Optimal collision avoidance in swarms of active Brownian particles

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Collective motion

Flocking





Common approach:

Observation

Optimization approach:

Mazzolini, A., & Celani, A. (2020). Generosity, selfishness and exploitation as optimal greedy strategies for resource sharing. Journal of theoretical biology, 485, 110041. Pezzotta, A., Adorisio, M., & Celani, A. (2018). Chemotaxis emerges as the optimal solution to cooperative search games. Physical Review E, 98(4), 042401.

Living organisms

Schooling

Swarming

Goals/biological role

Goals

Game theory Machine learning **Optimal behaviours**

Collective motion



Reinforcemente learning

Optimal control

Robots

kilobots. Source: wikipedia. Author: asuscreative

Biomimetic algorithm

Our model: a system of N active brownian particles in 2D



$$d\mathbf{x}_{i} = u_{0} \mathbf{n}(\theta_{i}) dt$$

$$d\theta_{i} = f_{i}(\mathbf{x}_{i}, \theta_{i}; \{\mathbf{x}_{j}, \theta_{j}\}_{j \neq i}) dt + \sqrt{2D} dt$$

$$\langle \xi_{i} \rangle = 0 \qquad \langle \xi_{i}(t) \xi_{j}(t') \rangle = \delta_{ij} \delta(t - t')$$



- $u_0 = \text{Linear velocity}$
- f = Control
- θ_i = Heading direction



Avoiding collisions: an optimization problem with a tradeoff





General second order expansion in even harmonics of a general cost

 $G_{ij} = \delta(\mathbf{x}_i - \mathbf{x}_j) g(\theta_{ij})$

Use control f_i to avoid collisions

BUT... **Control cost**

$$Y_i = \alpha f_i^2 / 2$$









Cost Interpretation

1) Cognitive cost \star

2) Power dissipation \star

3) Mechanical constraints

************* Ullmo, D., Swiecicki, I., & Gobron, T. (2019). Quadratic mean field games. Physics Reports, 799, 1-35. Todorov, E. (2009). Efficient computation of optimal actions. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences, 106(28), 11478-11483. Dvijotham, K., & Todorov, E. (2011). A unified theory of linearly solvable optimal control. Artificial Intelligence (UAI), 1.

Quadratic control costs

Control f_i

 $d\theta_i = f_i(\mathbf{x}_i, \theta_i; \{\mathbf{x}_i, \theta_j\}_{j \neq i}) dt + \sqrt{2D} d\xi_i$

★ Quadratic costs: a theoretically sound choice

$$Y_{i} = \alpha f_{i}^{2}/2$$

$$\sqrt{D dt}$$

$$\theta$$

$$\theta$$

$$\theta$$

$$\theta$$

$$\theta$$

 $P_{f}(\theta + d\theta, t + dt | \theta, t) \propto \exp(-(d\theta - dt f)^{2}/(2Ddt))$

$$\begin{aligned} P_0(\theta + d\theta, t + dt | \theta, t) \propto \exp(-d\theta^2 / (2Ddt)) \\ D[P_f || P_0] &= \int d\theta P_0 \log(P_f / P_0) \approx dt \, \frac{f^2}{2D} \end{aligned}$$

Kullbak-Leibler distance from uncontrolled dynamics





$X, \Theta = \{x_i\}, \{\theta_i\}$

Dvijotham, K., & Todorov, E. (2011) Artificial Intelligence (UAI), 1.





Constrained minimization with a tradeoff

$$\mathscr{H} = C + \lambda \left(1 - \int dX \, d\Theta \right)$$

Stationarity w.r.t. λ

Stationarity w.r.t. Φ

Stationarity w.r.t. P

Stationarity w.r.t. f_i

Equation for Φ can be linearized and reduces to a *many body quantum problem*: as typical in quadratic mean-field games





1) Agent-wise factorization $P(\{\boldsymbol{x}_i, \theta_i\}_{i=1}^N) = \prod p(\boldsymbol{x}_i, \theta_i)$ 1 = 1Strong hypothesis: agents have to base their behaviour on collective observables



Mean field cost and self-interaction

 $C = \int d\theta \ \rho(\theta) \ \left[\frac{\delta}{2} [g_0 - g_1 \mathbf{n}(\theta) \cdot \langle \mathbf{n} \rangle] + \frac{\alpha}{2} f^2 \right]$ Collision

 $\boldsymbol{m}\,\boldsymbol{n}(\bar{\theta}) = \left[\,d\theta\,\,\boldsymbol{n}(\theta)\,\rho(\theta) = \langle \boldsymbol{n} \rangle\,\right]$

Without loss of generality (rotational invariance) $\theta = 0$



Self-interaction with Average polarization

 $\boldsymbol{n}(\theta) \cdot \langle \boldsymbol{n} \rangle = \boldsymbol{m} \cos(\theta - \bar{\theta})$

 $\boldsymbol{m} = \int d\theta \, \cos(\theta) \, \rho(\theta)$





Self consistent formulation

 $\mathcal{H} = C + \lambda \left(1 - \left[d\theta \, \rho \right] \right) - \left[d\theta \, \Phi(\theta) \, \mathcal{L} \, \rho(\theta) \right]$

Hopf-Cole transformation



linearized Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equation



Mathieu equation and self-consistency condition



We need a real and positive solution -> ground state eigenfunction



$$\frac{\lambda}{D} + \frac{\delta m g_1}{2D} \cos \theta \bigg] Z + D \frac{d^2}{d\theta^2} Z = 0$$

