practices, performances etc.) to articulate an alternative account of what it means and what it feels like to be German.

### **Populism as affective dissent: The AfD, memory and the orchestration of far-right affects in Germany**

This paper introduces an approach towards contemporary far-right populism in Germany that takes into the account the specific politico-cultural and historical context and understands social political and cultural orders, processes and practices as inherently affective (Bens et al. 2019).

Based on a concept of populism as essentially a counter-hegemonic project, this paper suggests that in a German context, the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) should be theorized as project that offers a counter-hegemonic subject position understood as an alternative 'way of feeling into the world' (Ahmed 2004) and is constituted in opposition to the hegemonic system of affective governance (Shoshan 2016). Given the central role of Holocaust memory for modern Germany's politico-cultural order, commemoration constitutes a central battlefield in the struggle for hegemony. Accordingly, it is argued that AfD actors strategically use memory work and references to the past to articulate a counter-hegemonic German-ness through the careful orchestration of an alternative affective landscape (Grossberg 2018).

To advance a scholarly understanding of far-right populism as landscape of affective dissent, this paper introduces a methodological framework for an (explorative) analysis of affective dispositions introduced through multi-modal content shared by the AfD via Social Media. Such an analysis is not interested in identifying discursive structures of objective meaning-making or argumentative patterns but in affects as the quality of relations between bodies that make the world meaningful to the subject. To illustrate a 'reading' (Berg et al. 2019) for the affective dispositions, this contribution analyses visual material of commemorative performances staged by the AfD in the city of Chemnitz in September 2018. It finds that here, a culture of German victimhood is (re-)produced through depictions of affective experiences (Forchtner and Kølvråa 2017).

## **Sara Schmitt, University of Stuttgart (Germany)**

Sara Schmitt is a research assistant at the Department of Computational Social Science at the Institute of Social Science of the University of Stuttgart (Germany). She received her Master's degree in International and European Political Science from the University of Bamberg (Germany). Broadly speaking, her research interests lie in the area of policy change, politicization, polarization and how discourses affect different actor groups' perceptions of political and social issues. Methodologically, she is particularly interested in the possibility provided by computational methods to analyze large amounts of text.

### **Does social media make everyone a populist? Policy contagion of right-wing parties on Members of the European Parliament's Twitter discourse 2014-2019**

Discourses associated with populist and radical right-wing actors often emphasize the importance and the protection of the native population. This (re-)emerged nativism, exacerbated by the various recent crises in the European Union, has also increasingly found its way into the policy agendas and rhetoric of established parties. Most studies focused on policy changes and (mainstream) party strategy analyze party manifestos, or address how issues are framed in traditional media in national contexts. A surprisingly less considered possibility is to leverage the huge repositories of social media in a quantitative manner to study the strategic framing of established parties and resulting ideological shifts. The paper at hand addresses this research gap by focusing on policy contagion that can be identified in the direct communication expressed on Twitter by Members of the European Parliament (circa 3.5 Million tweets). Using structural topic models and sentiment analysis, we analyze the migration discourses between 2014 and 2019 to detect what discursive strategies established parties use in reference to the populist and right-wing parties traditionally linked to nativist issues. We show different patterns of behavior within the European parties based on nationality and between parties based on party ideology. We then link the patterns of issue salience, issue position and issue ownership expressed in their tweets to the electoral outcome in the 2019 election of the European Parliament to determine the effect on voting. In so doing, this study provides a fine-grained analysis of whether and how dynamics of policy contagion hold for the European Parliament and how issues associated with the populist and radical right affect electoral support of all parties.





## **Julius Schneider, University of Essex (United Kingdom)**

Julius Schneider is a second year PhD student at the the Centre of Ideology and Discourse Analysis (cIDA), University of Essex, UK. His research interests are political representation, political identities, and the far-right and informed by post-structuralist discourse analysis.

### **Demanding change: Representation and identities in the Essex School of Discourse Analysis**

Academic approaches informed by recent turns (ontological, linguistic, affective) in the social sciences provide a valuable counterposition to the dominant explanations of the rise of far-right populist and extremist parties and movements. They argue that to properly comprehend the success of the far-right, we need to pay attention to the conflictual and constructed nature of society and understand the role of emotions in tying individuals towards hegemonic projects. We concur.

Yet, this paper argues that the theories which subscribe to this view and are most promising in explaining the move to the right face shortcomings themselves. We discuss four of them. Althusserian interpellation theory shows how identities get constituted and that ideology is primary for any act of identification. However, their focus on the "dominant ideology" in society can only account for sedimented social relations and not the reactivating processes by the far-right. Constructivist theories of political representation overcome this deficit and indicate that representative claims can be made from a variety of places in the social structure. But they can't explain why one contingent set of claims gets accepted by parts of the population, while other claims aren't. Hegemony theory provides ways to do just that, but questions remain how particular demands - the basic unit of analysis according to Laclau - emerge in the first place. Lastly, psychoanalytic concepts like fantasy and enjoyment shed light on the question of how individuals identify in the way they identify but face similar critiques on why some particular objects come about as threatening the impossible fullness of identity.

Through a productive reading of these theories, we overcome their shortcomings and develop the notion of a "system of orientation" that needs to be shared by their supporters if a far-right hegemonic project is to emerge as a genuine political force.



## **Carola Schoor, Maastricht University (Netherlands)**

Carola Schoor holds a doctoral degree (cum laude) in political philosophy at Maastricht University in August 2020. Her dissertation is titled 'The Politics of Style: Political Performance Caught Between Populism, Elitism, and Pluralism'. She regularly publishes in peer-reviewed academic journals and edited volumes. Currently, she works as an independent scholar and consultant in political communication. Before entering academics, she was a journalist and political communications advisor.

### **Populist and non-populist political styles and corona**

During the Coronavirus pandemic, political leaders from different countries chose different approaches in their appeal to the people. As it was the same virus affecting these societies, the differences can mainly be considered as diverse constructions in discourse. This research compares three different discursive constructions of the Coronavirus crisis by analyzing political leaders' speeches during the pandemic. Speeches of Donald Trump of the US, Boris Johnson of the UK, and Mark Rutte of the Netherlands are analyzed. Subsequently, those speeches are compared with speeches that these politicians held before the entrance of the Coronavirus.

The analysis is conducted using the analytical framework that captures all political styles – mainstream as well as populist – as a mix of populist, elitist, and pluralist elements (Schoor, 2020). The focus on five elements and three dimensions of political style results in a detailed analysis in which, for instance, constructions of the people are compared, along with those of politics, the crisis, and the elite.

First, based on the analysis of speeches between 2012-2019, it is shown that Donald Trump's style is mainly populist, Boris Johnson's style is mainly elitist, and Mark Rutte's style is mixed pluralist-elitist. Second, speeches held during the Corona crisis are compared with each other and with speeches from before the pandemic. The analysis shows that the previous differences in political styles can, for an important part, explain the leaders' constructions of the coronavirus crisis.

Schoor, C. (2020). Probing into Populism's Core. An Analysis of the deep semio-linguistic structure of Populism. *Critical Discourse Studies*.

<https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2020.1769698>



# **Svitlana Shcherbak, Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Ukraine)**

Svitlana Shcherbak, Ph.D., Research Fellow, Department of Social Philosophy, Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, The National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

My fields of interests: political philosophy, modernization of post-communist countries, the relationship between economics and politics, democratization and its distortions (populism, plebiscitarianism).

Current project: Community and Tradition in Global Times (Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Washington, DC). In my paper entitled "Populism in Global Times: The Revival of Community," I seek to trace the connection between economic, political and cultural aspects of globalization and the rise of populism.

My recent papers: Max Weber and the Modern Plebiscitary Democracy (forthcoming); Populism from the Perspective of Political Philosophy (<https://doi.org/10.15407/fd2020.03.061>); Modernization Hypothesis and Neoliberalism (doi: 10.17323/1728-192X-2018-3-291-328).

## **Anti-nationalist populism in Ukraine**

When it comes to populism, how we define it is critical. Populism is a very complex phenomenon that can play the role of both an ideology and a politics of identity, as well as serve as a strategy of mass mobilization. In its core, populism is a kind of rebellion against an established system that appeals to "the will of the people". Populist movements should be assessed against the current context.

In the EU, the most worrisome trend is the rise of popularity in the extreme right-wing parties. The situation is somewhat different in Ukraine. After the Maidan Revolution, Ukraine has formed its own ideological mainstream that encompasses neoliberal economy and ethnonationalism. The rhetoric and ideology of the regime was built by virtue of permanent mobilization in the struggle with the external enemy, Russia. The purpose was to advance unification and cultural and linguistic homogenization of 'the people' (with total ukrainization of education and the public sphere). Warlike far-right ideology promoted 'the unity of the nation', contributed to the search for internal enemies, and was in fact illiberal. The emphasis on war, mobilization, and homogenization, as well as serious economic problems have laid the foundations for the victory of Vladimir Zelenskyy, who came to power on the wave of anti-system protest feelings.

Zelenski's figure rhetoric and figure in general meets many of the criteria of populism. Zelenskyy came to power as a man of the people; mobilized the masses against the corrupt elites; spoke on behalf of and in defense of the people; refused cultural and linguistic distinction, and focused on peace. He managed to reformulate the concept of 'the people' and to put in the center 'the people versus the corrupted elites' opposition. Voting for Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Ukraine in 2019 could be considered as democratic response to illiberal conservatism of Ukrainian authorities after 2014.

## **Laura-Elena Sibinescu, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Laura-Elena Sibinescu is a post-doctoral researcher at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Helsinki, where she is currently part of the Helsinki Hub on Emotions, Populism and Polarisation. Her research interests include democratic backsliding, the role of social media in elections and protest, qualitative comparative analysis, computational methods in political science, and in collecting and analysing data through an intersectional lens.

### **Debating the family: Online civic mobilisation in Romania's 2018 constitutional referendum**

Social media increasingly functions as a far-reaching platform that brings together geographically dispersed but ideologically compatible communities. This aggregation often results in the creation of filter bubbles with the potential to mobilize the public towards forms of offline political action, such as voting or protesting. This paper examines how non-political actors occupying highly polarized positions in a controversial debate use social media to mobilize electoral support for their cause. It takes the case of the constitutional referendum held in Romania in 2018, which pitched a coalition of conservative and religious NGOs against the country's LGBTQ community by proposing to change the constitutional definition of marriage from a free-willed union 'between spouses' to one 'between a man and a woman'. Notably, the referendum cited the legal concept of marriage, but the public debate around the event framed it as an attempt to (re)define the family, with the two sides attempting to legitimize their positions by debating the social acceptability of the 'traditional' family.

In the campaign leading up to the referendum, the use of social and traditional media, as well as the socio-political framing of the issue, were fundamentally different: while the LGBTQ community was mainly active online and pushed for a boycott, the referendum initiators made more extensive use of the hybrid media system and framed participation as a civic and democratic act.

The aim of this paper is to study how the two communities used social media to frame the 'marriage vs. family' issue differently for the purpose of mobilizing supporters. It uses content collected from two online sources: the public Facebook pages of the Coalition for Family (referendum initiators) and LGBTQ advocacy organizations Accept and Mozaic. Methodologically, a combination of automated textual analysis (topic modeling) and in-depth content analysis is used to determine which topics emerge around 'marriage' and 'family', and how they are mobilized differently.



## **Lone Sorensen, University of Leeds (UK)**

I joined the University of Leeds in 2020 as a lecturer.

I completed my PhD on a communication approach to populism at the University of Leeds in 2018 on a University Research Scholarship. I then held a position at the University of Huddersfield before rejoining Leeds.

I have published a number of book chapters and papers in peer-reviewed academic journals on populism and political performance. My forthcoming book, 'Populist Communication: Ideology, Performance Mediation' will be published in 2021 by Palgrave.

### **Populist representation: Ideology and performance**

From Trump to Farage, populist politicians shock audiences and disrupt norms. This communicative strategy speaks to commercial news values and patterns of virality on social media and enacts their self-representation as naughty anti-establishment figures. This paper, based on a forthcoming book (Sorensen, 2021), presents a theoretical argument that reconceptualises populism as a communicative process. Its focus on what populism does, rather than what it is, bridges the dichotomy between ideological and performative approaches in the literature. Its central argument is that populist disruptions perform claims to truth-telling that simultaneously delegitimize the elite's portrayal of reality and reconceptualize truth as the authenticity of the populist performer. They thereby manifest a particular mode of political representation that, in a claim to disintermediation, has profound implications for representative democracy in the modern media environment.

The paper sets out the populist mode of representation in a conceptual argument. But it builds on extensive empirical research across transitional and established democracies and rightwing and leftwing forms of populism through a case study analysis of UKIP in the UK and the radical-left opposition party the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) in South Africa. This 'most different' comparative perspective fills a gap in populism scholarship. Six disruptive performances by UKP and the EFF in the period 2014-2017 were the objects of study. Data included strategic communications by the two parties across the media ecology – from live performances in parliament to tweets. Their claims to representation and the performative construction of these claims were analysed inductively using grounded theory. This theory-building methodology explains how populist communicative practices emerge from, but also communicatively shape, a given democratic environment and its media landscape. It thereby provides an understanding of the profound implications of mediated populism and its claims to truth-telling for representative democracy across the globe.



## **Florian Spissinger, Leipzig University, Department of Political Science (Germany)**

Florian Spissinger holds a M.A. in Political Science (Leipzig University). Since 2018 he receives a PhD scholarship of the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Currently, he is a research associate at Leipzig University and affiliated with the BMBF-funded research project 'Strangers in their own land? On the malleability of national narratives using Political Laboratories (PoliLab)'. His dissertation project is inspired by affect theory and uses ethnographic fieldwork to scrutinize the affective appeal of the German far-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland.

Florian Spissinger's research focuses on political ethnography, politics of affect, far-right discourse, and nationalism.

Latest publications:

Leser, J.; Spissinger, F. (2020): The functionality of affects: Conceptualising far-right populist politics beyond negative emotions. In: *Global Discourse. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought* 20 (2): 325–342.

Feustel, R; Spissinger, F. (2020): »Selbsterhalt ist kein Rassismus« Zur neurechten Politik der Entpolitisierung. In: *Zeitschrift für Diskursforschung/Journal for Discourse Studies* 2019 (3): 285-304.

Leser, J.; Spissinger, F.; Homeyer, J.; Neidel, T. (2019): Performing 'resistance' – the far right's master narrative. In: *The Journal of Culture* 8 (1): 13–21.

### **Affects and narratives of the future: The appeal of far-right populism**

The rise of the far-right populists is commonly understood from the past. It is viewed as a historical continuity, as a relapse, or as nostalgia. Yet, understanding society solely based on the past underestimates the importance of narratives and practices of the 'near future' for the present (c.f. Ringel 2018). Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork of the far-right populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in two German towns, I use affect theory (e.g. Ahmed 2014) to scrutinize affects concerning the future that circulate within the field of far-right activism. I interrogate the role narratives and practices of the future can play in processes of affective appeal, attachment and identification.