LJB equation = Schroedinger equation for *quantum pendulum* - the Mathieu equation -

with "energy" $E = -\lambda/4D$ and eigenfunction Z

Mathieu equation and self-consistency condition

Mathieu eq. standard notation $[a(q)-q \cos(2y)] Z + Z'' = 0$ $y = \theta/2$ $y = \in [-\pi/2, \pi/2]$

Mathieu equation: both eigenvalue a = a(q) and eigenfunction $Z_{a(m)}(\theta)$ are known The ground state is symmetric and depends on *m*

$$m = \int d\theta \, Z_{q(m)}^2(\theta)$$



sistency equation:

 $\mathcal{F}(\theta) =: \mathcal{F}_{k}(m)$ $\eta \sim \gamma$





Universal behaviour in the tradeoff parameter



Solution: 2nd order phase transition





Critical region: perturbative result in small m

Critical point $h \rightarrow h_c^+ = 2$

$$m \approx \sqrt{(4/7)(h - h_c)}$$

$$Z(\theta) \approx \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \left[1 + \frac{h m(h)}{2} \cos \theta \right]$$

$$f \approx -D h_c m \sin(\theta) \quad \text{Sinusoidal reg}$$

$$C - C_0 \approx -(D^2/7)(h - h_c)^2$$







The sinusoidal approximation and Vicsek model



Sinusoidal control in both asymptotic cases: Is it true in general?

Sinusoidal control corresponds to approximation of kinetic regime of stochastic Vicsek model



 $f \approx -Rm \sin(\theta)$





Peruani, F., Deutsch, A., & Bär, M. (2008). The European Phys. Journal Special Topics, 157(1), 111-122. Vicsek T and Zafeiris A 2012 Phys. Rep. 517 71–140 Ginelli F 2016 Eur. Phys. J. Spec. Top. 225 2099-2117 Chepizhko A and Kulinskii V 2010 Physica A 389 5347–5352 Chepizhko A and Kulinskii V 2009 The kinetic regime of the vicsek model AIP Conf. Proc. vol 1198 pp 25–33

The sinusoidal approximation and stochastic Vicsek model (kinetic regime)

$$dx_{i} = u_{0} n(\theta_{i}) dt$$

$$d\theta_{i} = f_{i} dt + \sqrt{2D} d\xi_{i}$$

$$\langle \xi_{i} \rangle = 0 \quad \langle \xi_{i}(t) \xi_{j}(t') \rangle = \delta_{ij} \delta(t - \theta_{i})$$

$$f_{i} \propto n(\theta_{i}) \times \sum_{j \in [i]} n(\theta_{j})$$

$$\sum_{i \in [i]} n(\theta_{i}) \approx \delta \pi A^{2} m n(\bar{\theta}) = 0$$

 $f_i = -DRm \sin(\theta - \theta)$

 $\in l$



Optimal vs sinusoidal control

Optimal control

Minimize $\cot C$ by choosing $\operatorname{control} f$ amongst *all possible* control functional shapes

Best sinusoidal control

Find K such that control $f = -DKsin(\theta)$ Minimizes cost



$$\left(-KD\sin\theta - D\frac{d}{d\theta}\right)\rho_s = 0$$

 $\rho_s \propto \exp(-K\cos(\theta))$

 $\mathbf{u}\mathbf{v}$

Von-Mises







Same exponent $\gamma = 1/2$ and h_c but different prefactors β : prefactor is a **third order** effect



Critical point Critical point $h \rightarrow h_c^+ = 2$

(1/2)
$$(h-2)$$
 Vs $m_{opt} \approx \sqrt{(4/7)} (h - m \approx \beta (h - h_c)^{\gamma}$

Identical controls up to redefinition of m as a function of h $f = -2Dm_{opt/sin}\sin(\theta)$ Cost discrepancy





Strong coupling: gaussian case

 $h \gg h_c = 2$

Polarization and costs match at leading order:

Differences in probability density peak around $h \approx 8$



General comparison

Differences in control increase with h



We should look at costs



Cost comparison: optimal vs best sinusoidal control

For any given h, the difference ΔC can become arbitrarily large

but

What about relative cost $\Delta C/C$? No universal behaviour: $\Delta C/C$ Depends on g_0

$$C_{coll} = (\delta D^2/2) [g_0 - m^2 g_1]$$

Two notable cases:

1) pure alignment reward: $g_0 = 0$ $\max(\Delta C/C) = -1/8 \text{ at } h = 0$ 2) pure collision: $g_0 = g_1$ $\max(\Delta C/C) \approx -.02$ at $h \approx 4.8$

Optimal solution vs sinusoidal model Summary



Equivalence up to redefinition of *m* $m_{sin} \approx \sqrt{(1/2)(h-2)}$ $m_{opt} \approx \sqrt{(4/7)(h-2)}$

Equivalence at leading order

Relative cost differences are always small in realistic scenarios

Conclusion

- Optimal control theory or mean field game formalism -> promising framework for collective behaviours
- Exact mean field solution -> critical behaviour 2) Remarkably Vicsek-like (sinusoidal) interaction close to optimal control, at 3)
- least in the mean field formulation.

- Beyond mean field
- Different dynamics 2)
- Beyond spatial homogeneity 3)

Outlook

Thank you for your attention