My fieldwork uncovers two influential narratives of the future, both of which are dystopian: the imagination of the 'great replacement' or 'Islamization' – which gained scientific attention as anti-Muslim conspiracy theory – and the imagination of the 'self-destruction of Germany' as industrial nation of cars and coal, a decline for which ecological ideologists are to be blamed. Especially in the second narrative, 'the Greens' function as a symbol for a perceived hegemonic ideology threatening the German nation 'from the inside'. I show how the framing of political opponents as existential threat to 'Germany and the Germans' allows far-right activists to enact themselves not only as 'the resistance' (Leser et al. 2019), but also as saviours of the future. Furthermore, my fieldwork unearths how supporters of the AfD are producing hope against the background of these threatening scenarios – especially in East Germany. I argue that future-oriented affective practices and narratives render far-right populist politics appealing and contribute to the normalisation and mainstreaming of far-right discourses.

## **Alberto Stefanelli, KU Leuven (Belgium)**

Alberto Stefanelli interests are mostly within the field of public opinion, voting behaviour, and attitudes towards democracy. In his PhD, he is working on radical belief systems, the conditionality of liberal values, and polarisation. He is currently in charge of the questionnaire design and data collection for the Belgian National Electoral Study (BNES) and the Belgian Ethnic Minorities Election Study (BEMES).

Methods wise, he is particularly interested in conjoint analysis, matching and standardization techniques, graphical causal models, machine learning, text analysis, and big data.

He is a member of the survey and experimental teams of Team Populism, a research group that brings together renowned scholars from Europe and the Americas to study the causes and consequences of populism.

### **The nature of radical belief systems: Exploring the ontological and ontic components of radical ideologies**

Over the past three decades, radical formations have re-emerged as a pivotal electoral force across Europe. Radical parties on both sides of the ideological spectrum such as the Belgian Vlaams Blok, the German The Left, or the Spanish Podemos have established themselves in their respective party systems, sometimes reaching the 30% of the popular vote. Some scholars argue that success of left-wing and right-wing radical parties is related to specific idea features that are common to both left- and right-wing radical individuals (Fagerholm, 2018; A. Akkerman, Zaslove, & Spruyt, 2017). While contemporary literature has predominately focussed on the role of populist attitudes to explain the individual-level variation in the support for both left- and right-wing populist radical parties, radical ideological thinking has received far less academic attention. Building on Laclau (2005) and integrating recent literature on radical ideologies, this paper aims at uncovering the cognitive and attitudinal features that define the morphological structure of radical belief systems. Specifically, we hypothesize that radical individuals possess a hybridized belief system composed of two distinct layers: (1) an ontological structure consisting of content-free concepts, cognitions and goals that contribute to create a meaningful ideological narrative (Sharpe, 1974); and (2) an ontic structure defined by those positional elements and issue-based opinions that discriminate between different substantive types of belief systems (Freedon, 2003). The proposed theoretical model is tested on survey data collected in Belgium using a Latent Profile Analysis approach that allows me to create a typology of radical belief system. This novel person-oriented approach provides a more refined understanding of how radical ideologies are structured at the individual level and allows for a systematic investigation of the similarities and differences between left- and right-wing radical beliefs.



## **Mihnea Stoica and Ioan Hosu, Babeş-Bolyai University (Romania)**

Mihnea Stoica, PhD is a Lecturer at the Department of Communication, Public Relations and Advertising within the Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences at the Babeş-Bolyai University (BBU). He teaches political communication and advertising, and is interested in researching populism and Euroscepticism.

Ioan Hosu is Professor, PhD at Babeş-Bolyai University (BBU), Romania. He teaches Research Methods in Communication and Public Relations, as well as Political Communication and Organisational Communication. Ioan HOSU is Chair of the Communication, Public Relation and Advertising Department at BBU. His research projects focus on the relation between communication and community development matters, as well as on political communication.

### **Altering political perceptions: A comparative study on Romanian elections before and during the pandemic**

Romania was amongst the few European countries to organise elections in 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic. With the number of corona-cases on the rise and despite growing discontent with Governmental restrictions, parliamentary elections eventually took place on the 6th of December. Under such circumstances, the electoral campaign allowed the populist anti-elite discourse to successfully resurface and, as a result, the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), a newly-founded ultra-conservative party managed to gain representatives in the Romanian Parliament. The almost 10 percent share of the votes received by AUR was described as the most shocking outcome of these elections. The current paper seeks to find possible explanations for the rise of populism in Romania by looking at two original datasets: one which was collected on the occasion of the elections for the European Parliament (May 2019), and the other one for the recent parliamentary elections (December 2020). The data will allow us to explain how perceptions of voters have changed in just a matter of months. Our paper will especially look into polarisation (self placement of respondents), political cynicism and anti-elitism, as drivers of populism. The current study therefore provides an assessment of the extent to which political perceptions have been altered by the COVID-19 pandemic and whether this has generated fertile ground for the rise of populism.





## **Liv Sunnercrantz, University of Stavanger (Norway)**

Liv Sunnercrantz is a post-doctoral fellow in the Department of Media and Social Sciences at the University of Stavanger where she co-founded the research group Populism, Anti-Gender & Democracy. Liv received her PhD in sociology from Lund University for the dissertation Hegemony and the Intellectual Function in 2017. Her main contributions relate to post-foundationalist discourse theory, rhetorical-performative analysis, and the sociology of intellectuals. Her post-doctoral research project is located in the intersection of sociology of knowledge, post-foundational theory and institutional ethnography, as it deals with conditions and ideologies that shape PhD education in Scandinavia today.

### **Mainstreaming the fringe: populism, affect, and expertise in two Swedish crises**

How can crises function to shift a marginalised movement to the mainstream, and what happens when a populist party that attempts to mainstream is caught in the midst of transnational crisis? This contribution reflects on the relationship between the pandemic, past crises, and populism in Sweden. Expert positions, affect, and 'the people' are analysed through a rhetorical-performative perspective. The COVID-pandemic and ensuing crisis proves an intriguing conjuncture for analysis of populist politics in Sweden. The populist party, the Sweden Democrats, rose to fame by challenging the parliamentary consensus as well as the discursive domination of expert argumentation with affective appeals. SD have recently abandoned their underdog position for an attempt at mainstreaming. SD, and many others, have scrambled for footing during the COVID pandemic and Sweden's exceptional opposition to draconian lockdown. In order to challenge the ruling party, SD would have had to promote the restrictive measures opposed by nationalist populists around the world. The Swedish exceptionality and reluctance to enforce lockdown in times of COVID is analysed in the relation of the existing neoliberal hegemony - established through a successful populist project that utilised the Swedish 1990s crisis. During the corona-spring, state epidemiologist Tegnell, a personification technocratic expert, became a central reference point in the pandemic. The mainstream media discourse has abounded with nationalist narratives portraying Sweden as more rational and less alarmist than the rest of the world. Instead of pitting experts against common sense, ordinary people, or politicians, Swedish media have pitted Tegnell and Swedish exceptionality against domestic and foreign experts.



## **Lasse Thomassen, University of Copenhagen (Denmark)**

Lasse Thomassen is Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow in the Department of Political Science at the University of Copenhagen, and Professor of Politics in the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. He is the author of *Deconstructing Habermas* (2007) and *British Multiculturalism and the Politics of Representation* (2017). He is currently working on deconstruction, the category of representation and new forms of radical politics.

### **The “populist” constitution of liberal democracy**

This paper analyzes Jan-Werner Müller’s and Chantal Mouffe’s influential positions on populism as a strategy for the Left in order to clarify what is at stake in current debates about populism and, thus, to identify the political challenges more clearly. Müller and Mouffe both start from different versions of post-foundationalism, but understand post-foundationalism differently, and this has implications for how they understand democracy, populism and the legitimacy of the constitutional order. The different understandings of post-foundationalism also have implications for the question of how to guarantee pluralism, which is so central to debates about populism today. Pushing Müller’s post-foundationalism to its logical conclusions, I show how he cannot uphold the distinction he makes between democracy and populism. Mouffe goes further in her post-foundationalism, but she too tries to control the effects of the post-foundationalist starting point in ways that are ultimately untenable.



## **Silvia Tieri, King's College London (Italy)**

Silvia Tieri is a PhD Student at King's India Institute, King's College London, UK. Previously she was a Research Analyst at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an independent think-tank at the National University of Singapore.

### **Reinforcing discrimination: Media and the Covid-19 crisis in India**

As threats to human security, epidemics cause fear and anxiety, thus generating conspiracy theories, fake news, and discrimination. Additionally, when epidemics spread through people-to-people contact, they are likely to trigger or enhance the state's surveillance effort. In 2020 India, traditional and new media played a remarkable role at both these levels in relation to the Covid-19 outbreak.

On the one hand, as far as misinformation is concerned, mass media (newspapers, TV news channels) and social media (Twitter, Facebook) contributed to the sensationalisation of news regarding a Muslim gathering turned into a hot spot of infection. The hate speech and fake news that resulted from it circulated throughout the country causing a wave of Islamophobia, featuring both verbal and physical violence, whereby Muslims were blamed for purposefully spreading the Covid-19 to the detriment of the nation. So doing, media successfully securitised the Covid-19 outbreak, linking it to narratives of jihadism ('Corona-Jihad') and a pre-existing Islamophobic political discourse, in line with the government's nationalist stance.

On the other hand, as far as surveillance is concerned, the Indian government promoted contact-tracing through an app (Aarogya Sethu). Remarkably, it made its adoption mandatory, discounting concerns related to citizens' privacy. Most importantly, this app implied a narrow and elitist definition of the citizenry, excluding Indians who were not smartphone-enabled or differently-abled from the government's contact-tracing strategy. In conclusion, India's case showed that the media's involvement in the pandemic-caused crisis reflected some of the country's main political and socio-economic inequalities, acting to the detriment of already marginalised groups. Furthermore, this appears coherent with the political discourse and policy stance of the current majoritarian and populist Modi government, particularly its communal, neoliberal, casteist and classist outlook.



## **Ivan Tranfić, Scuola Normale Superiore and Maja Gergorić, University of Zagreb (Croatia)**

Ivan Tranfić is a PhD candidate in Political Science and Sociology at the Scuola Normale Superiore and a member of the Center of Social Movement Studies (COSMOS). He holds a BA and an MA degree in Political Science from the University of Zagreb, and an MA in Nationalism Studies from Central European University, Budapest. His research explores the role of churches and lay activists in anti-gender mobilizations and far-right opposition to gender+ equality. Specifically, his PhD project looks into networks, actors and far-right discourses in Croatia, Bulgaria and Serbia.

Maja Gergorić is a research assistant on the project Disobedient Democracy. Maja Gergorić is a PhD candidate at the University of Zagreb where she focuses on the comparative analysis of anti-gender movements in Eastern Europe, Maja holds a MA degree in Gender Studies from Central European University, Budapest, and an MA degree in Political Science with specialization in European Studies and Public Policy, Development and Management from the University of Zagreb, Faculty of Political Science.

### **Shiny happy people laughing: The far-right's mobilisation of emotions through visual repertoires of the march for life**

This paper is a case study of the anti-choice March for Life which is the most prominent campaign of the Croatian anti-gender movement. Despite a growing body of literature dealing with anti-gender mobilization and radical right populism, an analysis of the visual, performative and emotional aspects of this new movement is still lacking. In our paper, we use multimodal discourse analysis to examine Zagreb's March for Life. Our analytical focus is directed to the visual, performative, musical and other discursive elements of the March. We single out the role of the communication, transformation and mobilization of emotions in the formation of the anti-gender movement's collective identity. Firstly, we employ multimodal qualitative analysis using the NVIVO software on 600 posts from the online Facebook page 'March for Life - Zagreb'. It allows us to investigate how visuals and text are used to portray and represent different actors, emotions and symbols. Secondly, we extract several salient visuals produced by the movement for an in-depth analysis of the symbolic, rhetorical and connotative meanings and framing strategies. Finally, we analyze the kinaesthetic and symbolic aspects and dynamics of the 2019 March for Life: music, protest signs, its route, organization and artefacts used by the participants.


The paper demonstrates the skillful articulation of emotions in Croatia's new populist movement against 'gender ideology'. The movement engages in mirroring the repertoires of action traditionally belonging to the left and new social movements. By adopting the emotional tone, rituals and performative elements typical of identity politics repertoires, the March organizers enable the collective emotional expression of its participants. Our analysis demonstrates that the innovativeness of the movement is not only located in the adoption of scientific and human rights discourse, but also by a skillful cooptation of the politics self-expression and the construction of a positive, participatory political identity.

## **Salla Tuomola, Tampere University (Finland)**

Salla Tuomola (M.Soc.Sc.) is a fifth year PhD student in the Communication Sciences Unit at Tampere University in Finland. Her doctoral research for media studies investigates the digital public debate on the European refugee crisis with its consequences during 2015–2017 in alternative right-wing media primarily in Finland. Her dissertation takes an article-based form, and she approaches her study from four angles. Her research interests relate to alternative media, communication, anti-immigrant, right-wing populism, emotions.

### **The emotions in the people's imagery of the Finnish-language anti-immigrant alternative media**

In this study, we investigate the primary emotions that can be evoked in the images of the Finnish-language anti-immigrant alternative media, as an example of right-wing populist communication practices. The focus is on the representation of the people of three news cases in MV-lehti's refugee coverage over 2015–2017. In this research, emotions are understood as part of a larger societal meaning-making process that is consciously, culturally, and socially produced. Using methodologies of semiology and critical in-depth reading, we found that the most prominent emotions evident in imagery of the people are fear, disgust, hate, and distrust. Through these negative emotions, each prominent group of people was represented as scapegoats to the distress of the ordinary people. The finding goes hand in hand with distinctive right-wing populist ideology that declares the society to be separated into two antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite'.



## **Marina Vahter and Mari-Liis Jakobson, Tallinn University (Estonia)**

Marina Vahter received an MA (with distinction) in Political Science from Tallinn University, Estonia, in 2020. Her thesis, "The Use of Moral Foundations and Moral Emotions in the Discourse of Political Parties – the Case of Sweden", explored parties' expressions of morality and moral emotions within the framework of moral foundations theory and three ideological dimensions. In 2018-2020, she has also been teaching BA-level seminars in subjects Estonian Society and Politics, Political Parties and Party Systems, and Comparative Politics. She is also planning to pursue PhD studies in order to focus on morality and ideology in post-democratic politics.

Mari-Liis Jakobson is associate professor of political sociology at Tallinn University, Estonia. Her research relates to migration, migrant political participation and populism. In 2019-20 she was a visiting fellow at the Yale MacMillan Center's Baltic Studies program, where she was working on diaspora politics and transnational populism. In 2012, she was the PI for the project Populism in the Baltic States.

### **Morality and moral emotions as a predictor of populist success? The case of the Swedish Democrats**

Abundant literature on populism has offered numerous yet rather conflicting explanations on the rise of populism. The literature on the causes of populism has thus far primarily focused on the political demand side, exploring voters' psychological profiles and socio-economic factors (see e.g. Hawkins et al. 2017), but these findings have rarely been associated with the political supply side.

This paper addresses the cognitive aspect of populism's supply side in order to better understand the socio-psychological roots of the rapid expansion of populism in Sweden by analyzing the moral rhetoric of Swedish parties and their use of moral emotions. The paper builds on the moral foundations theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2012) and the system of moral emotions (Taguey et al., 2007; Moll et al., 2008), which enables to reveal how morality is used to influence voters' intuitive and emotional basis of judgment formation. Empirically, the paper draws on the qualitative content analysis of speeches of eight political parties presented at the 2019 Almedalen Week, the largest political forum in Sweden. The half-hour speeches include both current issues and issues arising from parties' ideological platforms, which provides a compact and comparable sample for analysis.

The results indicate that while other parties cluster on a select repertoire of dominant moral foundations and moral emotions, the Swedish Democrats use all moral foundations and also employs the largest number of moral emotions, focusing on sanctity in combination with loyalty. This suggests that despite the narrow variety of subjects, populists appeal to the full range of people's moral intuitions, conveying a promise to solve all (not just some) society's problems, thereby building trust among the audience and making them more open to populist ideas.

## **Daniele Valentini, University of Osnabrück (Germany)**

My name is Daniele Valentini. I am a Ph.D. student at the Institute of Cognitive Science at Osnabrück University. My research interests cover the emotional dynamics involved in jihadi and far-right extremism with a focus on how they integrate in online, offline, and hybrid spaces. I use a situated affectivity approach to investigate the role that different affective phenomena (moods, emotions) have on the radicalization of both single individuals and groups. My research is highly media-oriented and devotes particular attention to the relationship between new media environments, emotions and radical behavior. I published an article in *Frontiers in Psychology* and a book chapter with Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

### **Memetic mind invasion: Alt-right affective practices**

In this paper I examine meme-making as an affective practice designed to habituate social media users to the emotional atmosphere of Alt-Right echo chambers. Alt-Right echo chambers are closed digital enclaves inhabited by like-minded individuals in which hate speech and polarized behaviors are up and kicking. My main goal is to understand how meme-making has been successful in 1) transferring Alt-Right affectivity from echo chambers to mainstream platforms; 2) retaining new members within Alt-Right echo chambers by making extremist stances more engaging. In order to carry out my analysis I rely on the concept of mind invasion. Mind invasion refers to how aspects of the socio-technical environment modulate the emotional responses of individuals in a way advantageous to a specific domain. For example, to boost productivity companies nudge interns toward tuning their emotional reactions to the affective atmosphere that regulates interactions in a workplace. Over time, they learn that the company has “appropriate” places and people to express joy (relax areas) or fear (“go-to” co-workers).

When applying mind invasion to Alt-Right meme-making the latter can be conceived along two intertwined dimensions. On the one hand meme-making is a collective activity through which coordinated networks of users leverage the multi-platform nature of the Internet to disseminate the affective atmosphere of Alt-Right echo chambers. On the other hand, meme-making designates a practice apt to enculture newcomers to Alt-Right’s affective styles. I investigate two factors of this emotional enculturation: 1) the explicit guidance from expert members on the use of inside jokes; 2) the online interactions in Alt-Right echo chambers. The overall emotional dynamics exploits the twisted affective character of Alt-Right memes that mask racist slurs with a humorous coating. The intermingling of funny and hateful elements allows memes to stay on mainstream platforms while making discriminatory expressions more digestible for new members.



## **Diana Vallejo-Robalino, Eötvös Loránd University, Casa Grande University (Hungary)**

Master in Cultural Anthropology, Eötvös Loránd University. Political Scientist, Casa Grande University.

Research interests: Afro-ecuatorianity, decolonial studies, collective memory, Participatory-Action Research, populism

Recent published articles:

Populist political action on the move? The social demands of CONAIE and feminists in Ecuador (2007-2019). (Ríos-Rivera, Umpiérrez & Vallejo-Robalino, 2020)

### **Characterising the Ecuadorian pueblo: Towards the construction of a populist discourse by the hands of Afro-Ecuadorian women**

Along with the worldwide sanitary crisis caused by Covid-19 in 2020, social and racial clashes became more evident as a transnational contemporary cleavage. Examining social discontent in the people is key for understanding the process of construction and consolidation of a populist discourse from the bottom. Populism as a phenomenon is not new to the pandemic, many scholars argue that populist leaders and practices are and will be strengthened due to Covid-19, which highlights the renewed importance of its epistemological study. Hence, and in parallel with the ongoing social discontent, it is a priority to understand and reflect upon the conceptualization of populism, from the notion of pueblo. The present research aims to understand the configuration of a pueblo discourse taking as a case-study Afro-Ecuadorian women from the Afro-Ecuadorian community that lives in Nigeria, a peripheral neighborhood located in the portuarian city of Guayaquil, Ecuador. The methodological design included a total of 17 in-depth interviews and 2 groupal interviews. In this sense, this case-study will allow us to respond: how does the discourse(s) of Afro-Ecuadorian women articulate in the configuration of the notion of the Ecuadorian pueblo within the populist phenomenon? The main findings showed that these women in their cultural and political discourses construct a counter-narrative, based on their race, gender, class/status and territory to challenge the hegemonic discourse of the elite, turning themselves into a social and political subject. Integrated in a wider notion of Ecuadorian pueblo, the study of its discourse(s) permits an approximation to understand more profoundly this phenomenon in Latin America, and a contribution to the future populist research agenda.





## **Monika Verbalyte, Europe-University Flensburg (Germany)**

Monika Verbalyte has B.A. in Political Science from University of Vilnius (2007) and M.A. in European Sociology from Freie Universität Berlin (2010). From 2015 to 2020, she was Research Fellow in the project “Network Europe: Transnational Human Activities and European Integration” at University of Magdeburg and in 2020 joined Interdisciplinary Center for European Studies at Europe-University of Flensburg in the project “Value Conflicts in a Differentiated Europe (ValCon)” with partners in University of Madrid and Florence. Monika Verbalyte is also a Ph.D. student in the Department of Sociology at Freie Universität Berlin. Her doctoral thesis “The Emotional Dynamics of Political Scandal” examines how emotions of the public are produced, articulated and shaped by the media during the political scandal. Her research interests include emotion sociology, political communication, political attitudes and behavior, European sociology, social network analysis, survey data research and discourse methodology. She has already published some peer-reviewed articles in *European Journal of Political Science* and *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research*. In the latter, she now also serves as a guest-editor of the special issue on affective reactions on political crises in Europe and in *American Behavioral Scientist* on the link between populism and emotions.

### **Populist anger vs. anger about populists: Discourse network analysis of the European election campaign 2019 in Germany**

Thirty years ago, European Union was kept together by permissive consensus and has been an accepted reality by the majority of Europeans, without much of their emotional involvement. In the 90s, however, the EU decided to get nearer to its citizens and with its policies became more relevant in people’s lives, this permissive consensus turned into constraining dissensus (Hix 1999; Hooghe & Marks 2005). People and national politics seemed to become more emotionally engaged with Europe, yet mainly in a negative rather than positive way, e.g. emotional blame attributions to Europe in the national political communication (e.g. Hameleers et al 2017) and wide-spread public Euroscepticism (Lubbers & Jaspers 2011).

Heightened emotionality in regard to the EU is also often put in a relation to the populist upheaval of the last years (Rico et al 2017; Wirz 2018). The anger of populist parties is indeed very often directed at European politics, decisions as well as the whole existence of the EU (Capelos & Katsanidou 2018, Pirro & Taggart 2018). The question, though, is whether they really put the new layer of emotionality to the public European debate or whether it has already been present before, yet more successfully mobilized and capitalized on by the populist political parties. Also, maybe some emotions in particular started to dominate the discourse rather than emotional intensity in general, e.g. populist anger, fear or hate.

To tackle these questions, I analyse the coverage of European Parliament election 2019 in the German online media (in particular, *spiegel.de* and *welt.de*), after the rise of Alternative for Germany (AfD), German new right-wing populist party. Germany is a very suitable example for this research question because it is one of the founding and for a long time one of the most pro-European countries in the EU, yet still could not prevent the success of the anti-European populist party. I will compare media discourses in regard to expressed emotions, their subjects and objects. I will use a method of Discourse Network Analysis (Leifeld 2017) which combines qualitative Discourse and quantitative Social Network

Analysis, in order to better depict the whole media landscape in regard to the European elections. Network approach also allows for a better distinction of most polarizing themes and emotions, as well as assessment of the relations of dominance and exclusion of specific objects and subjects in the medial discourse.



## **Lorenzo Viviani, University of Pisa (Italy)**

Lorenzo Viviani is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. His research focuses on the sociology of political parties, political leadership, democracy, and populism. Among his most recent publications there are books, chapters, and articles on the growth of populism in post-representative democracy with particular reference to the sociological perspective of plebiscitarian leadership.

### **“I’m (not) one of you”: Populist personalisation and charismatic leadership**

The purpose of the paper is to investigate the different paths and the different role of leadership in the transformation from party democracy to leader democracy and audience democracy. It is certainly worth reiterating that not every process of personalization and not every new political cleavage can be linked to populism. Although a large part of the literature on populism tends to equate the populist leadership with the charismatic one, there is however a more recent questioning of the overlapping of the two phenomena. The paper aims to analyse the difference between the populist personalization and the charismatic personalization, not only because of the presence of non-charismatic populisms, but also because of the constitutive difference between the conceptual cores of the two phenomena. If the populist plebiscite democracy is therefore different from the leader democracy, and at the same time it cannot be overlapped on the subtype of democracy with a charismatic leader, then it is necessary to identify a typology of leadership with which to interpret the political style and the politicization strategy of the populist leader. Taking into account the changes in democracy and the emergence of populism, the problem is not whether the leadership is relevant (or not) but what kind of leadership is referred to in a phase of redefining actors and powers of politics. If political personalization modifies the linkage between people and institutions, then the effects of populism on representative democracy are different from those of the transition from party democracy to leader democracy as a development of the Weberian and Schumpeterian perspective.



## **Sabine Volk, Jagiellonian University (Poland)**

Sabine works on her dissertation in the context of the EU-funded Marie-Sklodowska-Curie project “Delayed transformational fatigue in Central and Eastern Europe: Responding to the rise of illiberalism/populism (FATIGUE)”, coordinated by Jan Kubik at University College London (UCL). Her research project explores far-right populist politics of memory as well as the ritualization of counter-hegemonic protest in post-socialist eastern Germany. Specifically, she studies how the Dresden-based “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident” (PEGIDA) mobilize historical memories in the context of the thirtieth anniversaries of the 1989 East German ‘Peaceful Revolution’ and the 1990 German Reunification. Moreover, Sabine is a Doctoral Fellow at the Centre for the Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR).

Prior to her PhD, Sabine obtained two MA’s in European Studies: one from the Erasmus Mundus Programme of Excellence ‘Euroculture’ and one from the College of Europe. Previous places of study and research include Tübingen, Groningen, Strasbourg, Indianapolis and Warsaw.

### **Resisting leftist dictatorship? Memory politics and collective action framing in the far-right populist PEGIDA movement**

Against the backdrop of rising far-right populist politics in Europe and beyond, this article investigates the political culture of the populist far right, focusing on memory politics. Based on a disciplined interpretive case study of the German far-right populist protest movement ‘PEGIDA’, it offers novel empirical insights into uses of memory in far-right populist protest. To this aim, it draws from original ethnographic data generated in PEGIDA’s public protest events in Dresden, which it analyzes through the lens of qualitative-interpretive frame and discourse analysis. The article shows that PEGIDA uses memory to construct the master frame of ‘democratic resistance against totalitarianism/dictatorship’, based on the populist antagonism between ‘the resistant people’ as an in-group and ‘the leftist-totalitarian elites’ as an out-group. In addition, this article makes two important theoretical contributions. Drawing from scholarship on memory politics and the movement-memory nexus, it develops an actor-centered, strategic, and instrumental approach to memory politics as ‘political uses of memory’ in the context of social movements and protest politics. Taking a semiotic approach to (political) culture, it defines memory as a key cultural tool for social movements, specifically in the context of scarce resources. Second, this study contributes to the scholarship on populism and the far right by spelling out the notion of populism as a constructed collective action frame, refining the concept employing the notions of discursive construction of in-group and out-group(s), and demonstrating how both notions are key to understanding ideology in action.

Keywords: ethnography; far-right populism; memory politics; PEGIDA; political culture

## **Marina Vulovic, University of Helsinki (Finland)**

Marina Vulović is a doctoral candidate at the University of Helsinki (2017-2020) funded by the Doctoral programme in Political, Societal and Regional Changes (PSRC). With a BA from the University of Belgrade (Serbia) and an MA from Heidelberg University (Germany), she works and publishes on Serbian-Kosovar relations, post-foundational political thought and statehood theory. She has been a visiting researcher at the University of Oxford (UK), the University of Graz (Austria) and the Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (Germany), and will continue her work as part of the KONE-funded project "Now-Time, Us Space: Hegemonic Mobilisations in Central and Eastern Europe" until the end of 2022.

### **Debating the ontological and ontic dimension of populism**

Populism as a concept is widely contested in current scholarship. While some studies focus on the ideological “core” of populism, others try to investigate how it entangles with other projects, e.g. nationalism. However, fleshing out the meaning of populism as an ontological category, and its manifestations and sedimentations on the ontic level of social and political practice, has been neglected. Building on recent debates between Brubaker and De Cleen and Stavrakakis on the relation between nationalism and populism, we put forward a conception of populism both as an ontological concept and as a “discursive repertoire”. The former is based on Laclau’s (2005) understanding of populism as a political logic that (re-)draws frontiers between “us” and “them”. The latter relies on the specific historic discursive and material sedimentations that De Cleen and Stavrakakis have fleshed out. By doing so, we attempt to bring in more clarity into the concept. We maintain that thinking of populism in its ontological and ontic dimension solves many issues when it comes to debating the “core” of populism – drawing frontiers between “the people” and “the elite”. We argue that populism, as an ontological category, does not essentialize the “us” (the people) and the “them” (the elite). It is more fruitful to conceptualize populism as a political logic with a particular form, not content (Palonen 2020). This means that populism as a logic is necessary for any political project or ideology (democracy, authoritarianism, nationalism, etc.). In turn, populism as an ontic category should be conceptualized in light of De Cleen’s and Stavrakakis’s argument: populism as a “discursive repertoire with its historically sedimented significations” that are anchored by the nodal points of the people and the elite. This has informed much of the way we think about populism today, especially about populism as a family of political parties.



## **Tobias Widmann, European University Institute (Italy)**

I am a PhD Researcher at the European University Institute working on political communication, political psychology, and quantitative text analysis. My thesis focuses on the rhetoric of political parties and their strategic use of emotional language. To trace these emotional appeals, I apply a series of computational text analysis tools including machine learning, word embeddings, and dictionaries. I also study the effects of emotional appeals in politics on polarization, attitudes, and political behavior.

### **Who played down the pandemic? Strategic emotional rhetoric in political communication and its impact on the mass public**

Effective political communication can constitute a key component of pandemic responses. Yet, a comprehensive analysis of party communication during COVID-19 is still missing. To do so, I focus on emotions which play a vital role in influencing attitudes and behavior during pandemics. Based on parties' position in the political arena (government versus populist radical parties) I expect differences in emotional rhetoric and impact on public opinion. To test my hypotheses, I use word embeddings and neural network classifiers to analyze social media messages of political parties in four European countries and more than 100,000 tweets of random samples of citizens in two of these countries. Furthermore, I employ fixed-effects regression models and vector autoregression (VAR) analysis to compare retweet volumes of political messages to emotional expressions in public tweets. Results indicate two main findings, (1) populist radical parties communicate less about the pandemic and strategically downplay the crisis severity by decreasing fear and increasing hope appeals while case number are rising; (2) increased diffusion of populist messages consistently precedes change in citizens' emotional expression about the pandemic. This finding can carry important implications for the level of protective behavior among the population.



## **Jitka Wirthová, Department of Sociology, Institute of Sociological Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague (Czech Republic)**

Jitka Wirthová is a PhD in Sociology at Charles University, Prague. She works in the field of the political sociology of education and knowledge. In her research, she focuses on the formation and relational embeddedness of legitimation practices which perform and are performed in society, and the current transformations of educational and expert knowledge. She has published papers elaborating the relational approach in the sociology of education and reflecting the Czech educational reform with regard to transnationalisation of educational knowledge, destatisation of educational governance, competing knowledge regimes, and the meaning of expertise. She has presented her research on several conferences and currently she is a co-editor of a special issue of the European Educational Research Journal called Return of the nation? Education in an era of rising nationalism and populism. Her research is supported by the Charles University Grant Agency [No. 624218]; and the Specific Academic Research Projects of Charles University [No. 260462].

Recent publications:

Wirthová, Jitka. "Patterns of Actorship in Legitimation of Educational Changes: The Role of Transnational and Local Knowledge." *European Educational Research Journal* (in review process)

Wirthová, Jitka. 2019. "How to Write a Proof: Patterns of Justification in Strategic Documents for Educational Reform". *Theory of Science* 41(2): 307–35. <http://teorievedy.flu.cas.cz/index.php/tv/article/view/488/489>.

Wirthová, Jitka. 2020. "Legitimizing Educational Reforms: Strategic Documents and Competing Knowledge Regimes." *Czech Sociological Review* 56(4):491–521 (<https://doi.org/10.13060/csr.2020.016>).

Wirthová, Jitka. 2019. "Třetí vlna sociologie vzdělávání: Kritický přístup pro globalizovaný i partikularizovaný svět (The Third Wave of the Sociology of Education: An Approach for Globalized and Particularized World)." *Sociální Studia* 16(1):165–84. ([https://journals.muni.cz/socialni\\_studia/article/view/12283/10705](https://journals.muni.cz/socialni_studia/article/view/12283/10705)).

### **Anti-state populism in Czech educational governance: Relations among state, expertise, and civil society**

This presentation is focused on anti-state populism in governing and legitimating education and on different (state and non-state) actors performing and being performed by specific divides. Considering populism as a relational object that comes into existence through different connection to various people-they divides (De Cleen, Stavrakakis 2020), presented research uncovers the conditions for anti-state populist legitimating and governing educational change. The Czech Republic is on the one hand (as some other post-communist countries) dependent on the path of "anti-totalitarian communist state attitude".

On the other, rather specifically, witnesses an increasing expertisation of non-government actors in education who employ mainly transnational knowledge sources.

Identifying conditions for populist anti-statism, illustrated on three cases, I indicate a significant shift away from the politicisation of education as a public issue toward politicisation of education as an effective source and strategic stake, which exclude some actors and definitions (de-pedagogisation) from political debate. I critically examine the consequences of these divides for formerly taken-for-granted actors as are teachers, academic pedagogues and state officials and other actors affected by this divisive process. The specific divides are public-private, expert – non-expert, and fixed-mobile sites of governance divides. Anti-state populism in Czech education is therefore performed and reproduced by these divisions, as something which is deployed in order to have all legitimacy voice, sources, and legitimate claim. By exploring actual relations and cultural politics of these divisions, I will offer an understanding of the crisis in Czech education not as mistake, but as consequences of specific divides as well as coalitions.

Examples from original qualitative researches (Wirthová 2019, 2020) are conceptually embedded in relational sociology (Abbott 2016; Dépelteau 2018) focused on legitimating practices proposing Czech curriculum reform, a claim to re-introduce the civil defence education, and a non-governmental initiative to run teachers' education. The data spans from 2010 to 2020.





## **Karolina Wiśniowska, Jagiellonian University in Kraków (Poland)**

I am an assistant researcher in ERC-funded project Deep uncertainties in bioethics: genetic research, preventive medicine, reproductive decisions (BI UNCERTAINTY) at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków and also a second-year PhD student in Doctoral School in the Humanities, having graduated from law as well as from inter-faculty individual studies in the humanities with specialization in philosophy. My main academic interests are populism and its relations with bioethics, medical policy and human rights. I have published in American Journal of Bioethics, among others.

### **Free speech and the spread of fake news: Moral aspects of appeals to scientific and philosophical discussions in the public debate**

In January 2020 court in G. in case Association for LGBT People T. v. P. Pro-Life Foundation upheld the decision of the first instance to grant precautionary measures by banning the spread of pictures with two naked men and slogans derogative towards the LGBT+ community. P. Pro-Life Foundation argued that its actions realize society's right to information, providing sources which were to support presented theses. Explaining its decision, the court stated that those actions are harmful considering the society's right to information; they present nuanced, multi-faceted social issue in extremely simplified way. The court also made an assessment of P. Pro-Life Foundation's actions as polarising and eliciting extreme emotions. There are several issues one can raise with the stance of P. Pro-Life Foundation. The sources provided by it are outdated, incomplete, methodologically questionable, widely criticized, sometimes simply false; and in best case scenario - the result of „cherry-picking” process. Nonetheless, many people who commit to similar views believe that they are supported by reliable data - or that the contrasting views are unreliable. In modern democratic societies there are many problems with science communication. How science is presented in mass media as well as in social media, how it plays out in politics, finally how it is presented during the educational process - it all can lead to various misconceptions. Banning expression of certain kinds of views because of their unscientific character prima facie does not help (although in those cases it may be important for the physical and mental wellbeing of certain group of people). On the other hand, how far can democratic society go if every view is treated equally, despite it is obvious that regarding every aspect of human knowledge (as well as social issues), there are people who know more about it than others. In my talk, I will consider certain aspects which are crucial to making decisions in cases where free speech is contrasted with wide - and often dangerous - spread of fake news.



## **Reja Wyss, University of Oxford (Switzerland/United Kingdom)**

Reja Wyss is an MPhil student in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford. She previously studied political science and history at the University of Basel where she now is a research associate in comparative politics. She also is a research assistant at the Dahrendorf Programme for the Study of Freedom (led by Prof. Timothy Garton Ash), St Antony's College, where she has mainly worked on European climate change politics and the Fridays For Future movement.

Her main research interests are: populism & “science” (focusing on populist parties in government and different fields of academic research rather than “science” as a broad topic); climate change politics; gender & politics; Central Eastern Europe.

### **(Populist) politics and science: The case of postdoctoral researchers in Poland**

In the age of Covid-19, the failures of politicians of the likes of Donald Trump, Boris Johnson and Jair Bolsonaro, have led to loud voices re-emphasising the previously established negative relationship between populist politics and science. However, recent research on populism and expertise (Caramani, 2017; Bickerton & Invernizzi Acetti, 2018), as well as the multitude of paths populist governed countries have taken in tackling the pandemic (especially once countries beyond the US, the UK and Brazil are included), show that once again, the socio-political realities are more complicated than they would seem to be.

In an attempt to contribute to the emerging research on the relationship between populist politics and (different forms of) science, this paper explores the relationship between the populist PiS government in Poland and scientific research through the lens of Polish female academics. The primary research question asks, how is the participation of female academics in research affected by a (right-wing) populist government? And how does this potentially differ depending on their field of research and the questions they work on? Especially considering that populist politics are often thought of as being “anti-science” and the incumbent Polish government has been described as “anti-gender”. These questions are explored through 20-30 semi-structured interviews with researchers in Poland and connect to research exploring feminist politics under populist governments (Gwiazda, 2020; Kantola & Lombardo, 2020), as well as research looking at populist discourses around science (such as Mede & Schäfer, 2020).



## **Tianhao Yang, Berkshire School (USA)**

Attended Berkshire School since 2018, Tianhao is currently a researcher for its Advanced Humanity Research Program. In the past, Tianhao has written papers about the division between the East and West in the modern world, the rise of nationalism, globalization, etc.

### **How media misinformation worsens political polarisation**

The 2020 United States presidential election smashes the record of the most polarized presidential election in recent decades. According to research from Pew Research Center, around 90% of the surveyed voters express tremendous concerns about the country's direction if their supporting candidate loses. Such polarization is largely attributed to misinformation from both traditional media and social media. The mainstream American press, often with political bias and affiliation, persuasively draws the attention of audiences who are inherently on their side, whilst the algorithm on social media nowadays precisely feeds the users content that they are in favor of. This phenomenon creates ideological bubbles that gather similar opinions and repel differences, with furthers the division and polarization. On the other hand, however, a polarized society provides ripe catalysts for the growth of misinformation. In Francis Fukuyama's Identity and Ezra Klein's Why We're polarized, both authors explain how identity politics is dangerously perpetuating polarization. They mention that in the current American politics, the paranoid division has caused one side to be more desired to see the other lose, even with the sacrifice of their own economic and social interests. With that purpose in mind, politicians and voters tend to make fierce criticism and assaults against their opponents, which creates more intentional and artificial misinformation. This essay, through a study of political posts on Twitter around the 2020 United States election period, will analyze the mutual influence of misinformation and political polarization. Misinformation can only be reduced and resolved when its causes and impacts are well-studied and understood.



## **Can Zengin, Temple University (United States of America)**

I'm a PhD candidate in the Political Science Department at Temple University. I study Comparative Politics with a focus on Political Psychology. My dissertation - Social Emotions in Political Behavior - explores the role of Self-conscious emotions (shame, guilt, pride) in individuals' political behavior, paying particular attention to the effects of psychological biases and causes of affective polarization and right-wing populism.

### **From Shame to Populism: The Role of Pride in Political Attitude**

The connection between individuals' experience of the self-conscious emotions and their emotional response to other's actions may tell us about the rising social distance among different identities and also the rising populist movements. The literature in various fields acknowledge that individuals generate various defense mechanisms to cope with the psychological distress. For example, theories of motivated reasoning (e.g., Cognitive dissonance) posit one solution to how group conflict shapes out-group bias: Individuals develop negative feelings about out-groups to justify/feel better about their in-group. Because shame, unlike guilt, doesn't provide a stress-free environment in times of encountering past transgressions, it often leads the situation with loss of empathy and elicit aggression and violence. In this transformation, I argue that individuals induce "pride" as a conciliator emotion to reduce cognitive dissonance and respond to the psychological strain created by shame. Hence, support for the right-wing populist movements may help individuals to reduce the cognitive dissonance created by feeling ashamed of the self-identity.



## **Ssu-Han Yu, London School of Economics and Political Science (Great Britain)**

Ssu-Han Yu is a PhD candidate at Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). Before studying at the LSE, she was working at National Taiwan University on a risk communications research project funded by Ministry of Science and Technology. However, her research interest has shifted to political communications since her participation in the Sunflower Movement in 2014 and the Anti-black-box Curriculum Movement in 2015. Ssu-Han's PhD thesis examines how democracy and national identity are mediated in Taiwanese society at both inter- and intra-generational levels.

### **Mediating polarisation and populism: An inter-generational analysis**

Drawing on Roger Silverstone's mediation theory, this paper is an analysis of media's role in generational understanding and handling of polarisation and populism in Taiwanese society. Based on 30 peer group conversations with young people aged between 18 and 37 (a total of 116 young participants) and in-depth interviews with 39 parents, it presents how the young and parent generations interpreted and responded to polarisation and populism in similar or different ways.

Both generations blamed legacy media for driving partisan polarisation and considered one another more susceptible to the influence of political parties and partisan media. While both generations developed two counterstrategies to cope with partisan media, namely 'reading and watching more media' and 'making comparison between varied media', these strategies were practiced differently by the respective generation; for example, the young generation used search engines for fact-checking, whereas the parent generation compared and contrasted multiple TV channels. Additionally, since young people commonly went to YouTube for political news and opinion, this paper critically examined YouTubers as a new type of celebrity politicians and reflected on potential repercussions.

Both generations did not associate populism with authenticity but interpreted populist democracy as being 'overly democratic' and 'overly free'. For the parent generation, young people tended to abuse freedom and democracy because they were 'small-self' centred and ignorant of traditional Chinese moral values. Young people were also said to lack deep thinking, being vulnerable to the influence of popular culture, and therefore their use of the Internet and social media for political expression could have a detrimental impact on democracy. The young generation disapproved the parent generation's paternalistic view of freedom and democracy, criticising it as a legacy of authoritarianism. Instead, young people ascribed the problem of populism to 'irrational people' and the Internet anonymity.

## **Dechun Zhang, Leiden University (Netherlands)**

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### **Media use, media trust and nationalism in China during the Covid-19 pandemic**

The COVID-19, as a major public health crisis, has triggered nationalism to different degrees all around the world at different points in time. This study utilizes an online survey including twenty-one choice questions and collects the response from 669 participants to explore the relationship among media use, media trust and nationalism in China during the COVID 19. This study finds mainstream media is more trustworthy than non-mainstream media, and TV is still the dominant news channel for the Chinese to obtain news. Meanwhile, based upon the observation that the level of nationalism is still considerably high in China, the study demonstrates that media use and media trust are both positively correlated to nationalism; however, positive mainstream media trust does not directly affect nationalism. Furthermore, this paper argues that mainstream media is designed by the Chinese government to offer the Chinese an “imagined community” to construct a sense of nationalism with the aim to facilitate the government’s interest. Although digital media challenge mainstream media, they still unconsciously spread daily news to reinforce a sense of banal nationalism. Overall, China’s nationalism is socially constructed by its history and culture, and it shows a feature of trans-party nationalism.



